Legal Realism, Sovereignty and the Pan-African Future
By Saeed Mohamed Ahmed (Surwaale Jr.)
Opinion and Analysis | Africa Realities Media
Abstract
This article examines Somaliland's claim to sovereignty through international law, constitutional history, democratic self-determination and the political experience of state-building in the Horn of Africa. It responds to Professor Abdi Ismail Samatar's criticisms of Somaliland's independence movement, particularly his characterisation of the project as sectarian and his comparison with apartheid-era Bantustans.
The discussion follows an exchange published by Pambazuka News in July 2026, beginning with Samatar's Caged Somalia: Can it be Liberated from a Demonic Elite?, followed by my response, The Mogadishu Blind Spot, and Samatar's subsequent rejoinder, Sectarian Navel-gazing Framework is Oxymoronic to Somali & African Ambitions.
Drawing on the scholarship of Paolo Contini, Eugene Cotran, Hussein M. Adam, Mark Bradbury, Marleen Renders, Michael Walls and others, the article examines the legal difficulties surrounding the 1960 union, the relevance of inherited colonial boundaries, Somaliland's political institutions and the relationship between African unity and self-determination.
The central argument is that Somaliland's claim cannot adequately be dismissed as tribal separatism. It rests on a distinct historical experience, serious legal arguments and more than three decades of efforts to establish political institutions and maintain self-government. Nevertheless, its legal status remains disputed, and the political aspirations of communities within its claimed territory require consideration.
The article concludes that a credible Pan-African approach must address these competing claims through historical evidence, legal consistency, democratic participation and respect for the people directly affected.
I. The Accusation and Its Mirror: Somaliland, Sovereignty and Political Legitimacy
The debate between Professor Abdi Ismail Samatar and myself concerns fundamental questions about Somalia's political future, Somaliland's sovereignty and the meaning of African self-determination.
In his July 2026 article, Caged Somalia: Can it be Liberated from a Demonic Elite?, Professor Samatar examined the political difficulties facing Somalia and criticised the conduct of its governing elites.
My subsequent response, The Mogadishu Blind Spot, questioned the extent to which his analysis adequately recognised the historical experiences, institutional achievements and political aspirations of Somaliland.
Professor Samatar's rejoinder challenged my position and questioned the intellectual foundations of Somaliland's independence movement.
Particularly contentious was his comparison between Somaliland's political leadership and the Black administrators of apartheid-era Bantustans.
The analogy raises a significant question: can a political movement claiming self-determination through historical sovereignty and locally developed institutions reasonably be compared with territories created by an apartheid government to perpetuate racial exclusion?
My answer is that the comparison overlooks fundamental differences in historical origin, political agency and institutional development.
Apartheid-era Bantustans were designed and controlled within a system that denied the Black majority equal political rights. Somaliland's modern independence movement, by contrast, emerged from the breakdown of the Somali Republic, the violence experienced under Mohamed Siad Barre's government and locally organised efforts to restore peace and political institutions.
This distinction does not mean that Somaliland's political institutions are beyond criticism. Their democratic performance, inclusiveness and treatment of dissent remain legitimate subjects of scrutiny.
It does mean, however, that Somaliland's political history requires analysis on its own terms.
Iqbal Jhazbhay's study, Somaliland: Africa's Best Kept Secret, drew attention to the territory's achievements in peacebuilding and governance. Other scholars, including Mark Bradbury, Marleen Renders and Michael Walls, have examined the interaction between traditional authority, political negotiation and state-building.
Their research demonstrates that Somaliland's experience cannot be reduced to a simple account of tribal mobilisation.
The central issue is whether Professor Samatar applies a consistent historical and legal framework to the questions of Somali unity, sovereignty and self-determination.
To answer that question, the legal foundations of the 1960 union must be examined.
II. The 1960 Union: Was Somaliland's Sovereignty Lawfully Extinguished?
Somaliland's independence on 26 June 1960
On 26 June 1960, the former British Somaliland Protectorate became independent as the State of Somaliland.
Five days later, on 1 July 1960, it entered a political union with the former Trust Territory of Somalia, administered by Italy under United Nations trusteeship.
The resulting Somali Republic was intended to unite two territories sharing substantial linguistic, cultural, religious and historical connections.
