Eight years after Paris handed the Francophonie to Kigali, the Phnom Penh summit showed what that choice cost France, the Congo and the organisation itself.
| African lives are not worth less. African deaths are not normal. Western interests must never become a licence to kill African people. |
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Introduction: A Bet That Ended in Phnom Penh
On 16 November 2026, for the first time in its history, the International Organisation of La Francophonie failed to choose a secretary-general. Rwanda refused to withdraw Louise Mushikiwabo's bid for a third term, the Democratic Republic of Congo refused to accept it, and the members settled for a one-year extension. For Emmanuel Macron, who put Mrs Mushikiwabo at the head of the organisation in 2018, it was a public rebuff from the government he had courted more than any other in Africa.
Over the past month, Africa Realities Media has published a series of articles, in English and French, on how that moment came about. They share one argument: Macron built his Africa policy around a single capital, Kigali, and the Francophonie paid part of the price. This piece brings the series together. It covers the policy itself, its effect on French influence, Mrs Mushikiwabo's third-term bid, the confrontation in Phnom Penh, and the changes our open letter asks the organisation's members to make.
1. Macron Built His Africa Policy Around One Capital
Reconciliation with Paul Kagame's government was the centrepiece of Macron's Africa policy. The Duclert report of 2021, Macron's acknowledgement of French responsibility in Kigali that May, a genocide memorial in Paris, more than half a billion euros in development commitments and the Francophonie post were meant to turn a bitter relationship into a model partnership and to build trust across the continent.
As our article on the policy's failure argues, Africa is not one country. Most African grievances against France concerned the present, not 1994: French troops, the CFA franc, visa rules and support for unpopular rulers. Reconciliation with Kigali answered none of them. Meanwhile coups and expulsions in the Sahel left France without permanent bases in West or Central Africa, and the deployment of Rwandan troops to protect TotalEnergies' gas project in Mozambique gave Kigali leverage over Paris rather than the reverse.
The series also questions the price paid in justice. The investigation into the 1994 attack on President Habyarimana's plane ended in a non-lieu during the rapprochement, upheld in 2022, and no French inquiry has examined crimes attributed to the RPF. In our view, Macron treated memory politics as foreign policy.
2. Deference to Kigali Weakened France Across the Continent
Our analysis of Franco-Rwandan relations sets out how deference to Kigali damaged France's standing elsewhere. African governments noticed the double standards:
**Coups and elections. **Paris condemned the coup in Niger in 2023, yet praised President Kagame after his re-election in July 2024 with 99.18% of the vote, once prominent critics had been excluded.
**Burundi and Rwanda. **Burundi faced EU aid suspension and a French-drafted Security Council resolution after 2015, while Rwanda's constitutional change allowing President Kagame to stay in power until 2034 drew only words.
**Sanctions. **Washington sanctioned the Rwanda Defence Force in March 2026, a gold refinery in June and the Ministry of Defence in October over eastern Congo. Macron declared that neither France nor the European Union would follow.
For many French-speaking governments, the lesson was that loyalty to France and to its language brought little in return. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger left the Francophonie in March 2025, and several governments turned to other partners, including Russia. Rwanda is not the only cause of France's decline in Africa, but our series argues that it is among its clearest illustrations.
3. Mushikiwabo's Third-Term Bid Exposed the Francophonie's Weakness
Mrs Mushikiwabo announced her bid for a third term in November 2025, at the ministerial conference in Kigali, months before candidacies closed. Our April article described this as a strategy of presenting members with a fait accompli, and reported, on the basis of diplomatic sources, an active Rwandan campaign among African capitals.
Our November analysis pointed out that she had never faced a contested election. She was chosen by consensus in Yerevan in 2018, after Macron announced his support, and was the sole candidate in Djerba in 2022. The organisation's charter sets no term limit, unlike the Commonwealth's. The candidacy came from a country that had replaced French with English in its schools in 2008, joined the Commonwealth in 2009, and where only about 6% of people speak French.
