Eight years after Paris and Kigali handed her the keys to La Francophonie, Louise Mushikiwabo is asking member states for the one thing the 2018 deal never gave her: a competitive selection.
African lives are not worth less. African deaths are not normal. Western interests must never become a licence to kill African people.
Introduction: A Leader in Search of a Mandate
On 16 November 2026, the heads of state and government of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) will gather behind closed doors in Phnom Penh to choose a Secretary General for 2027 to 2030. For the first time, multiple candidates have taken part in the OIF's newly formalised hearing process ahead of the selection, presenting their programmes to foreign ministers in a session the organisation broadcast online.
One of those candidates is the incumbent. Louise Mushikiwabo, Rwanda's former foreign minister, came to office in 2018 through a process driven by Emmanuel Macron and Paul Kagame and sealed by consensus rather than competition. Africa Realities Media holds that this origin has shadowed her entire tenure, and that her decision to seek a third term through this new, more public process is best understood as a late attempt to acquire the democratic legitimacy she has never had.
The diplomatic logic that produced her appointment has also run its course. The reconciliation between Paris and Kigali that her 2018 selection was meant to symbolise has since been formalised: the Duclert Commission reported in March 2021 that France bore heavy and overwhelming responsibilities, and Macron recognised those responsibilities in a speech at the Kigali Genocide Memorial in May 2021. With that objective delivered, the case for France to back a Rwandan candidate a third time is far weaker, which may explain why this campaign has had to be fought in the open.
This raises an uncomfortable parallel. Across Africa, leaders who take power outside the normal rules often organise a transition, write new rules, and then stand in the election that follows, emerging with a mandate that washes away the manner of their arrival. This piece examines how Mushikiwabo reached the top of La Francophonie in 2018, what the 2022 reform changed, why her third-term bid divides African members, how far the coup-and-transition comparison holds, and what the Phnom Penh selection should settle.
Yerevan 2018: How Paris and Kigali Replaced a Sitting Secretary General
In 2018, Michaëlle Jean, the Haitian-born former Governor General of Canada, was seeking a second term as Secretary General. Her campaign collapsed after Macron backed Rwanda's candidate, and Canada and Quebec then abandoned their own national.
France 24 reported that Kagame announced Mushikiwabo's candidacy after talks with Macron, and that the French president publicly declared she had every quality for the job. Analysts at the time described the move as part of a wider effort to end decades of hostility between Paris and Kigali over France's role in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi.
The shift in Ottawa was decisive. On 9 October 2018, two days before the Yerevan summit, the Canadian and Quebec governments withdrew support for Jean and lined up behind what they called the consensus candidate. The Globe and Mail reported that Canada chose not to risk alienating its European and African allies, who had united behind Mushikiwabo.
Kagame announced the candidacy in Paris in May 2018, standing beside Macron, and he did so in English. Two months later, at the African Union summit in Nouakchott, which Kagame chaired that year, the AU asked its members who belong to the OIF to back the Rwandan candidate. Le Journal du Dimanche reported at the time that several African governments felt their hand had been forced by Paris moving first, and that critics across the continent described the manoeuvre as a return of Françafrique.
There was no vote between the two women. Selection was traditionally by consensus, and once France, the African Union and finally Canada had moved, the outcome in Yerevan was a formality. Jean's spokesman argued that a real consensus required a debate held to proper standards, and Jean herself asked whether member states were ready to accept international organisations being used for partisan purposes.
The objections were not only Canadian. Canada's National Observer reported that four former French ministers responsible for La Francophonie signed an open letter arguing that Mushikiwabo had no place at the head of the organisation, given Rwanda's record on the democratic values the OIF is meant to defend. Writing in Le Monde, those former ministers asked whether any country in the world was less well placed than Rwanda to lead linguistic Francophonie. Trudeau, for his part, denied that Canada had traded Jean for support in its bid for a UN Security Council seat.
We describe Yerevan as a diplomatic coup. The phrase is not a legal finding: nothing in the OIF rules of the day was broken, and Jean herself had been chosen by consensus in 2014. It is a political judgement about who really decided the outcome. A sitting Secretary General was removed not by a debate among members, but by an agreement between two presidents whose bilateral reconciliation needed a symbol.
Djerba 2022: A Second Term Without a Contest
Mushikiwabo's first term ended without any test of her standing. At the Djerba summit in November 2022 she was the only candidate, and Jeune Afrique reported that she was confirmed unanimously, to applause from delegations.
Unanimity without a rival is not the same as a democratic mandate. By the end of 2026 she will have led La Francophonie for eight years without once facing a ballot, a fact her supporters rarely mention and her critics rarely forget.