The union also reflected the wider Pan-Somali aspiration to bring Somali-inhabited territories together under a common political framework.
Nevertheless, the manner in which the union was legally established has generated substantial academic debate.
Somaliland's independence movement argues that its sovereignty existed before the formation of the Somali Republic and that defects in the union's legal instruments are central to understanding its subsequent claim to restore independence.
This argument deserves examination rather than dismissal.
The legal difficulties surrounding the union
Paolo Contini's The Somali Republic: An Experiment in Legal Integration (1969) remains an important account of the legal integration process.
Contini documented the difficulties arising from the rapid transition from two separate constitutional and administrative systems into a single republic.
The northern and southern territories had different legal traditions and institutional arrangements. Their intended political integration therefore required properly coordinated legal instruments.
The Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law was adopted in Hargeisa on 27 June 1960. However, the legal steps taken in Mogadishu did not reproduce precisely the same instrument.
Eugene Cotran's 1963 study, Legal Problems Arising out of the Formation of the Somali Republic, examined these irregularities and raised questions about the legal procedures through which the union was created.
Hussein M. Adam also addressed the political and constitutional consequences of the union, including the grievances that developed in Somaliland.
These historical assessments provide substantial grounds for questioning whether the formation of the union followed all the procedures ordinarily expected of an agreement between two newly independent states.
However, identifying procedural defects is not identical to establishing that the Somali Republic never acquired legal existence.
The republic subsequently operated as a recognised state, exercised governmental authority and participated in international relations.
The competing legal interpretations must therefore be distinguished.
One interpretation holds that the union's original defects undermined its legitimacy and provide a foundation for Somaliland's subsequent claim to restored sovereignty.
Another holds that the Somali Republic's subsequent constitutional development, governmental practice and international recognition established a continuing state notwithstanding irregularities at its formation.
My position is that the first interpretation has not received the serious legal consideration it deserves.
The 1961 constitutional referendum
The constitutional referendum held on 20 June 1961 further exposed differences between the political expectations of northern and southern communities.
Historical accounts indicate that opposition to the proposed constitutional settlement was particularly strong in parts of the former State of Somaliland.
Although the constitution was approved nationally, the regional voting pattern illustrated a significant absence of political consensus.
The referendum therefore raises an important question: to what extent can a nationally approved constitution resolve objections arising from an earlier union between distinct sovereign territories?
The answer is not straightforward.
A national majority may establish constitutional authority within an existing state, but it does not necessarily resolve every question concerning the original consent of the territories forming that state.
The attempted military uprising by northern officers in December 1961 also demonstrated that dissatisfaction with the union was not merely a development of the late 1980s or early 1990s.
These tensions existed from the earliest period of the republic.
From political marginalisation to the restoration of independence
The grievances associated with the union developed alongside subsequent experiences of political centralisation, unequal development and authoritarian rule.
Under Siad Barre, the relationship between the central government and opposition movements in the north deteriorated catastrophically.
The bombardment of Hargeisa and Burao in 1988, together with extensive civilian suffering and displacement, became defining events in Somaliland's political memory.
Following the collapse of the Barre government in 1991, Somaliland's leadership declared the restoration of the independence originally attained on 26 June 1960.
The legal significance of that declaration remains disputed internationally.
However, the sequence of independence, union, political conflict, state collapse and restoration of self-government distinguishes Somaliland's claim from many conventional separatist movements.
It is therefore misleading to assume that the question can be resolved simply by describing Somaliland as a region attempting to break away from Somalia.
Somaliland's argument concerns whether a previously independent state can legitimately recover sovereignty following the collapse of a union whose formation and political operation remain contested.
That is a serious legal and historical question.
III. Pan-Somalism, Djibouti and the Principle of Inherited Borders
The Djibouti comparison
Pan-Somalism historically envisaged political unity among Somali-inhabited territories divided by colonial boundaries.
This aspiration extended beyond the former British Somaliland Protectorate and the former Italian-administered Trust Territory.
It also concerned Somali communities in French Somaliland, the Ogaden and other Somali-inhabited territories under Ethiopian administration, and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya.
Djibouti became independent from France on 27 June 1977 and subsequently developed its own sovereign institutions within internationally recognised boundaries.
