Looming DRC offensive prompts "humanitarian fallout" fears
KAMPALA, 16 December 2014 (IRIN) - Plans by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) army and UN peacekeepers to again take on one of the oldest insurgencies in the country have sparked concern for civilian populations and raised questions about the wisdom of the operation, set to take place in early 2015. Only a couple of hundred members of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) have so far complied with an ultimatum to disarm by 2 January and take part in a demobilization and reintegration programme. "Upon the expiry of the ultimatum, there will be no more time to talk. Our armed forces [FARDC] and partners [MONUSCO, the UN mission] will launch a military offensive to forcefully disarm the FDLR," DRC government spokesman Lambert Mende told IRIN. MONUSCO's military spokesman, Lt-Col Felix Prosper Basse, confirmed that the UN force would "take part in operations against the FDLR rebels with the FARDC when the deadline of 2 January 2015 is reached. Preparations and planning are ongoing in order to fulfil our mandate given by the UN Security Council. "We reiterate our calls to the FDLR to peacefully surrender to MONUSCO, FARDC, PNC [National Police] and engage themselves in the DDRRR [Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement] process in order to avoid being disarmed by force and unnecessary losses of lives." Reported to have some 1,400 fighters, FDLR was formed by leaders of the Interahamwe Hutu militia which fled to eastern DRC after carrying out much of the killing in Rwanda's 1994 genocide. Its ranks now include many DRC nationals. "Any military action should bear the following in mind," warned Jason Stearns, director of the Congo Research Group at New York University. "When the UN and the Congolese army launched an offensive against the FDLR in 2009, it displaced a million people and led to the deaths of thousands. "So any military action should only take place after political options have been exhausted and should be proportional to the threat," he said. Aid workers in eastern DRC shared Stearns' concerns. "Any military operation risks creating humanitarian fallout. In eastern Congo one of our biggest concerns is increased displacement, in areas which are already overwhelmed by the needs of displaced people on a massive scale," Frances Charles, advocacy manager with World Vision, DRC, told IRIN. Some 1.4 million people are currently displaced in North and South Kivu provinces. Risks to civilian population "This planned offensive comes with a high level of risk, in particular to the civilian population. Measures must be put in place by MONUSCO and the FARDC to ensure that planning and conduct of operations mitigate harm to civilians. Every effort must be made to reduce and monitor human rights violations related to operations," he said. Florent MÈhaule, head of the sub-office of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in South Kivu, said aid workers in that province were "convinced that the planned military operations against FDLR will likely have humanitarian consequences in terms of protection of civilians and forced displacements with its impacts on humanitarian needs. "One of the key issues in South Kivu could be humanitarian access due to both physical constraints and security. Regarding the latter, such an offensive will probably hamper any kind of access negotiations with armed groups. In addition to difficult access, the weak humanitarian presence in the potential military operations' areas will make it harder to quickly scale up large humanitarian operations if required," he added. His counterpart in neighbouring North Kivu, Annarita Marcantonio warned of the risk of "a possible increase in attacks, looting and reprisals by the FDLR, as well as civilians potentially getting caught up in hostilities". OCHA and aid agencies in eastern DRC are reportedly working with MONUSCO to develop a contingency plan for the protection of civilians in the event of a military assault against FDLR. Mende, the government spokesman, said: "Our people are aware. We have made announcements [on radio] urging them to move away from the places where FDLR are, as we plan to launch this offensive." For Charles, "the need to better protect the population is clear, but a military approach on its own is not the answer. We need to focus more on a broader, more comprehensive approach for the long-term peace and stability desperately needed here." Asked whether the combined forces of DRC and MONUSCU would prevail against the FDLR, Thierry Vircoulon, Central Africa project director with the International Crisis Group, told IRIN: "I think the question is not, 'Will it fail or succeed?' but 'Are the political and military conditions for such an operation met, and what kind of operation is needed against the FDLR?' "I am saying this because from the UNSC [UN Security Council] viewpoint it seems that the same type of operation [as was mounted in November 2013] against the M23 should be repeated. This would be a terrible mistake," he said.  