The Rwandophone Myth in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The Rwandophone Myth in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Linguistic Construction, Political Assimilation, and the Justification of Aggression

Historical Analysis | March 2026

 

 

Introduction

Across the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a political myth has taken root — one that has been cultivated, amplified, and instrumentalised by the Rwandan state with extraordinary strategic precision. This is the myth of the "Rwandophone": the idea that there exists, across the Great Lakes region, a coherent, unified community of "Rwandophone peoples" whose linguistic affinity to Kinyarwanda constitutes a form of shared Rwandan identity, and whose presence in the DRC creates legitimate claims for Rwandan protection, intervention, and ultimately territorial control.

This analysis argues, on the basis of historical, linguistic, and political evidence, that the concept of the "Rwandophone community" in the DRC is a constructed myth. There is no Rwandophone community in the DRC, Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, or any other neighbouring state in the sense that Kigali deploys the term. What exist are distinct ethnic communities — the Banyamulenge, the Banyabwisha, the Bafumbira, and others — who speak related but distinct Bantu dialects that share linguistic roots with Kinyarwanda, just as Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese share roots with Latin, without that kinship conferring identical nationality or political allegiance.

The term "Rwandophone" was not born from within these communities. It was manufactured by the Rwandan state and its intellectual apparatus as a tool of assimilation and territorial claim. Its deployment has served to obscure the genuine identities of affected communities, to provide rhetorical cover for M23 and the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) in eastern DRC, and to lay the groundwork for what analysts increasingly recognise as a strategy of Balkanisation — the fragmentation of the DRC's eastern provinces into a zone of Rwandan influence or even formal annexation.

This analysis traces the origins of the term, examines the distinct identities of the communities concerned, analyses the political architecture of the Rwandophone myth, and assesses its role in justifying Rwanda's ongoing military aggression and occupation of sovereign Congolese territory.

 

Part One: The Linguistic Reality — Dialects, Not Identity

1.1 Kinyarwanda and Its Linguistic Relatives

Kinyarwanda belongs to the Great Lakes branch of the Bantu language family, a vast linguistic grouping that spans sub-Saharan Africa. Within this family, Kinyarwanda is closely related to Kirundi (spoken in Burundi), and shares significant structural and lexical features with a range of community dialects spoken across the Great Lakes region. These include:

•         Igihutu and Ikinyabwisha, spoken in the Masisi and Rutshuru territories of North Kivu in the DRC;

•         Igifumbira, spoken by the Bafumbira in the Kisoro district of south-western Uganda;

•         Dialects spoken by Banyamulenge communities in the high plateaux of South Kivu;

•         Related speech forms used by Batutsi and Bahutu communities in Burundi and north-western Tanzania.

The existence of these linguistic relatives is neither surprising nor politically significant in isolation. It reflects the broader reality of the Bantu language world, in which related dialects and languages straddle borders that were drawn by colonial powers, not by the peoples themselves. The same phenomenon is observed across Africa and the world: Hausa is spoken across northern Nigeria and Niger; Somali across Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti; Arabic across twenty-two countries. Linguistic kinship does not create political unity, and it does not confer citizenship or statehood.

1.2 The Distinctiveness of the Communities Concerned

The communities in eastern DRC who are labelled "Rwandophone" by the Rwandan state are not Rwandans. They are Congolese citizens with deep historical roots in the territories they inhabit, roots that in many cases predate the colonial drawing of borders that created both Rwanda and the DRC as distinct political entities.

The Banyamulenge, for instance, are a community of predominantly Tutsi origin who settled in the high plateaux of South Kivu, in areas known as the Hauts Plateaux, centuries ago. Their arrival in what is now the DRC predates the formation of the modern Rwandan state. Their language, their pastoral way of life, and certain cultural practices bear resemblance to those of Rwanda, but their political identity, their land rights, and their sense of belonging are Congolese. Reducing them to "Rwandophones" erases their distinct history and subjects them to a foreign political project they did not choose.

Similarly, the Banyabwisha of Masisi and Rutshuru speak Ikinyabwisha, a dialect distinct from standard Kinyarwanda. The Bafumbira of Uganda speak Igifumbira. These are separate communities with their own social structures, oral traditions, customary systems, and political histories. Their dialects evolved in their respective environments and diverged from Kinyarwanda over generations. Treating them as a single, undifferentiated "Rwandophone bloc" is not linguistic science — it is political engineering.

