Paul Kagame, Staged Legitimacy, and the Politics of Forced Demonstrations in the Kivu Region
For more than two decades, Paul Kagame has projected an image of discipline, order, and strategic foresight to the international community. Yet behind this carefully cultivated façade lies a troubling record in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), particularly in North and South Kivu. As pressure mounts through the Washington Accords and UN Security Council Resolution 2773, a new tactic has emerged: the orchestration of forced demonstrations in occupied areas to manufacture consent and simulate popular support for Rwanda's military presence.
These demonstrations, held in towns and villages under the effective control of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and its proxy armed groups, are presented as spontaneous expressions of gratitude. Participants are compelled to chant slogans praising "security," "rights," and "liberation," whilst some are forced to call for the Kivu region to become a separate state—an explicitly balkanising narrative that serves Kigali's long-term strategic goals. Far from reflecting popular will, these events constitute coercive political theatre.
Occupation Dressed as Liberation
The Kivu region has endured cycles of violence, displacement, and resource plunder since the late 1990s. Rwanda's role—documented in multiple UN reports—has been consistent: cross-border military interventions, sponsorship of armed groups, and sustained influence over territory rich in strategic minerals. Whilst Kigali insists its actions are defensive, the evidence contradicts this narrative. RDF units and allied militias have exercised de facto authority over large swathes of North Kivu, undermining Congolese sovereignty and perpetuating instability.
The latest demonstrations represent an evolution in strategy. When direct military justifications lose credibility, narrative warfare steps in. By forcing civilians to perform loyalty on camera, Kagame seeks to recast occupation as protection and coercion as consent. This strategy relies on two assumptions: first, that images travel faster than context; second, that exhausted international audiences will accept optics in place of substance.
Coercion, Fear, and Manufactured Consent
Eyewitness accounts from eastern DRC describe how these demonstrations are organised. Local administrators and M23 operatives conduct house-to-house visits, compelling attendance at staged rallies. Lists of attendees are compiled. Refusal to participate can result in intimidation, loss of livelihood, arbitrary detention, or worse. In zones where armed force determines authority, "voluntary" participation is a fiction.
Particularly alarming is the forced articulation of separatist slogans. Asking traumatised communities—many displaced multiple times—to call for the secession of their own region is not grassroots self-determination; it is psychological coercion. The aim is transparent: to introduce, normalise, and internationalise the notion that Kivu is culturally, politically, or historically incompatible with the rest of the DRC. Balkanisation has long been a strategic objective in proxy conflicts; here, it is being advanced through intimidation masquerading as popular mobilisation.
Why Now? The Weight of International Pressure
This surge in staged demonstrations coincides with Kigali's narrowing diplomatic room for manoeuvre. The Washington Accords and Resolution 2773 demand de-escalation, respect for Congolese sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the withdrawal of foreign forces. For perhaps the first time in years, Rwanda faces coordinated scrutiny rather than fragmented condemnation.
Kagame understands the implications. Compliance would require dismantling a security and economic architecture that benefits elites in Kigali whilst devastating communities in eastern Congo. Non-compliance risks sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and reputational damage. The forced demonstrations thus represent a holding operation—an attempt to delay, confuse, and reframe the debate by suggesting that "the people" prefer the status quo.
Rwanda's remaining option is to force populations to demonstrate support for M23 and RDF presence. Rwanda may even manufacture insecurity to argue that without M23/RDF, occupied areas will descend into chaos. There are concerns that Rwanda will target Banyamulenge communities and attribute these attacks to FARDC and Wazalendo forces. By creating instability, Rwanda can justify RDF/M23 intervention as necessary for stability. These tactics mirror those employed during the attack and seizure of Goma, as well as strategies used during Kagame's 1990–1994 campaign in Rwanda.
The Myth of Security and Rights Under Occupation
One of the most cynical elements of these demonstrations is the claim that RDF presence improves security and protects rights. The empirical record contradicts this assertion. Areas under Rwandan influence have experienced mass displacement, targeted killings of Hutu communities accused of FDLR affiliation, sexual violence, child recruitment, and systematic illegal exploitation of Congolese resources. Civilians are trapped between armed actors, with minimal access to justice or protection.
