Can Kagame Outlast US Sanctions? Rwanda’s Five Bets on the DRC War

Waiting for a New Policy: Are Kagame’s Hopes of Outlasting the Sanctions Realistic?

Kigali’s strategy in eastern Congo now rests on a single assumption: that Washington, Brussels and the UN will tire before Rwanda does. The evidence suggests some of those hopes are sound, and others are already failing.

African lives are not worth less. African deaths are not normal. Western interests must never become a licence to kill African people.

Introduction: The Strategy of Waiting

On 28 October 2026 the US Treasury sanctioned Rwanda’s Ministry of Defence and Zigama Credit and Savings Society, a financial institution serving Rwanda’s security services, under Executive Order 13413, as amended, citing their roles in facilitating the Rwanda Defence Force’s activities and support for M23 in eastern Congo. They are the latest in a series of measures that now cover the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), four of its senior commanders, a Kigali gold refinery and the ministry that directs them all. Rwanda has not withdrawn. Its troops remain in North and South Kivu, M23 still holds Goma and Bukavu, and Kigali continues to describe the measures as one-sided.

In our companion analysis we set out why Rwanda is not leaving Congo and why the hope that a future Democratic administration will rescue it is unrealistic. This piece goes further. It asks whether the wider set of policy changes Kigali appears to be counting on, in Washington, in European capitals, in the Gulf and Beijing, at the UN and on the battlefield itself, is likely to arrive in time.

It examines five bets that appear to underpin Rwanda’s strategy, the regional risk posed by Burundi, the human cost of waiting, and the steps that would end the waiting game. The bets are our reading of Rwandan strategy, drawn from its public statements and conduct, not declared policy.

Bet One: Washington Will Change Its Mind

Kigali’s first and oldest hope is that American pressure is temporary. For thirty years that hope was usually justified. The question now is whether 2026 is different.

Three facts suggest it is. The first is consistency. Washington has escalated four times in twenty months: the designation of James Kabarebe, Rwanda’s Minister of State for Regional Integration, on 20 February 2025; the RDF and four senior commanders on 2 March 2026; the Gasabo Gold Refinery, three mining companies and two individuals on 25 June 2026; and the Ministry of Defence and Zigama on 28 October 2026. On 13 October, two weeks before the latest designations, US Ambassador Jeffrey Bartos told the Security Council that Rwanda must withdraw “immediately and unconditionally”. The State Department has also rated Rwanda at Level 3, reconsider travel, since May 2026.

The second is that Washington has not been one-sided, which removes Kigali’s main diplomatic argument. In April 2026 the Treasury sanctioned former Congolese president Joseph Kabila for supporting M23, and in June it designated commanders of the FDLR alongside M23. The US is applying pressure to several actors, not singling out Rwanda.

The third is the calendar. Next week’s midterm elections will decide Congress, not sanctions policy, which belongs to the executive. The earliest a new president could take office is January 2029. And as we argued in the companion piece, the recent Democratic record, from the Obama-era aid cuts of 2012 and 2013 to the Biden administration’s 2023 designation of RDF Brigadier General Andrew Nyamvumba and Democratic senators’ letters in 2023 and 2025, points towards more pressure on Rwanda, not less.

Verdict: unrealistic on present evidence. A shift in tone in Washington is possible. A reversal of sanctions while Rwandan troops remain in Congo appears unlikely under current US policy, although a future administration could change course.

The Price of Reversal

There is also a moral and political cost that no Democratic administration could easily carry. Sanctions relief that followed a verified withdrawal and credible compliance commitments would be a legitimate outcome of negotiation. But lifting sanctions while Rwandan troops remain in Congo, without any corresponding change in conduct, could only be read as rewarding the very conduct the sanctions were imposed to stop: the occupation of Goma and Bukavu, the extraction of coltan and gold, and defiance of a unanimous Security Council resolution. It would mean accepting a humanitarian catastrophe in which 6.4 million people are internally displaced across the DRC, most of them in the east, and tens of thousands of sexual violence cases are recorded each year.

A party that has spent years accusing its opponents of transactional foreign policy cannot credibly lift pressure on an army the US Treasury has found fighting alongside an abusive rebel group. Any administration that did so, Democratic or Republican, would be judged in Congo and beyond as having made peace with the atrocities rather than with Congo. That is a further reason the bet on a Democratic reversal is unlikely to pay.

Bet Two: Europe Will Stay Divided

Kigali’s second hope is far stronger. Europe has condemned Rwanda’s role in Congo but has not matched American measures, and it still buys Rwandan services.

