The Congolese are ungrateful to Burundi:
Burundi's military intervention against Rwanda-M23 aggression and its marginalisation in the Washington Accords
Explanatory note: This document analyses Burundi's military intervention to defend the DRC against Rwandan and M23 aggression (2022-2025), and the systematic marginalisation of Bujumbura in the resulting regional agreements. The expression "The Congolese are ungrateful" refers to the Congolese government's inability to recognise and defend its principal military ally in negotiations it itself initiated.
Executive summary
The aggression: Since March 2022, Rwanda has militarily supported the M23 with up to 12,000 troops (according to the UN). In January-February 2025, this offensive culminated in the capture of Goma and Bukavu, displacing 400,000 people.
Burundi's response: Burundi deployed over 10,000 soldiers to defend the DRC (October 2023-February 2025). President Tshisekedi acknowledged that only Burundian forces actually fought the M23.
The DRC's appeal to Washington: Facing the crisis, Tshisekedi appealed to the United States (February-March 2025), offering access to critical minerals in exchange for American security assistance.
The result: The Washington Accord (27 June 2025) completely marginalised Burundi. Rwanda obtained a privileged partner position with tripartite agreements (DRC-Rwanda-USA) and bilateral agreements (USA-Rwanda). Burundi was excluded from everything.
Rwanda's refusal: In September 2025, Rwanda maintains its troops in the DRC despite the agreement. No consequences. Economic agreements continue.
The verdict: The country that aggresses (Rwanda) is rewarded. The country that defends (Burundi) is punished. This injustice results from the Congolese government's inability to defend its allies.
1. The Rwanda-M23 aggression: Context and scale (2022-2025)
1.1. The resurgence of M23 with massive Rwandan support
The March 23 Movement (M23), a Congolese Tutsi rebel group, was militarily defeated in 2013 after an initial occupation of Goma in 2012. In March 2022, the M23 took up arms again with unprecedented Rwandan support.
Documented evidence of Rwandan support:
- December 2024: The UN estimated 4,000 Rwandan soldiers in the DRC assisting the M23
- March 2025: This figure reached 12,000 Rwandan troops according to UN estimates
- Command: The UN Group of Experts Report identified senior Rwandan officers directing operations: James Kabarebe (Minister of Regional Cooperation and former RDF Chief of Staff), General Vincent Nyakarundi (RDF Chief of Staff), General Patrick Karuretwa (President of Rwanda's High Military Court)
- Logistics: The RDF (Rwanda Defence Force) established headquarters one kilometre from the Congolese border to coordinate operations
1.2. The January-February 2025 offensive: The culmination
21 January 2025: M23 captured Minova (South Kivu), cutting the supply route to Goma.
23 January 2025: M23 cut all road connections to Goma.
25 January 2025: M23 entered Goma. The DRC severed diplomatic relations with Rwanda and recalled its diplomatic staff from Kigali.
26 January 2025: M23 broke through defence lines and occupied Goma.
30 January 2025: Goma was entirely under M23/Rwanda control.
5 February 2025: M23 captured Nyabibwe (between Goma and Bukavu).
16 February 2025: Bukavu fell to M23.
Offensive toll:
- Over 400,000 people displaced
- M23/Rwanda control over both provincial capitals (Goma and Bukavu)
- Control of strategic mining areas: Rubaya (coltan), Nyabibwe, Kitchanga
- Control of Kavumu airport
- 70 bound bodies found in a church in Mayba (Bukavu suburb)
- Executions of children by M23 (unverified number)
1.3. International accusation: Rwanda identified as aggressor
21 February 2025: The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2773 explicitly calling on Rwanda to cease its support for M23 and withdraw its forces from the DRC.
International positions:
- United States: Recognises Rwandan military support for M23
- European Union: Condemns Rwandan aggression
- African Union: Calls for M23 withdrawal to prevent DRC's "balkanisation"
- MONUSCO: Documents the "critical" role of Rwandan military support in M23's campaign
Rwanda, despite these accusations, continues to officially deny any direct military involvement.