Inside the Secretariat: A Record Her Critics Want Examined
Mushikiwabo arrived promising financial discipline after the controversy over her predecessor's spending. Early in her first term she commissioned an audit from KPMG, delivered in 2020, which Radio-Canada's investigative programme Enquête later obtained and described as identifying serious weaknesses in programme management, strategic planning and fraud detection.
Enquête also obtained an internal staff consultation carried out in December 2022 and January 2023, shortly after her reappointment. In it, 44 per cent of respondents said they believed they had experienced workplace bullying and 9 per cent sexual harassment. Former employees interviewed by the programme described the arrival of her team as damaging to the working climate.
The OIF's response deserves equal space. It said the KPMG report covered years before her arrival, that its finances had since been put in order, and that its accounts have been certified without reservation by external auditors every year since she took office. Those claims and the staff testimony have never been weighed in an open process, and the hearings and the Phnom Penh selection are the first real opportunity for member states to do so.
The 2022 Reform: New Rules, Written on Her Watch
The rules changed in March 2022, during Mushikiwabo's first term. According to the OIF, the Secretary General had been chosen since 1997 through bilateral diplomatic consultations, with no formal framework and a search for consensus among full members.
An extraordinary Ministerial Conference in March 2022 adopted a single rulebook for the organisation's bodies. It introduced an open call for candidates with set eligibility criteria, a filing deadline at least six months before the summit, and a compulsory presentation of each candidate's strategic vision to foreign ministers.
What the reform did not do is abolish consensus. Annex 1, paragraph 8 of the rulebook provides that the Summit elects the Secretary General in closed session by consensus, or failing that by a vote, with the winner needing a simple majority of members present and voting. The reformed procedure therefore introduces open candidacies and strategic presentations while retaining selection by consensus. Only if consensus cannot be reached do member states vote.
Multiple candidates are not new either. In Dakar in 2014, Michaëlle Jean faced four rivals, Pierre Buyoya, Henri Lopes, Jean-Claude de l'Estrac and Agustín Nze Nfumu, and was chosen by consensus after a closed-door meeting of a handful of leaders, even though Canada had proposed settling the matter by vote. What is new in 2026 is the formal, public hearing of competing candidates, not the competition itself.
The first full use of these rules came on 30 June 2026 in Paris. Four candidates were heard by foreign ministers in an extraordinary session, and the OIF broadcast the hearings on its YouTube channel. The candidates were Mushikiwabo; Juliana Amato Lumumba of the DRC, daughter of Patrice Lumumba; Dr Coumba Bâ of Mauritania, a special envoy of President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani; and Dacian Cioloș, the former Romanian prime minister.
The reform is a genuine improvement, and those who pushed for it deserve credit. Yet the sequence matters. The rulebook states that it implements governance conclusions adopted at the Monaco Ministerial Conference in October 2019 and the work of a reflection group first convened in May 2019, within months of her taking office. The leader installed under the old, opaque method presided over the design of the new one, kept consensus at its heart, and is now its first test as a candidate. That is the pattern this publication finds troubling.
Why the Third-Term Bid Divides African Members
Rwanda confirmed in January 2026 that it would put Mushikiwabo forward again. If she wins, she would become only the second Secretary General to serve three terms, after Senegal's Abdou Diouf, and the statutes set no limit on the number of terms.
In late 2025, the Congolese outlet Ouragan reported that she had previously said she would retire at the end of her second term. We have not been able to confirm that statement from a primary source, but if accurate it makes the current bid harder to explain on grounds of continuity alone.
The deeper problem is the war in eastern Congo. Since the resurgence of the M23 in 2021, Kinshasa has accused the OIF under Mushikiwabo of favouring Kigali. Afrikarabia recorded the Congolese delegation avoiding the 2022 family photograph alongside Kagame, Kinshasa declining to invite her to the 2023 Jeux de la Francophonie, and a DRC boycott of International Francophonie Day events in March 2024.
Congolese opposition figures went further. In 2022, Martin Fayulu called on the DRC to suspend its participation in the OIF for as long as it was led by what he called a partisan of aggression. Her public statements on the conflict have generally urged restraint and deferred to regional peace processes, a stance her critics read as evasion and her defenders as neutrality.
Asked about this in a France 24 interview broadcast on 25 September 2026, Mushikiwabo said the Rwanda–DRC confrontation had no place in the OIF and described herself as serene ahead of the November selection. She also rejected the idea that the 2025 withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the organisation was a failure of the Secretary General.