The key analytical point is this: linguistic similarity is not evidence of political homogeneity, and it is certainly not a basis for territorial claim. The Rwandan state's appropriation of these communities under the "Rwandophone" label is an act of ideological annexation that precedes and prepares the ground for physical annexation.

 

Part Two: The Political Construction of the Rwandophone Myth

2.1 Origins of the Term and Its Strategic Function

The term "Rwandophone" gained prominence in the political and academic discourse of the Great Lakes region in the 1990s, coinciding with the period of Rwanda's post-genocide reconstruction under the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) and its transformation into a regional military power. Its emergence was not accidental.

The RPF, having seized power in Kigali in July 1994, embarked on a project of regional influence that required both justification and cover. The presence of Hutu diaspora communities, including forces of the former Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) and Interahamwe militia — later reconstituted as the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) — in eastern Zaire provided an initial security pretext for cross-border military involvement. However, Rwanda's ambitions extended beyond counter-insurgency.

The "Rwandophone" concept served a dual strategic function. First, it created a constituency — a notional pan-Rwandan community spread across the region whose interests Kigali could claim to represent and protect. Second, it introduced into the political discourse of the DRC and the international community a latent territorial logic: if there are "Rwandophone peoples" in eastern Congo, then eastern Congo is, in some sense, Rwandan territory or at minimum a space of legitimate Rwandan interest.

This logic mirrors historical cases of irredentism — the use of ethnic or linguistic minorities as pretexts for territorial claims — that have been deployed with devastating consequences elsewhere in the world. The parallels with the use of "Russophone" communities in the former Soviet space as justification for Russian military intervention are particularly instructive and have not been lost on analysts of the Great Lakes crisis.

2.2 The Role of the M23 Rebellion

The M23 movement, reactivated in late 2021 after a period of dormancy, has operated as the principal military instrument through which Rwanda's Rwandophone narrative has been translated into territorial control. UN Group of Experts reports, US Treasury sanctions documentation, and independent investigative journalism have confirmed with extensive evidence that M23 operates under the command and logistical support of the Rwanda Defence Forces.

M23 has presented itself publicly as a defender of "Rwandophone communities" in the DRC — a framing that positions its armed campaign not as external aggression but as a protective response to persecution. This framing is essential to the Rwandophone myth's political utility: it transforms an act of invasion and occupation into an act of rescue.

The analysis conducted by this organisation and others has demonstrated that this claim collapses under scrutiny. The ethnic communities in Masisi, Rutshuru, and the Hauts Plateaux that M23 claims to protect have not, in aggregate, requested Rwandan military protection. Many community leaders and civil society representatives have explicitly rejected the M23 framing. The violence that has accompanied M23's advance — documented massacres, sexual violence, displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians — has visited its greatest harm upon the very populations M23 claims to protect, along with all other Congolese communities caught in the conflict.

2.3 The FDLR Pretext and Its Geographic Contradictions

Rwanda's foundational justification for maintaining military presence in eastern DRC has been the threat posed by the FDLR, a Hutu armed group that includes within its ranks individuals responsible for the 1994 genocide. On paper and in narrative terms, this argument has carried diplomatic weight, and Rwanda has deployed it with considerable skill as the centrepiece of its communications with Western partners. Over time, however, it has transformed from a genuine security concern into a pretext for permanent war — a propaganda instrument that sustains military presence long after any proportionate counter-insurgency rationale has expired.

The facts on the ground expose this transformation clearly. Rwanda has been present militarily in the DRC in one form or another since 1996 — nearly three decades. During this period, the international community and bilateral partners gave Kigali repeated opportunities, platforms, and resources to address the FDLR threat through legitimate means, including joint verification mechanisms, ceasefire agreements, and UN-supported disarmament processes. Rwanda consistently used these processes selectively, advancing them when convenient and abandoning them when a genuine resolution would have removed the pretext for continued presence.