2. Burundi's intervention: The only force actually fighting
2.1. Massive deployment (October 2023 - February 2025)
Facing the M23 offensive, Burundi responded to the DRC's call by deploying substantial forces within the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) framework.
September 2023: Burundi formalised its military cooperation with the DRC, becoming Kinshasa's principal regional ally.
October 2023: Beginning of the deployment of over 10,000 Burundian soldiers in eastern DRC.
Deployment zones:
- Fizi and Uvira High and Medium Plateaus (5 battalions)
- Defence of Bukavu (5,000 to 6,000 soldiers)
- Kalehe, Kamanyola, vicinity of Kavumu airport
- South Kivu and border with Burundi
Command: General Pontien Hakizimana (alias "Mingi"), leading a regiment composed of four brigades.
2.2. President Tshisekedi's recognition: Only Burundi actually fights
May 2025: President Félix Tshisekedi made a revealing public statement:
"The Burundian army is the only one operating against armed groups amongst all the East African Community forces deployed in eastern DRC since late 2022."
Tshisekedi added:
"There is a sort of collaboration between the EAC force and the M23 terrorists. Proof of this is the intervention of the Burundians when M23 terrorists began illegally levying taxes in the territories they occupied."
What this statement means:
- Other EAC forces (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, South Sudan) are not actively fighting M23
- Only Burundian forces militarily oppose M23
- The Congolese president himself recognises that Burundi is his only true military ally
2.3. The cost of Burundi's commitment
Military losses
Whilst official figures are not public, Burundian military sources confirm substantial losses during combat against M23 and Rwandan forces.
Critical logistical problems
February 2025: A senior Burundian army officer told AFP:
"Since yesterday, the army has accelerated the extraction of our soldiers deployed in the Rusizi plain in the DRC."
"Soldiers in the DRC face serious resupply issues, due to 'disorganised' Congolese forces. Burundian soldiers are 'totally lost', without ammunition, without food and must manage on their own."
Forced withdrawal: In February 2025, the majority of Burundian troops withdrew due to lack of logistical support. Approximately 3,000 soldiers remained deployed versus 10,000+ initially.
Humanitarian burden
January-February 2025: Following the fall of Goma and Bukavu, approximately 30,000 Congolese refugees fled to Burundi.
6 February 2025: Burundi temporarily closed its border with the DRC facing the massive influx.
UNHCR declared it to be "the largest refugee wave Burundi has seen since the early 2000s."
Refugee conditions: Congolese refugees in Burundi face difficult conditions – lack of food, shelter, blankets. Burundi, a poor country, struggles to manage this influx without significant international aid.
Economic costs
- Deployment and maintenance of 10,000+ soldiers
- Lost or damaged military equipment
- Unreimbursed logistical expenses
- Hosting 30,000 refugees
- Cross-border economic disruptions
No international compensation has been paid to Burundi for these costs.
2.4. DRC-Burundi bilateral cooperation: An alliance on paper
August 2024: Signing of a bilateral military agreement between the DRC and Burundi in Kinshasa.
22 December 2024: President Tshisekedi travelled to Bujumbura to meet his counterpart Évariste Ndayishimiye. Both presidents reaffirmed their solidarity against M23 aggression supported by Rwanda. Burundi, according to the communiqué, "firmly supports the DRC in this conflict."
The paradox: These bilateral agreements and verbal recognition do not translate into concrete logistical support for Burundian forces nor inclusion in major international negotiations.
3. The Congolese initiative with Washington: The process that marginalises Burundi
3.1. Tshisekedi's appeal to the United States
Facing the military collapse of January-February 2025, President Tshisekedi took the initiative to appeal to American power.
February 2025: Tshisekedi sent a letter to President Donald Trump, offering his administration privileged access to the DRC's critical minerals (cobalt, coltan, copper) in exchange for American security assistance.
March 2025: Tshisekedi formalised his offer to the United States.
March 2025: Massad Boulos, a businessman who served as Middle East adviser on Trump's transition team, was appointed to the US State Department to mediate the DRC conflict.
What this means: It was the DRC that initiated the process leading to the Washington Accords. This was not an external imposition. Tshisekedi voluntarily appealed to Washington and offered mineral resources as currency.