What Europe Has Done

On 17 March 2025 the EU Council listed nine people and one company over the M23 offensive, including Rwandan military officers, the head of Rwanda’s mines, petroleum and gas board, and the Gasabo Gold Refinery that Washington later sanctioned. The UK paused most bilateral aid in February 2025, ended high-level attendance at Rwandan government events, suspended future defence training and began reviewing export licences for the RDF.

What Europe Has Not Done

Twenty months on, the EU has not sanctioned the RDF as an institution, its senior commanders or the Ministry of Defence. EUobserver reported in March 2026 that France, Belgium and Germany were among member states pressing for tougher measures, but that a decision at the Foreign Affairs Council was unlikely. Congolese ministers have described the EU as reluctant. The European Network for Central Africa (EurAc) said in April 2026 that the EU had still not matched the US sanctions on the RDF.

Brussels also has not suspended its 2024 memorandum of understanding with Rwanda on critical raw materials, despite calls from the European Parliament, Kinshasa and civil society. Congolese communications minister Patrick Muyaya told EUobserver that Rwanda’s coltan exports rose 213 per cent in the first half of 2025, a claim that has not been independently verified. The UN Group of Experts reported in June 2026, however, that Rwanda’s coltan and cassiterite exports rose sharply from the second quarter of 2025, a trend not supported by its domestic production and closely aligned with output from M23-controlled areas.

Germany: Suspended, Not Sanctioned

Germany moved earlier than most. On 4 March 2025, after M23 took Goma and Bukavu, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development stopped approving new financial commitments to Rwanda, began reviewing existing cooperation and withdrew high-level participation from Rwandan government development events. Berlin demanded that Rwanda withdraw its forces and end support for M23, while saying that Rwanda’s security concerns must be taken seriously.

Because sanctions are agreed at EU level, Berlin’s main lever beyond aid is the Council. EUobserver reported in March 2026 that Germany, with France and Belgium, was among the member states pressing for tougher EU measures. Germany has therefore gone further than the EU collectively, but it has not used its weight to force agreement on matching the US designations. Its position illustrates Europe’s problem: individual governments condemn, suspend and press, while the Union as a whole hesitates.

Where Europe Is Moving

There are signs of change. EU member states did not renew European Peace Facility funding for the RDF mission in Mozambique when it expired in May 2026, and EUobserver noted that making such payments could conflict with US Treasury warnings about transactions with sanctioned parties. But the troops did not leave. In May 2026 Rwanda’s foreign minister said Mozambique had secured funding for the mission, without disclosing the amount, the source or the terms, and TotalEnergies’ gas project in Cabo Delgado continues under Rwandan protection.

This is not necessarily hypocrisy. A European government can support sanctions over Rwanda’s conduct in Congo while still wanting Rwandan troops to secure a gas project in Mozambique. But it shows that Europe is pursuing competing objectives, security and energy in one country and accountability in another, and Kigali can exploit the gap between them. What the EU closes collectively, others may keep open by different routes.

Relations with London remain strained in other ways. Rwanda filed a notice of arbitration against the UK in November 2025 over the cancelled migration partnership, a reminder that the scheme still carries financial weight in the relationship. And the Rwanda–DRC dispute has reached the Francophonie, where Kinshasa nominated Juliana Lumumba to challenge the incumbent secretary general, Rwanda’s former foreign minister Louise Mushikiwabo.

Verdict: partly realistic. Of all Kigali’s hopes, this one has the best foundation. Europe’s dependence on Rwandan troops in Mozambique, its interest in Rwandan minerals and its internal divisions give Kigali room. But the trend is against Rwanda: funding has been cut, the pressure from France, Belgium and Germany is real, and US sanctions also increase compliance risks for European financial institutions, particularly where transactions involve designated entities or the US financial system.

Bet Three: The Gulf and China Will Fill the Gap

Kigali’s third hope is that non-Western partners will soften the impact of Western pressure. Here the picture is mixed.

Qatar is the most important. It mediates the separate talks between Kinshasa and M23, which produced the Doha Framework for Peace in November 2025, and it brokered a Kagame–Tshisekedi meeting in March 2025. Through Qatar Airways it holds 60 per cent of the roughly $1.3 billion Bugesera International Airport project. That gives Doha both a stake in Rwanda’s prestige economy and a reason to keep Kigali inside the peace process rather than isolated from it.

China is a growing economic partner. China’s ambassador said two-way trade reached a record $849 million in 2025, though Rwanda’s statistics office has not confirmed the total. In the first quarter of 2026 China supplied about a quarter of Rwanda’s imports and took a similar share of its exports, and it is funding a new Kigali access road by grant. The US Treasury’s own findings say Zigama paid suppliers in China and elsewhere for RDF weapons and equipment.