Critically, the United States maintains a significant intelligence presence in the DRC and across the Great Lakes region. Washington's intelligence services have long monitored armed group activity in the Kivus with considerable granularity. If the FDLR posed a genuine, imminent, and unmanageable threat to Rwanda's territorial security, the United States — which has consistently shared intelligence with Kigali on matters of mutual concern — would have both the knowledge and the disposition to support Rwanda in taking targeted, proportionate action. The fact that the United States has instead imposed sanctions on the Rwanda Defence Forces is itself a profound assessment: it signals that Washington does not regard Rwanda's military conduct in the DRC as a legitimate counter-terrorism operation, but as something categorically different.

However, the geographic reality of the DRC conflict exposes the FDLR justification as strategically dishonest. The FDLR operates predominantly in the remote forest areas of the Kivus, particularly in the Walikale territory of North Kivu and parts of South Kivu far from the main population centres. The RDF and M23, by contrast, have advanced upon and occupied major urban centres including Goma, the capital of North Kivu, and Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu, as well as the city of Uvira.

There is no documented FDLR presence in Goma, Bukavu, or Uvira. There is no military logic by which the counter-FDLR mission requires the occupation of commercial urban centres far from the FDLR's areas of operation. The occupation of these cities serves economic, political, and territorial objectives that have nothing to do with FDLR neutralisation. The mineral wealth of North and South Kivu — coltan, cassiterite, gold, wolframite — flows through these cities and their hinterlands. Control of these centres means control of supply chains, taxation points, and export routes.

The FDLR pretext, in short, has been used to initiate and justify a presence that then exceeds its stated purpose by an order of magnitude. This is the strategic logic of the Rwandophone myth applied at the military level: use a legitimate security concern as the entry point, then expand the mission to serve territorial and economic objectives that were always the primary goal.

 

Part Three: Historical Roots of the Territorial Claim

3.1 Colonial Borders, Pre-Colonial Identities, and the Rwandan Kingdom

Any honest engagement with the Rwandophone myth must address the genuine complexity of pre-colonial history in the Great Lakes region. Before colonisation, the Great Lakes was a world without formally demarcated borders as the modern mind understands them. Peoples, lineages, and chieftaincies existed across a wide territory in which authority was defined by social, political, and customary relationships rather than fixed territorial lines. Within this context, certain communities — including groups associated with the Rwandan kingdom (ubwami) — moved across the region. But movement, in the absence of formal territorial sovereignty, is not the same as claim. Wherever these communities went, they arrived among peoples who were already there, with their own names for their lands, their own governance, and their own relationship to the territory. The fundamental principle of justice is straightforward: to arrive in a place where people already live, in a territory those people already inhabit and name, and to declare that place your own, is not a historical right — it is dispossession. No community, however mobile or historically significant, can claim sovereignty over territory it reached without invitation, without prior knowledge of, and without governance over, simply because its members passed through or settled near others. The borders later imposed by German and then Belgian colonialism formalised what were already existing human geographies in which distinct peoples held distinct relationships to their lands.

What the pre-colonial record cannot support, therefore, is any contemporary territorial claim. The principle of uti possidetis juris — the international law doctrine by which post-colonial states inherit the borders of colonial administrative units — was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity at its founding in 1963 and remains the cornerstone of African state sovereignty. It exists precisely because the alternative — a continent in which every state with a historical grievance or ethnic kinship argument could redraw its neighbours' borders — would produce permanent and catastrophic conflict.

Rwanda's implicit territorial argument, encoded in the Rwandophone narrative, challenges this foundational principle. It suggests that pre-colonial patterns of population distribution and linguistic affinity supersede the post-colonial international order. Applied consistently, this logic would unravel borders across the entire continent.

3.2 The 1994 Genocide and the Uses of Historical Trauma

The 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda was one of the defining atrocities of the twentieth century. Approximately 800,000 to one million people — predominantly Tutsi, but also including moderate Hutu who refused to participate in or actively opposed the killing — were murdered in one hundred days. The genocide's horror is not in dispute, and its legacy shapes every dimension of Rwandan politics, identity, and foreign policy.

The RPF government has, however, consistently weaponised the memory of the genocide in ways that serve present-day political objectives. The Rwandophone narrative benefits from this weaponisation: to question Rwanda's claims about protecting Kinyarwanda-speaking communities is characterised by Kigali as a form of genocide denial or anti-Tutsi prejudice. This rhetorical trap has silenced legitimate critical analysis for decades.