The international acceptance of Djibouti's sovereignty demonstrates that shared Somali identity has not invariably required political incorporation into a single Somali state.
That observation raises an important question about consistency.
If Djibouti's separate sovereignty is compatible with the existence of a wider Somali cultural community, why must Somaliland's claim necessarily be interpreted as a rejection of Somali identity?
Somaliland's supporters argue that political sovereignty and cultural or ethnic identity are distinct questions.
A people may share language, religion and historical connections with neighbouring communities while maintaining separate political institutions.
Somaliland's independence movement should therefore be examined as a claim about sovereignty and governance, not automatically classified as hostility towards Somali identity.
The Ogaden question and the limits of Pan-Somalism
The historical aspiration for Greater Somalia also encountered the political realities of inherited African boundaries.
Somali-inhabited territories remained within Ethiopia and Kenya following decolonisation, while Djibouti established a separate state.
These outcomes illustrate the tension between national self-determination and the international protection of existing territorial boundaries.
A consistent Pan-Somali analysis must acknowledge that tension.
It cannot treat shared ethnic identity as decisive in one territorial dispute while accepting the consequences of inherited borders in another without explaining the distinction.
The question is not whether every Somali-inhabited territory should form an independent state. Rather, it is whether arguments about sovereignty are being applied consistently.
Uti possidetis juris and the 1964 OAU resolution
The principle of uti possidetis juris concerns the preservation of inherited boundaries as territories become independent states.
In Africa, this approach was reflected in the Organisation of African Unity's 1964 Cairo resolution, Border Disputes Among African States, AHG/Res. 16(I).
The resolution affirmed that member states would respect the borders existing when they achieved national independence.
Somaliland's argument draws upon the fact that the former British Somaliland Protectorate attained independence within identifiable territorial boundaries on 26 June 1960.
Its supporters maintain that these boundaries deserve the same consideration given to those of other African states.
This argument has force, but it also encounters an important legal objection.
Somalia's internationally recognised territorial boundaries subsequently incorporated both former territories, and the African Union has generally defended Somalia's unity and territorial integrity.
Consequently, the OAU resolution does not automatically settle Somaliland's claim.
Its significance depends partly on how the relevant moment of independence is interpreted and how the subsequent union is understood.
The principle should therefore be examined rather than invoked selectively by either side.
For Somaliland, it provides an important foundation for the argument that its independence claim concerns the restoration of a previously existing territorial state.
For opponents of recognition, the same African commitment to territorial stability supports the continued sovereignty of Somalia.
A convincing legal analysis must engage with both interpretations.
IV. Why the Bantustan Comparison Fails to Explain Somaliland
Professor Samatar's use of the Bantustan analogy requires closer examination.
What were the Bantustans?
Under apartheid, the South African government established ethnically designated territories as part of a wider system of racial segregation and political exclusion.
These territories were intended to deny Black South Africans equal citizenship and political rights within a unified South Africa.
Their political institutions operated within a system designed and controlled by the apartheid state.
Mahmood Mamdani's Citizen and Subject (1996) provides an influential account of how colonial and post-colonial systems used administrative divisions and customary authority to organise political control.
That history is relevant to debates about ethnicity, governance and political fragmentation.
However, the historical origins of the Bantustans differ fundamentally from Somaliland's experience.
Somaliland's indigenous peacebuilding process
Following the collapse of Somalia's central government, Somaliland's communities developed political arrangements through negotiations involving elders, political leaders, former armed movements and local representatives.
Major conferences included those held in Burco in 1991, Borama in 1993 and Hargeisa in 1997.
These negotiations helped establish frameworks for reconciliation, governance and institutional development.
Traditional dispute-resolution practices, including xeer, were incorporated into broader arrangements for political authority.
The 1993 Borama conference was particularly important in developing a constitutional and institutional framework that combined modern state institutions with elements of customary governance.
This process has been examined by scholars including Bradbury, Renders, Walls and Rebecca Richards.
It represents an important example of political institutions emerging through local negotiation rather than being imposed exclusively through external intervention.
Nevertheless, indigenous origins do not guarantee permanent legitimacy.
Political institutions must continue to be assessed through their treatment of citizens, their protection of rights and their capacity to accommodate communities with competing political aspirations.