3.2. The negotiation process: Systematic exclusion of Burundi
25 April 2025: First meeting in Washington between the foreign ministers of the DRC (Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner) and Rwanda (Olivier Nduhungirehe), in the presence of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
A "Declaration of Principles" was adopted, calling for respect for territorial integrity, addressing legitimate security concerns, and economic cooperation on critical minerals.
Who is at the table?
- DRC
- Rwanda
- United States
- Qatar (co-mediator)
Who is absent?
- Burundi – despite 10,000 deployed soldiers and Tshisekedi's recognition as sole fighting ally
- Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda (other EAC members)
- Angola (historical mediator of the Luanda process)
19 June 2025: Signing of a preliminary peace agreement.
27 June 2025: Signing of the definitive Peace Agreement between the DRC and Rwanda in Washington.
3.3. The Washington Accord content: An architecture that excludes the defender
Security provisions:
- Withdrawal of Rwandan forces from the DRC within 90 days
- The DRC must cease all support for the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)
- Creation of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) between DRC and Rwanda
- Harmonisation of a plan for FDLR neutralisation
Economic provisions:
- Establishment of a regional economic integration framework centred on critical minerals
- US involvement in this economic framework
- DRC-Rwanda cooperation on exploitation and trade of strategic resources
The fundamental problem:
This agreement treats Rwanda – the aggressor identified by the UN – as an equal party to the DRC. It even offers it a privileged position in the economic exploitation of eastern Congolese minerals. Burundi, which defended the DRC militarily, is not mentioned anywhere.
3.4. USA-Rwanda bilateral agreements: Double legitimisation of the aggressor
Beyond the tripartite DRC-Rwanda-USA accord, the United States and Rwanda signed parallel bilateral agreements covering:
- Economic cooperation
- Strategic minerals
- Regional security
The amplified injustice:
Rwanda thus obtains double legitimisation:
- As an equal party to the DRC in the tripartite peace accord
- As a direct partner of the United States in bilateral agreements
Rwanda moves from aggressor status (UN Resolution 2773) to privileged economic and security partner of the world's leading power.
Burundi has access to none of these frameworks.
3.5. The DRC's failure to defend its ally
What the Congolese government should have done:
- Demand Burundi's participation as a precondition for any negotiation
- Insist that the economic framework on minerals include Burundi which shares 233km of border with South Kivu
- Make any agreement with Rwanda conditional on respect for territorial integrity AND recognition of Burundi's contribution
- Use the presence of 10,000 Burundian soldiers as diplomatic leverage
What the Congolese government did:
- Passively accepted the exclusion of its principal military ally
- Negotiated directly with its aggressor without including its defender
- Signed an economic cooperation framework with Rwanda whilst continuing to fight it militarily
- Allowed the United States to establish privileged bilateral relations with Rwanda
The result: Burundi was betrayed not by its enemy, but by the country it was defending.
4. Rwanda's refusal to respect the agreement: Total impunity
4.1. September 2025: Rwanda remains in the DRC
The 27 June 2025 accord provided for Rwandan forces' withdrawal within 90 days, i.e. before end-September 2025.
September 2025 reality:
- Rwandan troops are still present on Congolese soil
- M23 still controls Goma and Bukavu
- M23 still controls strategic mining areas (Rubaya, Nyabibwe, Kitchanga)
- No withdrawal has begun
- Implementation of the agreement is completely stalled
4.2. Absence of consequences
American reaction: No sanctions against Rwanda
Reaction to USA-Rwanda bilateral agreements: No suspension
Reaction to economic cooperation framework: Discussions continue normally
DRC's reaction: The DRC states that no economic cooperation with Rwanda is possible until its troops withdraw – but no concrete action is taken
Burundi's position: Still excluded from all mechanisms, despite Rwanda demonstrating it does not respect agreements
4.3. The message sent: The effectiveness of aggression
The clear geopolitical lesson:
If you are an aggressor with good diplomatic apparatus:
- You can militarily occupy a sovereign country
- Obtain a seat at the negotiating table as an equal party
- Sign advantageous economic agreements
- Establish bilateral partnerships with great powers
- Violate these agreements without consequences
- Continue to benefit from all economic and diplomatic advantages
If you are a loyal defender:
- You sacrifice lives and resources
- You are excluded from negotiations
- You receive no compensation
- You must withdraw your troops for lack of support
- You host refugees without international aid
- You remain marginalised even when the aggressor violates agreements
This system reverses all normal incentives in international relations and guarantees the perpetuation of conflicts.