The African consensus that delivered Yerevan has gone. Notre Afrik observed that the unanimity of 2018 has been broken by the eastern Congo war and the third-term question, and that diplomats in Paris no longer treat her reappointment as automatic. Kinshasa, home to more French speakers than any other city, now has its own candidate in the field. Africa Realities Media has documented the territorial dimension of that conflict in The Land Grab: Inside Rwanda's 30-Year Strategy to Annex Eastern Congo, and our wider coverage of the Great Lakes is available at Africa Realities.
The Coup-and-Transition Playbook: How Far the Comparison Holds
The pattern we see at the OIF is familiar from national politics. A leader arrives by a route that bypasses ordinary competition, governs for a period under transitional or exceptional arrangements, introduces new rules, and then stands in the first election held under those rules.
Gabon is the clearest recent example. General Brice Oligui Nguema removed Ali Bongo in August 2023, led a transition, oversaw a new constitution, and won the April 2025 presidential election with 94.85 per cent of the vote. The African Union then lifted its sanctions, judging the transition broadly successful. In Chad, Mahamat Idriss Déby took over through a military council in 2021 and was elected president in 2024.
Guinea follows the same script even more closely. General Mamadi Doumbouya overthrew Alpha Condé in September 2021 under a transition charter that barred junta members from standing. A new constitution adopted by referendum in September 2025 removed that bar, and in December 2025 he was elected with 86.72 per cent of the vote while leading opposition figures remained in exile and the main opposition called for a boycott.
In each case, the election does real work: it converts power taken outside the rules into authority recognised by neighbours and international bodies. The OIF itself, through the 2000 Bamako Declaration on democracy, rights and freedoms in the French-speaking world, has suspended member states after military takeovers and readmitted them after such elections.
The comparison has limits, and fairness requires saying so. No one was harmed in Yerevan, no constitution was suspended, and Mushikiwabo was chosen under the procedures then in force. The analogy is about the logic of legitimacy, not about violence.
That logic is what makes the November selection significant. Mushikiwabo has chosen to stand against three rivals and defend her record in a public hearing, something an incumbent could once have avoided. In our reading, that choice is a tacit admission that eight years of consensus appointments have not given her the democratic standing an open process would. But the rules leave a familiar exit: if heads of state settle on her by consensus behind closed doors, she will emerge with a third term that is lawful under the reformed procedure yet still untested by a ballot. Whether the 2018 manoeuvre is finally laundered into legitimacy or rejected may depend less on who wins than on whether member states are ever asked to vote.
Rwanda's Retreat From French Is a Question the Selection Should Not Ignore
In 2008 Rwanda replaced French with English as the main language of public education, and in 2009 it joined the Commonwealth. French remains one of four official languages alongside Kinyarwanda, English and Kiswahili, but English now dominates government, business and diplomacy. When Prime Minister Justin Nsengiyumva addressed the 81st UN General Assembly in September 2026, he spoke in English.
The issue is not Mushikiwabo's own command of French, which is not in doubt. It is whether a state that has deliberately moved away from French should keep leading the organisation built to promote it.
On that measure, the DRC makes a far stronger claim. French is its sole official language, and Kinshasa is the largest French-speaking city in the world. Mauritania and Romania present different cases: Arabic is Mauritania's official language and Romanian is Romania's, though both have long francophone traditions. Member states choosing the next Secretary General are entitled to weigh which sponsoring state actually carries the French language in its schools, institutions and diplomacy.
Macron has framed the question himself. Inaugurating the new campus of Senghor University near Alexandria on 9 May 2026, at a ceremony where Mushikiwabo also spoke, he said the epicentre of the French language is now in the Congo River basin and not on the banks of the Seine, because that is where most of its speakers live.
He used almost the same line in Yerevan in October 2018, when critics objected that Rwanda had turned its back on French. Then it served to defend the choice of a Rwandan Secretary General. Taken at his word today, it points somewhere else: if the heart of the French-speaking world beats in the Congo basin, the strongest linguistic claim in this race belongs to the candidate from Kinshasa, not the one from Kigali.
What a Credible Selection in Phnom Penh Would Require
A selection only confers legitimacy if it is genuinely open. The 2022 reform created a more transparent structure, but several conditions will determine whether the Phnom Penh outcome deserves to be called an election.
First, member states should judge the candidates on their programmes rather than ratify a deal agreed in advance between Paris, Kigali and a handful of other capitals, as happened in Dakar in 2014 and Yerevan in 2018. Second, the incumbent's use of the Secretariat's visibility during the campaign should be scrutinised in the same way any national electoral body would scrutinise a sitting president. Third, the OIF should say clearly whether the outcome was reached by consensus or by ballot, and if by ballot, publish the result, so that it can be trusted by the members who lose as well as those who win.