Verdict: a cushion, not a replacement. Gulf investment and Chinese trade reduce the pain of sanctions but cannot remove it. Most international finance still clears through dollar and euro systems, which is exactly where the Zigama designation bites. Qatar, as a mediator with deep ties to Washington, is unlikely to openly underwrite a party the US has sanctioned for breaching an agreement Doha helped support. China trades with everyone but rarely spends political capital to shield a partner from Security Council resolutions it voted for. Resolution 2773 was adopted unanimously, with China’s vote.

Bet Four: The FDLR Argument Will Win

Kigali’s fourth hope is diplomatic. Rwanda insists that its forces are in Congo because the FDLR remains active and is supported by Kinshasa. The FDLR was founded by former Rwandan army and militia leaders implicated in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi; not all of its present members took part in the genocide, but its leadership and origins trace back to it. It hopes that if the FDLR issue stays unresolved, the international community will eventually accept its presence as defensive.

This argument contains a real grievance, and it should be stated fairly. The Washington Accords commit the DRC to neutralise the FDLR. The Security Council has also demanded that Congolese forces end any collaboration with the group. Kinshasa signed a protocol on 30 May 2026 on the disarmament and cantonment of FDLR elements, and said in late July that an FDLR faction had joined it. Rwanda rejected the approach, arguing that the Accords require the FDLR to be neutralised, not negotiated with. At joint security talks in Geneva in August and September, mediated by the United States, Qatar, Togo and the African Union Commission, neither the neutralisation of the FDLR nor Rwanda’s lifting of its defensive measures had been declared complete.

Kinshasa’s Own Record

Kigali’s argument is strengthened by Kinshasa’s own conduct, and an honest account must say so. The UN Group of Experts reported in June 2024 (S/2024/432) that the Congolese government was making growing use of the FDLR against M23. Its final report of July 2025 (S/2025/446) went further, stating that the Congolese government continues to rely on the Wazalendo militias and the FDLR as auxiliary forces, and that these groups had reorganised and begun retaliatory attacks. A state that arms or coordinates with an armed group founded by genocide perpetrators hands its adversary a ready-made justification.

The same July 2025 report is equally clear about Rwanda. It found that RDF operations in eastern Congo were planned and directed from Kigali, including by James Kabarebe, that the RDF ran an advanced headquarters in Gisenyi across from Goma, that around 6,000 Rwandan troops were deployed in January and February 2025, and that Rwanda exercised direct control over M23 in order to secure minerals, farmland and political influence. The experts also reported that Kigali had itself recruited former FDLR fighters for reconnaissance and intelligence work inside Congo.

Both governments, in other words, have used armed proxies. But the scale is not equivalent. Kinshasa’s collaboration with the FDLR is a serious violation that it must end. Rwanda’s deployment of regular troops, which the UN Group of Experts in its June 2026 report conservatively estimated at 14,000 to 18,000 as of December 2025, is of a different order. That is an expert estimate rather than a verified headcount. Human Rights Watch concluded in June 2026 that Rwanda’s effective control over M23-held areas meets the legal threshold for belligerent occupation. The first cannot justify the second, and the international community should demand that both stop at the same time, under independent verification.

But the FDLR argument has a structural weakness. The FDLR’s main recent positions, as even Rwanda’s New Times has described them, lay in Nyiragongo territory in North Kivu, close to the Rwandan border. Yet the UN Group of Experts’ conservative estimate for December 2025 placed more Rwandan troops in South Kivu, 8,000 to 10,000, than in North Kivu, 6,000 to 8,000, and found that Rwanda deployed over 8,000 troops for the offensive on Uvira, on the Burundian border far to the south. M23 and Rwandan forces also took Bukavu and the Rubaya coltan mines. A security operation does not need a mining ministry, gold escorts or a financial institution moving tens of millions of dollars for a rebel administration.

Verdict: unrealistic as a path to legitimacy, effective as a delaying tactic. The FDLR question will not persuade Washington to lift sanctions. It does, however, allow Kigali to slow the verification process and blame Kinshasa. That is why the fastest way to remove Rwanda’s excuse is for the DRC to deliver a verifiable, internationally monitored FDLR disarmament.

Bet Five: The UN Cannot Do Without Rwandan Peacekeepers

Kigali’s fifth hope is institutional. According to UN figures, Rwanda was the largest contributor of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping in February 2026, with 4,405 troops and police, narrowly ahead of Nepal with 4,340, mainly in South Sudan and the Central African Republic. Forbidden Stories has reported that Kigali uses this role as a shield against UN sanctions, with a former official describing the threat to withdraw peacekeepers as the government’s standard response to pressure.