The 2001 constitutional referendum
On 31 May 2001, Somaliland held a referendum on a constitution affirming its separate political status.
Officially reported results indicated that approximately 97.1 per cent of valid votes supported the constitution.
The Initiative and Referendum Institute's international observation mission concluded that the referendum was conducted openly and fairly, although its monitoring was limited and did not cover every region.
This distinction matters.
The referendum demonstrated substantial support among those who participated, but it should not be presented as conclusive evidence of unanimous consent throughout all territories claimed by Somaliland.
Political differences in Sool and parts of Sanaag, for example, require separate consideration.
Even with these qualifications, the referendum remains an important development in Somaliland's constitutional history.
Political institutions and democratic development
Somaliland has developed a bicameral legislature, executive institutions, a judicial system and a multiparty electoral framework.
Its political history includes competitive presidential and parliamentary elections, transfers of executive power and significant public participation.
These achievements distinguish its experience from the political arrangements imposed under apartheid.
Yet Somaliland's democratic development has also experienced electoral delays, restrictions on political activity, institutional weaknesses and disputes over representation.
Recognising those shortcomings does not invalidate its state-building achievements.
Rather, it establishes a more credible foundation for evaluating the strengths and limitations of its political system.
The Bantustan analogy fails because it obscures these historical and institutional differences.
Somaliland's experience should instead be examined through the more appropriate frameworks of post-conflict reconstruction, self-determination, constitutional development and contested sovereignty.
V. Eight Responses to Professor Samatar's Critique
Professor Samatar's rejoinder raises eight questions about Somaliland's legitimacy, governance and intellectual foundations.
Each deserves a substantive response.
1. The Sool conflict and SSC-Khaatumo
The conflict in Sool presents one of the most serious challenges to Somaliland's territorial and political claims.
The emergence of SSC-Khaatumo reflects longstanding disputes about political allegiance, representation, local authority and competing visions of sovereignty.
The conflict cannot adequately be explained as a minor administrative disagreement.
Nor can the perspectives of communities opposing Somaliland's authority simply be dismissed.
In 2023, fighting around Las Anod caused civilian deaths, injuries, widespread displacement and damage to civilian infrastructure.
Amnesty International documented indiscriminate shelling by Somaliland forces and called for accountability for violations by parties to the conflict.
These findings demand serious consideration.
A credible defence of Somaliland's claim to self-determination must recognise that the same principle raises questions concerning communities within its claimed borders.
At the same time, the existence of contested territory does not, by itself, demonstrate that every institution developed by Somaliland lacks legitimacy.
Many states experience territorial disagreements, internal political conflicts and disputes over representation.
The appropriate response is neither denial nor automatic rejection of Somaliland's wider political achievements.
Instead, the conflict underlines the need for political negotiation, civilian protection, accountability and meaningful participation by affected communities.
Somaliland's future legitimacy will depend partly on its capacity to address these questions.
2. Political tensions between central and western communities
Somaliland's political system has historically attempted to accommodate clan relationships through a combination of formal institutions and customary authority.
The incorporation of the Guurti, or House of Elders, represented an effort to integrate traditional mediation into the constitutional structure.
The transition to civilian leadership under President Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal and the participation of leaders from different communities were significant developments.
However, political inclusion cannot be assessed solely through the existence of representative institutions.
It also requires examining the distribution of authority, access to resources, accountability and the extent to which communities believe their interests are respected.
Political tensions in western Somaliland and elsewhere therefore deserve attention.
They should not automatically be interpreted as proof that Somaliland's entire state-building project has failed.
Rather, they demonstrate that its institutions, like those of other states, must continue to evolve.
3. The intellectual foundations of Somaliland scholarship
Professor Samatar's criticism of Somaliland-focused scholarship raises an important question about the relationship between academic research and political argument.
The work of Mark Bradbury, Marleen Renders, Michael Walls, Rebecca Richards and the Academy for Peace and Development cannot reasonably be reduced to an uncritical celebration of traditional institutions.
Their studies examine the difficult relationship between social authority, conflict, political negotiation and formal governance.
Bradbury's Becoming Somaliland (2008) analyses the processes through which Somaliland developed relative stability following the collapse of the Somali Republic.