Some way to go: while thousands of FDLR fighters have handed in weapons since 2002, many hundreds remain active in eastern DRC "From a military perspective, FDLR is quite a different problem than M23 and it seems that the main thinking is to apply the same strategy. One military offensive will not be enough to knock out FDLR because this group is scattered from North to South Kivu and made of small units of fighters who can easily withdraw further into the bush," he said. "So the tactical configuration is completely different from the M23. In addition, as FDLR is embedded within the communities, those ones can get involved into the fighting, and brutal retaliations by FDLR against civilians will follow the ADF [Allied Democratic Forces] example. "Those who are planning an operation against FDLR should ask whether running after FDLR in the bush will put an end to this threat. Even if this operation is a success, will it end FDLR? Certainly not, if this is a one-shot operation," he warned. On the political perspective, Vircoulon said, "there is no strong consensus yet about such an operation. Tanzania remains opposed to it and it provides the bulk of the Force Intervention Brigade. In addition, if Tanzania does not want to do such an operation, South Africa does not want to go alone and take the full responsibility. Everybody knows that in a peacekeeping mission the troop contributing countries call the shots at the end of the day, whatever the UNSC says. Therefore, the whole political environment of the operation is problematic, unlike against the M23." Building alliances Despite facing the deadline, FDLR is reportedly regrouping, recruiting, mobilizing political support and building military alliances with Congolese armed groups, and continuing to pose a regional security threat, according to the US Enough Project report published on 18 November. [ http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/how-dismantle-deadly-militia ] The evidence from UN experts and findings from six months of Enough Project field research in DRC suggest that FDLR is focusing on reorganizing itself in three main areas: generating more income to trade for ammunition and weapons, mobilizing political support in an attempt to gain greater legitimacy, and preparing to avoid military defeat through military alliance-building and recruitment. The report notes that this militia - responsible for grave human rights abuses, serious violations and the subject of UN sanctions - continues to generate revenue mainly by trading gold through North Kivu and Uganda and by illegally producing and trading charcoal from Virunga National Park, a trade worth an estimated US$32 million per year. "The group is using part of that revenue to purchase ammunition and arms from Congolese army [FARDC] officers, with whom it continues to collaborate and share intelligence," says the report. Mende denied these allegations. Tactics The report noted that FDLR's current strategy is consistent with its long-time pattern of responding to military pressure. "In this pattern, the group promises to disarm and reiterates its political aspirations for recognition as a Rwandan opposition group. FDLR then uses any reprieve to regroup by building military alliances and increasing economic activity and recruitment," said the report. FARDC and FDLR have on occasion in recent years worked in alliance with each other against common enemies. so/am/cb Access report online |
| Australia's new migration bill shifts task to security
BANGKOK, 18 December 2014 (IRIN) - This week's passing into law of Australia's Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment Act, which comes on the heels of a year of tightened border controls and refugee intake policy changes, could chill regional cooperation. Experts say it reflects global trends of treating migration as a security problem, and acknowledge that might be an important avenue for Southeast Asian regional policy development. Since September 2013 Australia has run Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB), a military-led initiative the government describes as an effort to "to combat people-smuggling and protect Australia's borders". Navy ships intercept boats carrying asylum seekers, who are then detained in off-shore processing centres, the conditions of which have been criticized repeatedly, including by the UN Refugee Agency ( UNHCR). Only one boat has made it to shore in 2014, to resounding cheers of "success" by the government, and condemnation by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, who said OSB was "leading to a chain of human rights violations". In November 2014 Australia reduced its resettlement quota from Indonesia from 600 to 450 and said no refugees registered (with UNHCR) after 1 July 2014 would be eligible for resettlement, sparking criticism from Indonesia, which cited the country's own current refugee bottleneck (it is host to around 10,000 refugees, who experience notoriously long waits). Australia portrayed the move as an export of its domestic success, "designed to reduce the burden, created by people smugglers, of asylum seekers entering Indonesia". But critics say it "puts into serious question the humanitarian rationale for Australia's resettlement programme." Anne Hammerstad, a lecturer at the UK's University of Kent and author of a new book on the history of UNHCR as a global security actor, told IRIN: "Part of the problem is that the whole migration topic has become securitized." She argued that attitudes on migration have shifted - to the detriment of refugees - from humanitarian empathy to nationalized security. "9/11 harmed refugees and migrants generally - it straight away became an issue of border control and national security and dangers to society," she said.
But that governments understand migration as a security issue, others say, could indicate an effective avenue for fresh regional policy dialogue.