5. The injustice table: Rwanda vs Burundi
Complete comparative table
| Criterion | RWANDA (Aggressor) | BURUNDI (Defender) |
|---|---|---|
| Military role 2022-2025 | Deployment of 12,000 soldiers to support M23 | Deployment of 10,000+ soldiers to fight M23 |
| UN position | Accused of aggression by Resolution 2773 | Recognised as stabilisation partner |
| Tshisekedi recognition | Designated as supporter of M23 "terrorism" | "Only force actually fighting M23" |
| Territorial control | Indirect control of Goma, Bukavu, mining areas via M23 | No territorial control in DRC |
| Direct economic benefits | Hundreds of millions USD/year via mining exploitation (Rubaya, Nyabibwe) | Massive uncompensated military and logistical costs |
| Costs assumed | None – exploitation generates profits | Deployment, equipment, munitions, unreimbursed food |
| Refugees | No Congolese refugees hosted | 30,000+ Congolese refugees hosted |
| Washington Accord participation | Principal party to negotiations | Not invited, completely excluded |
| Bilateral agreements with USA | Yes – privileged agreements signed | No – no agreements |
| Economic cooperation framework | Privileged partner on critical minerals | Excluded despite 233km border with South Kivu |
| Accord compliance (Sept. 2025) | Total violation – troops maintained | N/A – not party to agreement it should have signed |
| Consequences of non-compliance | None – agreements continue normally | N/A |
| Final diplomatic position | Legitimised as indispensable regional actor | Marginalised as peripheral actor |
| International recognition | USA partner in regional framework | No international recognition |
| Net benefits | Enormous: economic gains + political legitimisation + privileged partnerships | Negative: military losses + economic costs + refugee burden + diplomatic exclusion |
The table's verdict: Aggression is rewarded, defence is punished
This table reveals a perverse logic whereby:
- The country destabilising the DRC obtains diplomatic recognition and economic opportunities
- The country defending the DRC obtains marginalisation, uncompensated costs and exclusion
This complete inversion of normal principles of international justice demonstrates that the current system:
- Rewards manipulative diplomatic effectiveness rather than real contribution
- Favours those who violate international law if they have good influence networks
- Ignores those who sacrifice to defend another state's sovereignty
- Creates perverse incentives that encourage future aggression.
6. The causes of this injustice: Congolese institutional weakness
6.1. Chronic diplomatic incapacity
The Congolese government suffers from structural institutional weakness explaining this injustice:
Paralysing diplomatic dependence
- The DRC never pilots its own negotiations
- It passively accepts priorities of external mediators (USA, Qatar)
- It did not demand Burundi's inclusion as a precondition
Absence of coherent strategic vision
- Signs bilateral agreements with Burundi (August 2024, December 2024)
- Then negotiates economic frameworks with Rwanda without involving Burundi
- This incoherence reveals the absence of coordination within the governmental apparatus
Capture by private interests
- Eastern DRC economic elites have lucrative business relations with Rwanda
- These cross-border networks influence governmental decisions
- Personal profit takes precedence over national interest or ally loyalty
Absence of institutional memory
- The government forgets its partners' sacrifices
- Burundian contribution (10,000 soldiers, Tshisekedi recognition) weighs nothing in decisions
6.2. Vulnerability to Western pressures
The United States and European Union have historically favoured Rwanda as a regional partner, perceived as:
- Stable and modern
- Economically effective
- Reliable ally (despite aggression accusations)
The DRC, dependent on international aid, struggles to resist these orientations. It follows American priorities even when they contradict its strategic interests.