Renders' Consider Somaliland (2012) examines the political role of traditional leaders and the complexity of state-building.
Walls' research explores the interaction between Somali political identity, customary practices and modern institutions.
These works are valuable because they do not assume that political development must follow a single externally prescribed institutional model.
Nevertheless, their findings should remain open to criticism.
Academic disagreement is most productive when competing interpretations are assessed through evidence, methodology and engagement with the original research rather than broad characterisations of entire scholarly traditions.
4. Collective action, the prisoner's dilemma and impoverishment
Professor Samatar raises a serious concern about the failure of Somali political elites to overcome divisions that undermine collective welfare.
This problem can be understood through theories of collective action.
Elinor Ostrom's Governing the Commons demonstrates that communities can, under appropriate conditions, develop institutions capable of managing shared resources and resolving cooperation problems.
Somaliland's experience offers one example of how locally negotiated institutions can contribute to political order.
The peace conferences, customary mediation mechanisms and development of electoral institutions suggest that political cooperation can emerge without comprehensive external state-building.
However, Somaliland has not eliminated poverty, inequality, unemployment or dependence on external economic relationships.
Its experience should therefore not be portrayed as a complete escape from the structural difficulties affecting the Horn of Africa.
The stronger argument is that Somaliland developed important mechanisms for collective political action despite difficult conditions.
That achievement deserves comparative study.
5. The question of inspiring political leadership
Assessments of political leadership inevitably involve normative judgements.
Professor Samatar's concerns about the quality of Somali political leadership cannot be answered simply by identifying prominent officeholders.
Nevertheless, Somaliland's history includes individuals and institutions that played important roles in conflict resolution and political reconstruction.
President Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal contributed to institutional consolidation and constitutional development.
The Guurti and other customary leaders participated in reconciliation processes.
Civil society organisations, businesspeople, diaspora communities and local political actors also contributed to peacebuilding and reconstruction.
These contributions should not be overlooked.
The question is not whether Somaliland's leaders were flawless.
It is whether their actions helped establish institutions capable of sustaining political cooperation after prolonged violence and institutional collapse.
The historical record provides substantial reasons to answer that question positively, while recognising continuing weaknesses in governance and accountability.
6. The African Union, inherited borders and neocolonialism
The African Union's defence of Somalia's territorial integrity reflects an established continental commitment to stability and inherited international boundaries.
That position deserves serious consideration.
However, Pan-Africanism has never been a single, uncontested doctrine.
Its intellectual traditions include arguments for continental integration, national independence, popular sovereignty, anti-colonial liberation and resistance to external domination.
Kwame Nkrumah warned that formal independence could coexist with continuing economic and political dependence.
These concerns remain relevant to contemporary debates about African sovereignty.
Somaliland raises a particular question about the relationship between territorial integrity and a population's expressed preference for separate political institutions.
The OAU's 1964 resolution was intended to reduce destabilising territorial disputes.
However, Somaliland's supporters argue that their claim concerns the restoration of borders existing at the moment of independence, rather than the creation of entirely new boundaries.
That argument does not automatically override the African Union's position.
It does, however, deserve consideration within the continent's broader principles of peaceful dispute resolution, political consent and self-determination.
A Pan-African framework should be capable of examining these questions without treating inherited state structures as immune from historical scrutiny.
7. Somaliland's relationship with Israel
Israel's formal recognition of Somaliland on 26 December 2025 introduced a significant development into the territory's longstanding diplomatic campaign.
It was the first formal recognition of Somaliland's claimed independence by a United Nations member state since its 1991 declaration.
The decision provoked strong opposition from Somalia and several regional and international actors, including the African Union.
Critics raised concerns about territorial integrity, regional security and Israel's wider geopolitical interests.
These concerns cannot simply be dismissed.
The political and humanitarian consequences of Israel's actions in Gaza also inform public assessments of its international relationships.
Nevertheless, understanding Somaliland's diplomatic calculations requires consideration of its prolonged exclusion from normal channels of international recognition.
For more than three decades, Somaliland's authorities have sought international acceptance, access to financial institutions, diplomatic relationships and greater opportunities for economic cooperation.
From this perspective, Israel's recognition can be understood as a strategic development in Somaliland's pursuit of international legitimacy.