Above all, the bid collided with the war in eastern Congo. UN experts have documented Rwandan support for the M23 rebels, and Kinshasa made clear that a third Rwandan term was unacceptable. It put forward its own candidate, Juliana Lumumba, daughter of Patrice Lumumba, and threatened to leave the organisation.
4. Phnom Penh Brought Refusal, Confrontation and a One-Year Reprieve
The summit turned the dispute into a personal clash between two presidents. According to Jeune Afrique, Macron wrote to President Kagame before the summit asking him to withdraw Mrs Mushikiwabo in favour of a consensus candidate, the former Romanian prime minister Dacian Cioloș. Kigali refused. Rwanda's foreign minister, Olivier Nduhungirehe, said Rwanda would not withdraw its candidate, "encore moins sur injonction", still less under orders, and declared that the old Francophonie, in which one country decided, was over.
The two presidents then met privately. Jeune Afrique described a heated exchange in which President Kagame reportedly called Macron the sole factor of division at the summit. Kigali denounced French "ingérence", and Mrs Mushikiwabo said the pressure on her had been "nombreuses et fortes". Congo's government spokesperson, Patrick Muyaya, pointed out the paradox: Rwanda was denouncing French interference over the very post that Paris had secured for it.
Our open letter reads Kagame's anger as that of a leader who expected a third term. France had said nothing about the succession during its two-year presidency of the organisation and changed course only when Kinshasa's threat to leave became serious. The letter calls the outcome an unprecedented humiliation for a French president at the end of his term, and part of a long pattern stretching from the Amahoro stadium in 2004 to the rupture of 2006.
The compromise satisfied no one. Mrs Mushikiwabo stays for twelve months to lead the reform of the rules that will choose her successor. Congo's foreign minister, Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, called her departure in twelve months "non négociable", and Burundi warned that a third term would bury the organisation.
5. Our Open Letter Asks the Members to Rebuild the Organisation
The open letter is addressed to Macron, but its requests go to the organisation's 90 member and observer states and governments, because the mistakes of the last eight years cannot be corrected by those who made them. Its main recommendations are these:
**A neutral commission. **Take the reform of the electoral rules away from the outgoing secretary-general and entrust it to a commission led by the organisation's administrator, with no further extension. The letter also calls on Mrs Mushikiwabo to resign now.
**Shared leadership. **Rotate the post between regions, and between sub-regions within Africa, with a five-year term renewable once, reserved for former heads of state or government.
**One standard for all. **Apply the democratic charter to every member, Rwanda included, and take the war in the Congo seriously.
**French as a shared language. **Reject the idea that French has become an African language, or that the Francophonie should become an African organisation. Given the hostility towards France across much of the continent and the legacy of colonialism, either step would provoke more rejection, because it would signal that French stands above African languages. Develop French alongside African languages instead, through online translation tools, the Kinshasa academy and school curricula that deal with African issues. In international cooperation, too, an African-only Francophonie would be counterproductive: its value lies in linking Africa with the rest of the French-speaking world.
**Impact, not numbers. **Report each year on what the organisation has changed in people's lives, in education, health, water and livelihoods.
**Open archives. **Ask every government holding files on 1994 and on the wars in Rwanda and Congo to publish them for historians from every side.
Conclusion: One Capital Is Not a Continent
Taken together, the series tells one story. Macron hoped that reconciliation with Kigali would open the door to Africa. Instead it tied French policy to one government, weakened France's credibility elsewhere, and handed the Francophonie to a leadership that, in our judgement, served Kigali's diplomacy more than the French language or the organisation's democratic values. Phnom Penh was where the bill arrived.
The next twelve months will decide whether the Francophonie recovers. If its members choose their next leader openly, under fair rules, and measure the organisation by its impact on ordinary people, the crisis could become a turning point. If they allow another extension, they risk losing the largest French-speaking country in the world.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why did the Francophonie fail to elect a secretary-general in 2026?