The UN’s position is genuinely difficult. Its peacekeeping budget is under severe strain, partly because of US funding cuts that Democratic senators criticised in November 2025. Few countries can quickly replace thousands of trained troops. When the DRC asked the Security Council on 29 September 2026 to exclude Rwanda from future peacekeeping deployments, it was challenging one of the UN’s most relied-on contributors at the moment the organisation can least afford to lose one.

Verdict: realistic in the short term. This is the bet most likely to pay off for Kigali in the coming year. But it is eroding. US sanctions do not legally bar Rwanda from UN peacekeeping, which is a decision for the UN and the Security Council. Sanctions against senior military institutions do, however, create growing political, reputational and potentially financial complications for Rwanda’s participation, and make the arrangement harder for troop-receiving governments to explain to their own citizens.

The Regional Front: Burundi and the Risk of a Wider War

Kigali’s apparent strategy faces one risk that cannot be controlled through diplomacy or sanctions management: escalation with Burundi. Burundian troops have fought alongside Congolese forces in South Kivu. When M23 advanced on Uvira in December 2025, less than a week after the Washington Accords were signed, M23 claimed to have captured hundreds of Burundian soldiers, a claim by an armed group that could not be independently verified. The UN reported that nearly 25,000 people fled into Burundi in four days.

Burundi’s role is not neutral. Burundian troops remained in eastern Congo after the East African Community regional force left in December 2023 and joined the Congolese-led coalition fighting M23, which Rwandan officials say included the FDLR. Kigali has accused Burundian forces of cooperating with the militia rather than fighting it. In December 2025 President Kagame claimed that more than 20,000 Burundian troops were deployed in North and South Kivu; that figure comes from Kigali and has not been independently confirmed.

Relations between the two governments have been hostile for years. Burundi unilaterally closed its border with Rwanda early in 2024, after accusing Kigali of backing the RED-Tabara rebels behind a December 2023 attack, which Rwanda denied. In March 2025 President Évariste Ndayishimiye told the BBC he had intelligence that Rwanda was planning to attack Burundi, without presenting evidence; Rwanda’s foreign minister called the claim unfortunate and said the two militaries were already discussing de-escalation.

The US Treasury warned in March 2026 that M23’s continued presence near the Burundian border, and the RDF’s support for it, risked turning the conflict into a broader regional war. Rwanda and Burundi have a long history of mutual accusations. A direct clash would transform a sanctions dispute into a regional crisis, and the international response to a cross-border war would be far harsher than anything Kigali has faced so far. Waiting is only a viable strategy if the war stays contained, and that is not within Rwanda’s gift.

The Human Cost of Waiting

Every month that Kigali waits for a better policy environment is measured in Congolese lives. These are national figures for the DRC as a whole, but the crisis is concentrated in the east. The 2026 humanitarian response plan identifies 14.9 million people in need across the country. Sida’s detailed March 2026 analysis cites 6.4 million internally displaced people nationally as of January 2026, most of them in the eastern provinces, and about 3.2 million people in emergency levels of food insecurity.

Between January and September 2025, humanitarian service providers across the DRC recorded more than 160,000 reported cases of gender-based violence, including over 90,000 cases of sexual violence; these are reported cases, and the true number is likely higher. The fighting around Uvira in December 2025 killed more than 70 civilians and displaced over 200,000 people within days, and the World Food Programme suspended operations across South Kivu, cutting off food support to 25,000 people.

At the same time, the international response is shrinking. The 2026 appeal sought $1.4 billion, and by December 2025 the previous plan had received only about a fifth of its funding, the lowest level since 2017. Sanctions on Rwanda and aid cuts to Congo are happening simultaneously. The result is that pressure on the occupier grows slowly, while support for the occupied falls quickly.

What Would End the Waiting Game

If Kigali’s strategy depends on time, the response must make time expensive. That means acting on the bets that are still paying off for Rwanda, not only the ones that are already failing.

Europe must close the gap. The EU and UK should match US designations against the RDF, its commanders, the Ministry of Defence and Zigama, suspend the 2024 raw materials memorandum, and agree that no member state will fund the RDF bilaterally in Mozambique while it occupies Congolese territory.

Verification must replace promises. Rwanda’s disengagement and the FDLR’s neutralisation should be monitored by an independent mechanism with access to both sides of the border and published reports, so that neither government can use the other’s delay as cover.