Explaining that calculation is not equivalent to endorsing every policy of the recognising state.
A consistent analysis should distinguish between the legal question of recognition, the political interests motivating recognition and the moral assessment of the states involved.
The significance of Israel's decision will ultimately depend on its diplomatic consequences, the reactions of African institutions and the extent to which it changes Somaliland's international relationships.
8. Professor Samatar's membership of Somalia's Senate
Professor Samatar's role in Somalia's political institutions provides relevant context for understanding his public interventions.
However, institutional affiliation alone neither establishes nor invalidates an academic argument.
His criticisms of Somaliland should be evaluated on their substance.
Equally, Somaliland's political claims should be assessed through historical records, legal reasoning, institutional performance and the expressed preferences of its communities.
The purpose of scholarly disagreement should be to clarify those questions rather than reduce them to judgements about personal loyalty.
My disagreement with Professor Samatar is therefore primarily intellectual and political.
I contest his interpretation of the 1960 union, his characterisation of Somaliland's independence movement and his assessment of its state-building experience.
Those differences should be resolved through evidence and reasoned argument.
VI. Institutional Models: External Dependence and Local State-Building
The contrasting political experiences of Mogadishu and Hargeisa provide an opportunity to examine different approaches to state-building.
These differences should not be exaggerated into a claim that one system is entirely dependent and the other entirely self-reliant.
Both operate within complex regional and international economic and political relationships.
Nevertheless, important institutional distinctions exist.
The Mogadishu model: International assistance and federal reconstruction
The Federal Government of Somalia has relied heavily on international security assistance during its reconstruction.
African Union peace operations and bilateral security partnerships have played substantial roles in efforts to establish security and confront Al-Shabaab.
Somalia has also received significant external financial and technical support.
These arrangements reflect both the country's security challenges and the international community's commitment to supporting its federal institutions.
However, reliance on international support can create difficulties concerning domestic accountability, institutional capacity and long-term political sustainability.
The 2024 defence and economic cooperation agreement with Türkiye illustrates Somalia's efforts to strengthen its security capabilities through strategic partnerships.
Such agreements raise legitimate questions about the balance between sovereign decision-making and external influence.
They should, however, be assessed according to their actual legal terms rather than automatically characterised as transfers of sovereignty.
Somalia's political institutions have also operated through indirect electoral mechanisms, although electoral reform and the expansion of democratic participation remain important areas of political debate.
The central challenge is how to develop a more accountable and effective state while maintaining security and reducing dependence on external assistance.
The Hargeisa model: Locally negotiated institutions and domestic revenue
Somaliland's state-building process developed under different conditions.
Without the same international recognition or access to institutional financing, Somaliland relied heavily on local political negotiation, domestic revenue, commercial activity and contributions from diaspora communities.
Its security institutions developed without a comparable international peacekeeping presence.
The territory has also used commercial partnerships, including investment in Berbera Port, to expand economic activity and infrastructure.
Somaliland's electoral system has provided opportunities for direct public participation through presidential and parliamentary elections.
Its use of biometric voter registration represents another element of institutional development.
These achievements have attracted scholarly attention because they illustrate the possibilities of political reconstruction through locally generated arrangements.
Yet Somaliland also faces serious challenges.
Economic development remains uneven. Youth unemployment, political exclusion, institutional accountability and territorial disputes continue to affect its governance.
External trade, remittances, private investment and international partnerships also demonstrate that Somaliland is not economically isolated or entirely self-sufficient.
The more convincing distinction is therefore not between complete dependence and complete independence.
It is between different historical pathways through which political institutions have been constructed and sustained.
What can African state-building learn from these experiences?
The comparison between Somalia and Somaliland raises several questions relevant to the continent.
Can international assistance strengthen domestic institutions without undermining political ownership?
Can customary forms of authority coexist with democratic accountability?
What conditions allow political reconciliation to produce functioning public institutions?
How should international organisations respond when a territory establishes durable governing structures but remains in dispute with an internationally recognised state?
These questions cannot be answered through legal formalism alone.
They require attention to political history, institutional performance, human rights, democratic participation and international relations.
Somaliland's experience deserves recognition as an important case study in locally negotiated political reconstruction, irrespective of the final resolution of its international status.