6.3. Diplomatic abandonment of Burundi: A symptom of incompetence
The fact that the DRC did not demand Burundi's presence at Washington negotiations illustrates fundamental incapacity.
A strong sovereign state would have:
- Made its participation conditional on inclusion of all its military allies
- Used Burundian deployment as diplomatic leverage
- Refused any economic agreement with Rwanda without Burundi's inclusion
The Congolese government:
- Passively accepted the architecture proposed by Washington
- Allowed its principal ally's exclusion
- Signed agreements with its aggressor
This is not malevolence – it is institutionalised incompetence.
7. Rwanda's benefits: How the aggressor profits from conflict
7.1. Direct economic benefits
Mining exploitation via M23
- Control of Rubaya (one of the world's largest coltan sources)
- Control of Nyabibwe and other strategic mining areas
- Export of Congolese minerals as Rwandan production
- Estimate: hundreds of millions of dollars annually
Commercial intermediary position
- Obligatory transit of numerous Congolese products via Rwanda
- Customs duties and transit fees
- Commercial margins on DRC-international markets exchanges
7.2. Diplomatic and strategic benefits
International legitimisation
- The Washington Accord places Rwanda on an equal footing with the DRC
- For a country accused of aggression by the UN, this is a major diplomatic victory
- Rwanda moves from aggressor to indispensable partner
Privileged access to economic frameworks
- Regional integration framework on critical minerals
- Partnerships with American investors
- Central position in future regional economic projects
Strengthening of regional influence
- Seat at major negotiating tables
- Influence on regional security and economic decisions
- Consolidation of status as indispensable regional power
7.3. Absence of costs for aggression
No sanctions for:
- Deployment of 12,000 soldiers on Congolese territory
- Occupation of Goma and Bukavu
- Military support for M23
- Documented violations of international law
No consequences for:
- Violation of Washington Accord (non-withdrawal in September 2025)
- Maintenance of military occupation
- Continuation of Congolese resources exploitation
Net result: Rwanda wins on all fronts – massive economic gains, diplomatic legitimisation, increased regional influence, privileged international partnerships, and no cost for its aggression.
8. Consequences of this injustice: Threats to regional stability
8.1. Disincentive to loyal cooperation
Fundamental question: Why would a country sacrifice its resources to help the DRC if this commitment translates into no recognition?
Burundi has learnt that:
- Deploying 10,000 soldiers leads to no recognition
- Hosting 30,000 refugees generates no aid
- Being recognised by Tshisekedi as only true ally guarantees no inclusion
- Military and economic sacrifices translate into no benefits
Consequence: Future potential DRC allies will think twice before committing.
8.2. Encouragement of aggressive opportunism
Lesson learnt by regional actors: Military aggression with good diplomatic apparatus leads to:
- International recognition
- Advantageous economic agreements
- Partnerships with great powers
- Impunity even when violating agreements
Consequence: This system incentivises destabilisation rather than cooperation.
8.3. Weakening of Congolese institutional credibility
How to take seriously a government that:
- Does not defend its allies
- Rewards its adversaries
- Forgets its partners' sacrifices
- Cannot honour its bilateral commitments in multilateral forums
Consequence: The DRC loses all credibility as a reliable regional partner.
8.4. Risk of definitive marginalisation of Burundi
If Burundi remains excluded from regional frameworks:
- Loss of economic opportunities (South Kivu minerals, commercial corridors)
- Progressive geopolitical isolation
- Frustration potentially leading to destabilising decisions
- Potential rupture of future cooperation with the DRC
Consequence: A marginalised Burundi is not just an injustice – it is a security vulnerability for the entire region.