The UN must set conditions. New Rwandan peacekeeping deployments should be frozen until Resolution 2773 is implemented, with a clear, public timetable for review rather than an open-ended threat.

Mineral buyers must act. Refiners and manufacturers should treat coltan, tin and gold exported from Rwanda as high-risk until independent tracing can separate Rwandan production from Congolese supply.

Humanitarian funding must not be the casualty. Donors who are reducing support to Kigali should redirect resources to Congolese civilians, not cut both.

Conclusion: Time Is Not Neutral

Kagame’s hopes are not all unrealistic. Europe’s divisions, the UN’s dependence on Rwandan troops and Gulf investment give Kigali real room to manoeuvre in the short term. But the two bets that matter most are failing. Washington is not about to reverse course, and no future administration will take office before 2029. The FDLR argument can delay a settlement but cannot legitimise the occupation of Rubaya, Goma and Bukavu.

Waiting has worked for Rwanda before because the world eventually moved on. This time the sanctions sit higher up the chain of command, the evidence is part of the US legal record, and the risk of a regional war grows with every month. Time is not neutral. For Kigali it is becoming more expensive. For the people of eastern Congo it has already cost far too much.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why has Rwanda not withdrawn its troops from eastern Congo despite US sanctions?

In our interpretation, Rwanda’s continued involvement reflects its stated security claims about the FDLR, its strategic and economic interests in eastern Congo, and an apparent expectation that international pressure can be managed, through European security partnerships, Gulf investment, its role in UN peacekeeping and time. These are our reading of its conduct, not confirmed government motives.

Is Rwanda hoping US sanctions will be lifted?

Rwanda has not said so directly, but its response to each round of sanctions, calling them one-sided while keeping troops in Congo, suggests it expects US pressure to ease over time. The evidence from 2025 and 2026 points to escalating pressure instead.

Has the EU sanctioned Rwanda?

Partly. In March 2025 the EU sanctioned several Rwandan military officers, the head of Rwanda’s mines board and the Gasabo Gold Refinery. It has not sanctioned the Rwanda Defence Force as an institution or the Ministry of Defence, as the US has.

Has the UK sanctioned Rwanda?

In February 2025 the UK paused most bilateral aid, ended high-level attendance at Rwandan government events, suspended future defence training and began reviewing RDF export licences. It has coordinated with partners on further measures but has not matched the full US designations.

What is the FDLR and why does it matter?

The FDLR is an armed group in eastern DRC founded by former Rwandan army and militia leaders implicated in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. Rwanda says the group’s presence justifies its defensive measures; the Washington Accords require the DRC to neutralise it.

Has Germany sanctioned Rwanda?

Germany suspended new development funding to Rwanda on 4 March 2025 and withdrew from high-level Rwandan government events. Sanctions are decided at EU level, where Germany has pressed for tougher measures that the EU has not yet agreed.

Does the DRC government work with the FDLR?

UN experts reported in July 2025 that the Congolese government continues to rely on the FDLR and Wazalendo militias as auxiliary forces. The same report found that Rwanda directly controls M23 and deployed around 6,000 troops in early 2025.

Could the DRC conflict become a regional war?

The risk is real. Burundian troops have fought in South Kivu, M23 advanced on Uvira near the Burundian border in December 2025, and the US Treasury warned in March 2026 of escalation into a broader regional war.

How many people are displaced in eastern DRC?

Sida’s detailed analysis cites 6.4 million internally displaced people across the DRC as of January 2026, most of them in the eastern provinces, with 14.9 million people in need of humanitarian assistance nationwide.

Can Qatar or China replace Western support for Rwanda?

Not fully. Qatar is a major investor and mediator, and China is Rwanda’s fastest-growing trade partner, but most international finance still clears through dollar and euro systems that US sanctions reach.

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US Department of the Treasury (2026) ‘Treasury sanctions Rwandan gold refinery and network enabling illicit conflict minerals trade’, 25 June. Available at: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0543

US Department of the Treasury (2026) ‘Treasury sanctions Rwandan Ministry of Defence and financial institution supporting M23’, 28 October. Available at: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0668

African lives are not worth less. African deaths are not normal. Western interests must never become a licence to kill African people.

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Author: Africa Realities Media Editorial Team

Disclaimer: This article combines reporting from publicly available sources with the editorial analysis of Africa Realities Media. Descriptions of Rwanda’s strategy and the assessments of whether its hopes are realistic are informed judgements, not established facts. Claims by governments and armed groups are attributed to them and distinguished from findings by independent investigators. The Government of Rwanda denies supporting M23. Nothing in this article constitutes legal, financial or investment advice.