VII. Conclusion: Beyond Sectarian Labels Towards Legal and Historical Realism
Somaliland's claim to sovereignty presents a complex question of African political history and international law.
It concerns a territory that attained independence on 26 June 1960, entered a union five days later, experienced severe political conflict and state violence, and declared the restoration of its independence in 1991.
Since that declaration, Somaliland has developed political institutions, conducted elections, negotiated internal agreements and sustained a substantial degree of self-government.
These achievements do not resolve every legal or political question surrounding recognition.
Nor do they remove the need to address territorial disputes, democratic shortcomings and the political preferences of communities that reject Somaliland's authority.
They do, however, challenge the suggestion that Somaliland's independence movement can be adequately explained as a purely sectarian project.
The legal difficulties surrounding the original union deserve serious investigation.
So do the historical consequences of centralised rule, the experiences of communities affected by state violence and the constitutional significance of Somaliland's subsequent political development.
Professor Samatar is right to question political fragmentation, elite interests and the danger that narrow identities can undermine collective welfare.
Those concerns are important throughout the Horn of Africa.
However, they do not justify treating every demand for separate sovereignty as inherently illegitimate.
The history of Pan-Africanism demonstrates that African unity and national self-determination have always existed in a relationship of tension as well as mutual reinforcement.
African political thought has sought both to overcome colonial fragmentation and to protect peoples from domination.
A credible approach to Somaliland must engage with both objectives.
The experience of the 1993 Borama conference remains particularly significant.
It illustrates how community representatives, traditional authorities and political actors contributed to rebuilding governance following institutional collapse.
The wider history of Somaliland's reconstruction demonstrates that effective political institutions can emerge through local initiative, compromise and sustained negotiation.
This experience should not be romanticised.
It was contested, imperfect and influenced by unequal distributions of authority and resources.
Nevertheless, it represents an important contribution to understanding political reconstruction in post-conflict Africa.
The historical development of education, public services and economic infrastructure also deserves consideration. Somaliland's leaders and citizens have frequently argued that northern communities experienced marginalisation under the former Somali Republic.
Such claims should be examined through documentary evidence, budgetary records and comparative historical research.
They should not be dismissed simply because they challenge the legitimacy of a previously unified state.
Ultimately, Somaliland's sovereignty question cannot be resolved by invoking unity as an unquestionable virtue or independence as an automatic entitlement.
Both positions require justification.
The relevant questions concern historical sovereignty, political consent, international law, territorial integrity, democratic accountability and the rights of affected communities.
My argument is that Somaliland has established a sufficiently substantial historical, legal and political case to deserve serious consideration as a claim to restored sovereignty.
Its experience also offers important lessons about peacebuilding, political negotiation and institution-building in Africa.
Whether one supports Somaliland's international recognition or continued Somali unity, those achievements should form part of any serious assessment.
The future of the Horn of Africa demands more than competing assertions of territorial entitlement.
It requires legal consistency, historical honesty, respect for political choice and a commitment to peaceful resolution.
Recognising the significance of indigenous state-building does not weaken Pan-Africanism.
It offers an opportunity to ground African unity in democratic legitimacy, mutual respect and the lived political experiences of African communities.
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About the Author
Saeed Mohamed Ahmed (Surwaale Jr.) is a Horn of Africa affairs analyst and geopolitical commentator whose work examines regional governance, state-building and democratic transitions.
He previously served as President of Gollis University and as Chief Director of Public Relations, Media and Communications for Somaliland's National Electoral Commission during the 2021 parliamentary and local council elections.
He has also held senior programme leadership roles with Alight International, formerly the American Refugee Committee, and the SONYO Umbrella.
His professional experience includes civil society leadership, communications, institutional development, business strategy and entrepreneurship.
His writing focuses on the relationship between constitutional history, political institutions, international law and the experience of communities in the Horn of Africa.
Editorial Disclaimer
This article is an independent opinion and analysis contribution by Saeed Mohamed Ahmed. The legal interpretations, political assessments and conclusions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the editorial position of Africa Realities Media.
Somaliland's international legal status, territorial claims and relationship with Somalia remain subjects of political and legal dispute. The article is intended to contribute to informed public debate and does not constitute authoritative legal advice or an institutional determination of sovereignty.
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