International partners, haunted by the failure of the international community to intervene in 1994, have been particularly susceptible to this framing. The result has been a diplomatic environment in which Rwanda has enjoyed considerable latitude to pursue regional military and economic objectives under the protective canopy of its genocide history. The Rwandophone myth is, in part, a product of this environment — it weaponises legitimate historical grief to serve contemporary territorial ambition.

3.3 From Alliance to Aggression: The Strategic Error of 2024–2026

The current phase of Rwanda's military engagement in the DRC represents, in historical terms, a qualitative escalation that has finally stripped away the protective ambiguity of earlier interventions. In 2024 and into 2025 and 2026, RDF forces and M23 moved from supporting a proxy insurgency to conducting what international observers, the United Nations, and the United States government have characterised as a direct military occupation of Congolese territory.

The imposition of US Treasury sanctions in March 2026 on the Rwanda Defence Forces and senior commanders — including for activities in support of M23 and for the exploitation of Congolese mineral resources — represents the most significant formal international recognition to date that Rwanda's conduct in the DRC cannot be justified by the Rwandophone narrative or any other security framing.

This escalation mirrors, in some respects, the trajectory of Paul Kagame's earlier career. His military partnership with Yoweri Museveni during the Ugandan bush war of the 1980s demonstrated an understanding that regional alliances and cross-border operations could achieve objectives unavailable through conventional bilateral diplomacy. The strategy that worked within the context of a collapsing Zaire in the late 1990s — intervention under a civilian cover story, resource extraction as a funding mechanism, and plausible deniability as a diplomatic shield — has been deployed again in a fundamentally changed geopolitical environment, one in which documentation capacity, international monitoring, and US strategic attention have all increased dramatically.

 

Part Four: The Balkanisation Strategy

4.1 The Architecture of Fragmentation

The Rwandophone myth is not merely a propaganda tool. It is a component of a coherent strategic architecture aimed at the Balkanisation of eastern DRC — its fragmentation into zones of external control, potentially including a Rwandan-dominated entity carved from the territory of North and South Kivu.

The architecture of this strategy can be traced through several interconnected elements. The first is the creation of a political constituency through the Rwandophone label, providing M23 and the RDF with a notional civilian base whose interests they claim to represent. The second is the establishment of parallel administrative structures in occupied territories, where M23 has sought to replace Congolese state authority with its own governance, taxation, and security systems. The third is the control of mineral supply chains, which provides both the economic rationale for sustained occupation and the funding mechanism for continued military operations.

The fourth, and perhaps most consequential, element is the demographic transformation of occupied territories through the displacement of non-Rwandophone communities and the movement of new populations into vacated areas. Displacement creates facts on the ground that subsequent political negotiations may be required to accommodate — a strategy with clear historical precedents in other conflict zones.

4.2 Mineral Exploitation as Strategic Infrastructure

The connection between Rwanda's military presence in eastern DRC and the exploitation of Congolese mineral wealth has been documented in successive UN Group of Experts reports. Rwanda's formal mineral export statistics show consistent exports of coltan, gold, and other minerals at volumes that significantly exceed Rwanda's own domestic production capacity. The gap between production and export is filled by smuggled and laundered Congolese minerals, transiting through Rwanda's controlled export infrastructure.

This mineral economy is not incidental to the Rwandophone narrative — it is integral to it. The Rwandophone myth creates the political justification for the military presence that enables the mineral extraction that funds the continuation of the military presence. The three elements form a self-reinforcing system in which territorial control, ethnic politics, and resource exploitation are mutually dependent.

The economic dimension also explains why Rwanda has resisted numerous diplomatic solutions that would have required its military withdrawal from eastern DRC. A withdrawal, even one dignified by favourable political language, would sever the supply lines of an economic system worth hundreds of millions of dollars annually. The Rwandophone narrative provides the political cover for an economic interest that cannot be openly stated.

4.3 The International Community's Delayed Recognition

For two decades, the international community — including Rwanda's principal bilateral donors in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union — declined to formally acknowledge the structural role of the Rwandan state in the DRC's destabilisation. Rwanda's image as a model of post-genocide reconstruction, its effective public diplomacy, its participation in UN peacekeeping operations, and the genuine complexity of the conflict all contributed to a prolonged period of diplomatic ambiguity.