The members could not reach a consensus. The DRC opposed a third term for Louise Mushikiwabo over Rwanda's alleged support for the M23 rebels, Rwanda refused to withdraw her, and on 16 November 2026 the members postponed the election to 2027.
Why did Macron support Louise Mushikiwabo in 2018?
Macron backed her as part of his reconciliation with Paul Kagame's government, announcing his support in May 2018. Critics, including former French ministers for the Francophonie, objected because Rwanda had moved from French to English and because of its human rights record.
What happened between Macron and Kagame in Phnom Penh?
According to Jeune Afrique, the two presidents held a heated private meeting on 15 November 2026 after Rwanda refused Macron's written request to withdraw Mrs Mushikiwabo. Kagame reportedly called Macron the sole factor of division at the summit. Neither government commented publicly.
Could the DRC leave the Francophonie?
Kinshasa has said Mrs Mushikiwabo's departure in twelve months is non-negotiable and has warned that it would draw the consequences of a choice that went against its values. Our analysis is that a further extension would very probably push the DRC out of the organisation.
Read the Full Series
This summary only scratches the surface. Each article in our series goes deeper, with the full evidence, sources and analysis behind the points above. Read the open letter to President Macron, our analysis of why his Rwanda-centred Africa policy failed, our investigation into how Franco-Rwandan relations contributed to France's decline in Africa, and our French-language articles on Louise Mushikiwabo's third-term bid. All are listed in the references below. If you find them useful, share them with others who care about Africa's future.
References
Africa Realities Media (2026a) 'Why President Macron's Rwanda-Based Africa Policy Failed to Deliver', 8 November. Available at: https://www.africarealities.com/2026/11/why-macron-rwanda-based-africa-policy-failed-to-deliver.html
Africa Realities Media (2026b) 'Pourquoi la politique africaine du Président Macron, centrée sur le Rwanda, n'a pas porté ses fruits', 8 November. Available at: https://www.africarealities.com/2026/11/politique-africaine-macron-rwanda-echec.html
Africa Realities Media (2026c) 'How Rwanda-France Diplomatic Relations Contributed to France's Decline in Africa', 9 November. Available at: https://www.africarealities.com/2026/11/rwanda-france-relations-france-decline-africa.html
Africa Realities Media (2026d) 'Comment les relations diplomatiques entre le Rwanda et la France ont contribué au déclin de la France en Afrique', 10 November. Available at: https://www.africarealities.com/2026/11/relations-france-rwanda-declin-influence-francaise-afrique.html
Africa Realities Media (2026e) 'Quelles sont les conséquences d'un troisième mandat de Mushikiwabo à l'OIF ?', 6 November. Available at: https://www.africarealities.com/2026/11/mushikiwabo-troisieme-mandat-francophonie-rdc.html
Africa Realities Media (2026f) 'OIF : Louise Mushikiwabo, une candidature embarrassante pour un troisième mandat de trop', 10 April. Available at: https://www.africarealities.com/2026/04/oif-louise-mushikiwabo-une-candidature_0875721227.html
Africa Realities Media (2026g) 'An Open Letter to Macron After Kagame's Humiliation in Phnom Penh', 19 November. Available at: https://www.africarealities.com/2026/11/open-letter-macron-kagame-humiliation-phnom-penh.html
| African lives are not worth less. African deaths are not normal. Western interests must never become a licence to kill African people. |
|---|
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Author: Africa Realities Media Editorial Team
Disclaimer: This article summarises analysis and opinion published by Africa Realities Media. Reported diplomatic exchanges, including President Macron's reported letter to President Kagame and their private meeting in Phnom Penh, are attributed to the media that reported them and have not been publicly confirmed by the French or Rwandan governments. Allegations concerning Rwanda's role in eastern Congo are denied by Kigali. Interpretations of motives and causes are the editorial judgement of Africa Realities Media. Nothing in this article states or implies that any individual acted unlawfully.

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