Rights cannot exist under occupation enforced by fear. Security cannot be claimed where communities are compelled to perform political loyalty. These slogans are not merely false; they constitute an affront to the lived experience of Congolese civilians who have borne the costs of foreign intervention.
Balkanisation as a Strategic Endgame
The campaign to present Kivu as a potential "separate state" warrants particular scrutiny. Balkanisation would permanently weaken the DRC, fragmenting its political authority and facilitating external control over territory and resources. It would also establish a dangerous precedent across Africa, where borders—however imperfect—remain a cornerstone of continental stability.
What exists in the Kivu region instead are armed pressures, ethnic manipulation, and externally driven narratives. To portray forced chants as evidence of popular aspiration is to abuse the very language of self-determination.
The International Community's Responsibility
The danger lies not only in what Kagame is doing, but in what the international community may permit. If staged demonstrations are accepted as evidence of legitimacy, international law is reduced to spectacle. The enforcement of Resolution 2773 cannot be contingent on propaganda exercises; it must be grounded in verifiable actions: troop withdrawals, disarmament of proxies, and respect for Congolese sovereignty.
Media organisations, diplomats, and multilateral institutions have a responsibility to interrogate images, not merely circulate them. Who organised these demonstrations? Under what conditions? What risks did non-participants face? Without these questions, disinformation prevails.
A Stark Contradiction: No Freedom of Assembly Inside Rwanda
The narrative Kigali seeks to project in the Kivu region collapses when contrasted with political reality inside Rwanda itself. Whilst the Rwandan state claims to defend the right of Congolese civilians to demonstrate in occupied areas, no such freedom exists within Rwanda. Under Paul Kagame's rule, public demonstrations are effectively prohibited, tightly controlled, or violently suppressed. Freedom of assembly exists on paper but not in practice.
Independent protests in Rwanda—whether organised by opposition parties, civil society, journalists, or families of victims—are routinely denied authorisation or dispersed by security forces. Participants face arrest, intimidation, enforced disappearances, or prosecution under vague charges such as "inciting disorder," "spreading false information," or "threatening national security." Even peaceful gatherings, candlelight vigils, or symbolic acts are treated as criminal offences when not sanctioned by the state.
This reality exposes the profound hypocrisy of Rwanda's actions in eastern Congo. A government that does not tolerate unscripted public expression at home cannot credibly claim to promote democratic rights abroad. In Rwanda, demonstrations are permitted only when state-organised, state-approved, and state-directed—typically to endorse government policies or Kagame's leadership. There is no space for dissenting marches, alternative slogans, or spontaneous mobilisation.
The forced demonstrations in the Kivu region mirror Rwanda's internal political culture. They are not expressions of civic freedom but extensions of authoritarian control exported across borders. Civilians are mobilised not as citizens with rights, but as instruments of political messaging. The same methods used to silence Rwandans—fear, surveillance, coercion—are now imposed on Congolese communities under occupation.
This contradiction should alarm the international community. A state that criminalises assembly within its own borders cannot be an honest guarantor of rights elsewhere. The staged rallies in Kivu are not evidence of popular support; they reflect an authoritarian system that conflates obedience with consent. Recognising this double standard is essential if international actors are serious about accountability, sovereignty, and the genuine protection of civilian rights in the Great Lakes region.
Conclusion: Coercion Cannot Substitute for Consent
Paul Kagame's latest strategy in the Kivu region reflects constraint rather than strength. Forced demonstrations are the tools of a project that recognises it is losing moral and legal ground. As international pressure intensifies, spectacle replaces persuasion, and coercion replaces consent.
The people of Kivu do not need choreographed rallies. They need peace without occupation, security without proxies, and rights without fear. Implementing the Washington Accords and UN Security Council Resolution 2773 is not optional; it is a legal and moral imperative. Anything less risks rewarding aggression and entrenching a cycle of violence that has already claimed too many lives.
Prepared by: Sam Nkumi, Chris Thomson & Gilberte Bienvenue – Improve Africa, London, UK
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