The US Treasury sanctions of March 2026 mark a decisive break with this pattern. By formally designating the RDF and its commanders for activities in the DRC, the United States has made an official legal finding that contradicts the Rwandophone narrative at its foundation. There is no legitimate protection mission in Goma. There is no counter-FDLR operation in Bukavu. There is an occupation, and it has been named.

The United Kingdom, the European Union, France, and Germany now face a corresponding obligation to align their positions with the evidence that the United States has formally assessed. The continued provision of development assistance to Rwanda without conditionality linked to its military conduct in the DRC has become untenable not merely on moral grounds but on the grounds of policy coherence.

 

Part Five: The Communities Behind the Label

5.1 Structural Marginalisation, Not Ethnic Persecution

A crucial distinction must be drawn in any rigorous analysis of the eastern DRC crisis: the distinction between structural marginalisation and deliberate ethnic persecution. The communities in Masisi, Rutshuru, the Hauts Plateaux, and elsewhere who speak Kinyarwanda-related dialects do face genuine challenges. They face limited access to state services, difficulty obtaining identity documents, land tenure insecurity, and the vulnerabilities that come with decades of conflict in their territories.

These challenges are real and deserve serious attention. However, they are predominantly products of structural factors — the weakness and limited reach of the Congolese state, the historical inequities of customary land tenure systems, and the disruptions caused by successive waves of armed conflict — rather than products of deliberate state policy targeting a specific ethnic group. The DRC state's failure to protect and serve its citizens in the east is comprehensive: it fails Nande, Hunde, Tembo, Shi, Lega, and all other communities equally.

The Rwandophone narrative requires the fiction of systematic anti-Kinyarwanda persecution in order to justify a protective intervention. The evidence does not support this fiction. Communities in eastern DRC who speak Kinyarwanda-related dialects have held political office at provincial and national levels, have participated in electoral processes, have led civil society organisations, and have served in the Congolese armed forces. Their situation is that of citizens of a poorly governed, conflict-affected state — a situation they share with the majority of their fellow Congolese.

5.2 The Instrumentalisation of Community Identity

What the Rwandophone narrative has done to these communities is, in a profound sense, a form of exploitation. By assigning them an identity they did not choose — "Rwandophone", with its implication of Rwandan affiliation — the Rwandan state has exposed them to the hostility of other Congolese communities who reasonably perceive in the label an assertion of foreign allegiance. The Rwandophone myth has thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy: by labelling these communities as essentially Rwandan, it has contributed to the suspicion and tension that it claims to be responding to.

The communities themselves are not a homogeneous bloc with a unified political position. Many Banyamulenge, Banyabwisha, and Bafumbira leaders and intellectuals have explicitly rejected both the Rwandophone label and the M23 project. Civil society organisations from within these communities have appealed for Congolese state protection, for inclusion in national political dialogue, and for recognition of their Congolese citizenship — not for Rwandan military rescue.

Their voices have been systematically marginalised in international media coverage, which has too often accepted the Rwandan framing without adequate scrutiny. Genuine advocacy for these communities requires, as a first step, distinguishing them clearly from the political project that claims to speak on their behalf.

 

Conclusion: Dismantling the Myth, Defending Sovereignty

The Rwandophone myth is one of the most consequential political fictions of the twenty-first century's African history. Constructed from the raw materials of genuine linguistic kinship, historical complexity, and legitimate security concerns, it has been assembled into an instrument of territorial ambition and resource exploitation. Its dismantlement is not merely an academic exercise — it is a prerequisite for any durable resolution of the eastern DRC conflict.

The dismantlement must proceed on several levels simultaneously. At the academic and journalistic level, it requires the rigorous insistence that linguistic proximity is not political identity, and that the communities of eastern DRC who speak Kinyarwanda-related dialects are Congolese citizens with distinct histories and rights. At the diplomatic level, it requires the international community to name Rwanda's conduct in the DRC for what it is: aggression and occupation, not protection.