9. Urgent recommendations: How to correct this injustice
9.1. Immediate inclusion of Burundi in all regional frameworks
Required actions:
- Reopening of the Washington Accord to formally integrate Burundi as a signatory party
- Inclusion of Burundi in the regional economic integration framework on critical minerals, particularly for South Kivu with which it shares 233km of border
- Integration of Burundi into the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) in recognition of its military contribution
- USA-Burundi bilateral agreements similar to those signed with Rwanda, to balance partnerships
9.2. Official recognition of Burundian contribution
Required actions:
- Official Congolese government statement publicly recognising Burundian sacrifice and apologising for exclusion
- Financial compensation for military, logistical and humanitarian costs assumed by Burundi
- Medal or distinction for Burundian forces who fought in the DRC
- Memorial to Burundian soldiers fallen defending Congolese sovereignty
9.3. Conditionality of agreements with Rwanda
Required actions:
- Immediate suspension of all economic cooperation frameworks with Rwanda whilst its troops remain on Congolese territory
- Firm conditionality: No economic agreement with Rwanda without complete withdrawal AND Burundi's inclusion
- Targeted sanctions against Rwandan officials identified by the UN as directing military operations in the DRC
- Review of USA-Rwanda bilateral agreements to include sanction mechanisms in case of violation
9.4. Institutional strengthening of Congolese government
Required actions:
- Reform of diplomatic apparatus to develop autonomous negotiation capacity
- Inter-ministerial coordination to ensure coherence between bilateral agreements and multilateral positions
- Anti-corruption to reduce influence of private business networks on governmental decisions
- Diplomatic training so Congolese negotiators can firmly defend national interests and strategic alliances
9.5. Verification and enforcement mechanisms
Required actions:
- Independent international monitoring of Rwandan forces withdrawal with publication of monthly reports
- Automatic sanctions mechanism in case of withdrawal deadline non-compliance
- Freezing of economic agreements as soon as a violation is confirmed
- Increased role for the African Union and EAC to guarantee that all concerned member states are included in regional processes.
10. Conclusion: Congolese ingratitude and the urgency of justice
The record of a flagrant injustice
Burundi's military intervention to defend the DRC against Rwanda-M23 aggression represents one of the most substantial commitments by an African country for another's sovereignty in recent history:
- Over 10,000 soldiers deployed
- Only force actually fighting M23 according to President Tshisekedi himself
- Massive military losses and logistical costs
- 30,000+ Congolese refugees hosted
- Forced withdrawal due to lack of support
The Congolese government's response to this sacrifice:
- Total exclusion from Washington Accords
- No inclusion in regional economic frameworks
- No compensation for costs assumed
- No organised international recognition
- Diplomatic abandonment in favour of Rwanda, the aggressor
The double betrayal: Congolese initiative that marginalises its own ally
The injustice is amplified by the fact that it was the DRC itself that initiated the process leading to this marginalisation. By appealing to Washington (February-March 2025) and offering access to critical minerals, Tshisekedi triggered negotiations he could not control.
Result: The process initiated by the Congo to solve its security problem resulted in:
- Legitimising Rwanda (tripartite and bilateral agreements)
- Excluding Burundi (no participation)
- Rewarding the aggressor (privileged economic frameworks)
- Punishing the defender (total marginalisation)
Rwandan impunity: The price of Congolese weakness
In September 2025, Rwanda maintains its troops on Congolese territory despite the 27 June accord providing for withdrawal within 90 days. No consequences. Economic agreements continue. USA-Rwanda bilateral partnerships remain in force.
Meanwhile, Burundi remains excluded, its troops had to withdraw for lack of support, and it continues hosting 30,000 refugees without international aid.
The message is clear: In the current system, well-executed diplomatic aggression leads to success. Loyalty and sacrifice lead to abandonment.
Why "the Congolese are ungrateful"
This expression does not aim to stigmatise the Congolese people. It names a geopolitical reality: the Congolese government's chronic inability to:
- Honour its alliances
- Recognise its partners' sacrifices
- Defend its allies in international negotiations
- Coordinate its bilateral commitments with its multilateral positions
This ingratitude is not malevolence – it is the symptom of institutional weakness:
- Paralysing diplomatic dependence
- Absence of strategic vision
- Capture by private interests
- Vulnerability to external pressures
A system that guarantees perpetuation of conflicts
The current architecture creates perverse incentives:
It rewards:
- Military aggression (Rwanda: privileged partner)
- Violation of agreements (no consequences for non-withdrawal)
- Exploitation of others' resources (minerals via M23)
- Diplomatic manipulation (effective lobbying)
It punishes:
- Military loyalty (Burundi excluded despite 10,000 soldiers)
- Humanitarian sacrifice (30,000 refugees without recognition)
- Diplomatic honesty (absence of lobbying penalised)
- Respect for principles (defending sovereignty brings nothing)
Inevitable consequence: This system guarantees conflicts will continue. Why choose loyal cooperation if it leads to exclusion? Why not opt for aggression if it opens Washington's doors?