No ballot is guaranteed. Under Annex 1, consensus remains the first route, so a consensus reached in Phnom Penh would follow the reformed procedure to the letter. With four candidates and an African Union no longer united behind the incumbent, reaching one will be harder than in Yerevan or Djerba, which is precisely why a vote, if it comes, would mean more.
France, the OIF's leading funder and host of its Paris headquarters, carries particular responsibility. It backed Mushikiwabo in 2018. If Paris now signals its preference again before the summit, the reform will have changed the procedure without changing who decides.
Conclusion: Legitimacy Cannot Be Backdated
Louise Mushikiwabo did not seize La Francophonie by force, and her administration has introduced real changes, including the open candidacy process now being tested. But her path to office in 2018 was decided by two presidents and confirmed by a consensus that left no room for a ballot, and her 2022 renewal was unopposed.
The Phnom Penh selection is therefore about more than one candidate. It is a test of whether an international organisation that lectures its members on democratic transitions will apply the same standard to itself. A leader who arrives without a contest and then seeks validation under new rules is following a script African citizens know well, and African member states should judge it with the same clear eyes they would bring to any national transition.
Rwanda, the DRC, Mauritania and Romania have each put forward a candidate. In Phnom Penh, the other members must decide whether the incumbent's eight years count as experience or as a debt still owed to the members she serves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is the current Secretary General of the OIF?
Louise Mushikiwabo of Rwanda is the current Secretary General of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie. She was chosen at the Yerevan summit in October 2018, took office in January 2019 and was reappointed unopposed at Djerba in November 2022.
How is the OIF Secretary General chosen?
The OIF Secretary General is chosen by the heads of state and government of full member states in a closed session of the Francophonie Summit, by consensus or, if consensus cannot be reached, by a vote decided by simple majority. Since the March 2022 reform, there is also an open call for candidates and a compulsory presentation of each candidate's vision to foreign ministers.
Will there be a vote for OIF Secretary General in 2026?
A vote is not guaranteed. The 2022 rules keep consensus as the first route and provide for a ballot only if heads of state cannot agree, so a ballot will happen in Phnom Penh only if consensus fails.
When is the next OIF Secretary General selection?
The next selection will take place on 16 November 2026 at the 20th Francophonie Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The winner will serve from 2027 to 2030.
Who are the candidates for OIF Secretary General in 2026?
There are four candidates: Louise Mushikiwabo (Rwanda), Juliana Amato Lumumba (DRC), Dr Coumba Bâ (Mauritania) and Dacian Cioloș (Romania). All four presented their programmes to foreign ministers in Paris on 30 June 2026.
Why was Michaëlle Jean replaced by Louise Mushikiwabo in 2018?
Michaëlle Jean lost the post because France and the African Union backed Mushikiwabo, and Canada and Quebec withdrew their support for Jean days before the Yerevan summit. Jean had also faced criticism over spending during her term, which weakened her position.
Is there a term limit for the OIF Secretary General?
There is no limit on the number of terms an OIF Secretary General can serve. Each term lasts four years, and Abdou Diouf is the only previous holder to have served three terms.
What did Macron say about the epicentre of the French language?
Macron said on 9 May 2026, at Senghor University near Alexandria, that the epicentre of the French language is in the Congo River basin rather than on the banks of the Seine, because most French speakers now live there. He made a similar remark at the Yerevan summit in 2018.
Is French an official language in Rwanda?
Yes, French is one of Rwanda's four official languages, alongside Kinyarwanda, English and Kiswahili. Since 2008, however, English has replaced French as the main language of public education, and it now dominates government and diplomacy.
Why does the DRC oppose Louise Mushikiwabo?
The DRC opposes her mainly because of the conflict in eastern Congo, where UN experts and Western governments say Rwanda backs the M23 rebels, which Kigali denies. Kinshasa accuses the OIF under a former Rwandan foreign minister of failing to speak clearly on the war, and has put forward its own candidate.
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African lives are not worth less. African deaths are not normal. Western interests must never become a licence to kill African people.
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Author: Africa Realities Media Editorial Team
Disclaimer
This article is an independent analysis and opinion piece by Africa Realities Media. It draws on published news reports and official OIF communications listed above. Descriptions of the 2018 appointment as a "diplomatic coup" and comparisons with coup-and-transition processes are editorial characterisations and political judgements, not allegations of unlawful conduct by any individual or government. Readers are encouraged to consult the original sources and form their own views.
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