At the legal level, it requires support for international accountability mechanisms — including ICC jurisdiction over crimes committed in the DRC, and the sustained application of targeted sanctions against those who direct and profit from the occupation. At the political level within the DRC itself, it requires genuine reform of the processes by which Congolese identity and citizenship are administered, so that the structural grievances of marginalised communities — of all ethnic groups — are addressed through democratic and legal means rather than through armed proxy.

The peoples of the eastern DRC — Banyamulenge, Banyabwisha, Nande, Hunde, Tembo, Shi, Lega, Bembe, and all others — deserve a future in which their security is guaranteed by a functioning Congolese state rather than by a foreign military force that serves interests other than their own. The Rwandophone myth has delayed that future. Its refutation is an act of solidarity with all the peoples of the African Great Lakes Region.

 

 

Frequently Asked Questions

What does the term 'Rwandophone' mean and where did it originate?

The term "Rwandophone" was coined to describe communities in the Great Lakes region who speak Kinyarwanda or related dialects. While it appears to be a neutral linguistic descriptor, its political use was pioneered by the Rwandan state and its allies to group diverse and distinct ethnic communities — including the Banyamulenge, Banyabwisha, and Bafumbira — under a single label implying Rwandan cultural and political affiliation. The term is not widely accepted by the communities themselves and is contested by scholars of the region.

Are there really no Rwandophone communities outside Rwanda?

There are communities across eastern DRC, Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania who speak dialects related to Kinyarwanda. However, these communities have their own distinct identities, histories, and political affiliations. Describing them as "Rwandophone" in the political sense deployed by Kigali — as members of a pan-Rwandan community with ties of allegiance to the Rwandan state — is inaccurate and misleading. Their linguistic kinship with Kinyarwanda no more makes them Rwandan than the linguistic kinship between Portuguese and Spanish makes Brazilians Spanish.

What is M23 and what is its relationship to the Rwandophone narrative?

M23 (Mouvement du 23 Mars) is an armed group operating in eastern DRC that has presented itself as a defender of "Rwandophone communities." Multiple UN investigations, US government findings, and independent analyses have confirmed that M23 operates with the direct military support of the Rwanda Defence Forces. The Rwandophone narrative provides M23's political cover story, framing what is effectively a Rwandan military intervention as a community protection mission.

Why has the international community taken so long to respond to Rwanda's role in the DRC?

Several factors contributed to the delayed international response. Rwanda's post-genocide reconstruction narrative generated significant diplomatic capital and goodwill among Western governments. The complexity of the conflict, with multiple armed groups and overlapping grievances, made clear attribution difficult. Rwanda's effective public diplomacy and participation in international peacekeeping operations further complicated assessments. The US Treasury sanctions of March 2026 represent the most significant formal break with this pattern of diplomatic deference.

What is the FDLR and how has it been used to justify Rwanda's presence in the DRC?

The Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) is a Hutu armed group in eastern DRC that includes individuals responsible for the 1994 genocide. Rwanda has consistently cited the FDLR threat as its primary justification for military involvement in the DRC. However, the FDLR operates in remote forest areas far from the urban centres that RDF and M23 have occupied, undermining the security rationale and revealing the territorial and economic nature of Rwanda's objectives.

What is the significance of US Treasury sanctions on Rwanda's RDF?

The March 2026 US Treasury sanctions on the Rwanda Defence Forces and senior commanders constitute a formal legal finding by the United States government that Rwanda's military has engaged in conduct in the DRC that warrants punitive measures. This represents a decisive shift in US policy and provides a legal and diplomatic framework for other governments — particularly the UK, EU, France, and Germany — to impose corresponding measures.

What should happen to the communities falsely labelled as Rwandophone?

The communities of eastern DRC who speak Kinyarwanda-related dialects deserve full recognition and protection as Congolese citizens. This requires reform of DRC's citizenship and identity administration, inclusive political representation, and the resolution of land tenure insecurity through legal rather than military means. It also requires protection from the instrumentalisation of their identity by both Rwandan state actors and Congolese political actors who deny their citizenship. The withdrawal of foreign military forces from their territories is a prerequisite for this.

 

 

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Author

THE AFRICAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN

London, United Kingdom

africanrightscampaign@gmail.com

For the Peoples of the African Great Lakes Region