The urgency of rebalancing
Without immediate correction of this injustice, any pretence of lasting peace in the Great Lakes will remain illusory.
Three imperative actions:
- Retroactive inclusion of Burundi in all regional frameworks – Washington Accords, economic cooperation, security mechanisms
- Firm conditionality: Suspension of all economic agreements with Rwanda until complete withdrawal of its troops AND Burundi's inclusion
- Institutional strengthening of the DRC so it can defend its alliances and pilot its own negotiations
Final verdict
Burundi has been faithful. The DRC has been ungrateful. Rwanda has been rewarded. This dynamic must cease.
A system that rewards aggression and punishes loyalty is not a peace system – it is a system that guarantees conflicts will continue indefinitely.
Burundi deserves better than this marginalisation. The DRC deserves a government capable of defending its allies. The Great Lakes region deserves a peace architecture founded on justice, not opportunism.
The injustice done to Burundi is not a diplomatic detail – it is the symptom of a dysfunctional regional system where the weakness of the Congolese state allows aggression to be rewarded and loyalty punished.
Without justice for Burundi, there will be no peace in the Great Lakes.
Principal references
Official documents and UN reports
- United States Department of State (27 June 2025). Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda. https://www.state.gov/peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda
- UN Security Council (21 February 2025). Resolution 2773 - Call for Rwanda to cease support for M23.
- MONUSCO (2024-2025). Reports on security situation in DRC. Estimates: 4,000 Rwandan soldiers (Dec. 2024) → 12,000 (March 2025).
- UN Group of Experts on DRC (2024). Report on Rwandan military support to M23. Identification of Rwandan commanders.
- UNHCR (February 2025). Burundi Refugee Situation Update. 30,000+ Congolese refugees in Burundi.
Government sources
- Presidency of the DRC (May 2025). President Tshisekedi's statement: "The Burundian army is the only one operating against armed groups."
- Burundian Ministry of Defence (2023-2025). Communiqués on deployment of 10,000+ soldiers in EACRF.
- Presidency of Burundi (22 December 2024). Communiqué on Tshisekedi's visit to Bujumbura.
Analyses and documentation
- Wikipedia (2025). "2025 Democratic Republic of the Congo–Rwanda peace agreement". Complete documentation.
- Wikipedia (2025). "Democratic Republic of the Congo–Rwanda conflict (2022–2025)".
- Wikipedia (2025). "2025 Goma offensive" and "2025 Bukavu offensive".
- Lieber Institute West Point (15 September 2025). "The Conflict in Eastern DRC and the State Responsibility of Rwanda and Uganda".
Reference media
- The Defence Post (21 February 2025). "Burundi Forces Flee DR Congo as Conflict Sparks Refugee Wave".
- The New Humanitarian (12 May 2025). "Congolese escaping the M23 conflict face new hardships in Burundi".
- The East African (14 November 2023). "M23 go for Burundian troops in DRC clashes".
- African Security Analysis (2025). "Burundi Intensifies Its Military Involvement in Eastern DRC".
- Council on Foreign Relations (2025). "Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo". Global Conflict Tracker.
Burundian perspectives
- Burundi-Forum (27 June 2025). "Burundi / Géopolitique – RDC, Rwanda, USA : Comment comprendre la signature du 27 juin 2025 ?"
- Burundi-AGNews (2025). Analyses on Burundi's exclusion from regional agreements.
International briefings
- UN Press (28 February 2025). "As Regional Tensions Rise, M23 Advances Further in Eastern DRC". Security Council briefing.
Prepared par :
Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte Bienvenue
Improve Africa, London, UK
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