"The fact that OSB has stopped the boats is a window of opportunity. It should be the start of a conversation not the end of it," said Travers McLeod, chief executive officer at the Centre for Policy Development (CPD), an Australian think tank. CPD has been attempting to defuse Australia'scontentious immigration debate, which McLeod called "a political hot potato without a compass."
Boats may, indeed, have stopped arriving in Australia, but asylum seekers in Southeast Asia have not stopped undertaking perilous journeys. According to UNHCR data released in November, around 54,000 people (all but 1,000 departing from Bangladesh and Myanmar) have undertaken irregular maritime journeys in the region in 2014. These numbers are up from previous years, showing a 15 percent increase from 2013, and triple the number of departures from 2012.
"While it's foolish to strip away at the [1951 Refugee] convention itself, we have to realize there are different ways countries can work toward the protections the convention enshrines," McLeod said, explaining: "In some places [migration] is a trafficking issue, in some places it's about controlling the flow, in some places it's a security issue, [and] in many cases it is about access to protection."
Going it alone
The report on a July 2014 CPD roundtable meeting for Southeast Asia's migration stakeholders, titled Beyond the boats: building an asylum and refugee policy for the long term, explained that Australia's migration debate treats forced migration "primarily as a matter of domestic politics, rather than regional policy" and that denial of access to Australia for maritime arrivals "risks closing the protection space".
Indonesia and Australia are co-chairs of the Bali Process, a regional 50-member mechanism established in 2002 to combat people-smuggling, which has been criticized for failing to produce regional results while serving Australia's political interests.
Pointing to the November resettlement reduction from Indonesia, Maria O'Sullivan, a law lecturer at the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law at Monash University in Melbourne cast doubt on Australia's regional commitment: "If Australia does wish to establish a wider regional framework between countries in Southeast Asia, a ban on resettling asylum seekers from Indonesia, one of Australia's most important regional asylum partners, seems contrary to this."  The immigration detention centre in Makassar on Indonesia's Sulawesi Island is one of 13 across Indonesia According to McLeod, the CPD dialogue, because it was conducted under the anonymizing "Chatham House" rules, allowed regional stakeholders to speak more openly than they do when representing their countries in public. He said: "What we saw at the roundtable was the value of including representatives from Indonesia and Malaysia. Their presence changed the tenor of the discussions and facilitated a richer understanding of the issues." Government hats off? The political sensitivities around migration among governments in the region, including security concerns, mean a more private approach to cooperation might be necessary. CPD report recommendations include establishing a "Track II" regional dialogue. McLeod told IRIN he thinks a "Track II" format, in which participants from around the region can gather and discuss policy without officially representing their respective constituencies or governments, could extend the comfort level achieved at the CPD roundtable by mimicking regional security talks. "The Track II format is usually used for discussions about trade or security - it's clear that migration is itself a security issue for many of the governments concerned - so it's a format that could work well," he said, echoing research that has found unofficial policy dialogues to be a crucial component in Southeast Asian regional cooperation. Migration's "perfect storm" While the regional dialogue may need to allow focus on migration as a security issue, that discussion alone won't erode the global construal of migrants as a threat. For Hammerstad, that task is broader – and involves restoring public understanding that migration has been a human behavior throughout history. "The question is how to get to a point where societies receiving migrants feel that the balance is OK," she said. Calling the current global migration situation "a bit like a perfect storm", she explained: "We have refugee receiving countries feeling like their economy is not very solid, coupled with large-scale humanitarian crises and record level migration." The current debate, she says, includes a "knee-jerk reaction that migration is unnatural and that the people who migrate are there to abuse your system and take advantage, rather than people who want to prosper in a different place than their home. It's a lack of empathy in public discourse." kk/cb | What did Australia's new migration law do? | | The Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment Act changed the way Australia manages and processes asylum seekers by amending five domestic laws: the Maritime Powers Act of 2013, the Migration Act of 1958, the Migration Regulations of 1994, the Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946, and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act of 1977. Much of the bill's focus was on eliminating references to international law, a tactic Immigration Minister Scott Morrison touted when he introduced the legislation in parliament. | | Expanding Australia's reach, limiting its obligations For example, the Act removes from the Maritime Powers Act of 2013 the phrase "In accordance with international law, the exercise of powers is limited in places outside Australia," and adds "Failure to consider international obligations etc. does not invalidate authorization" and "Failure to consider international obligations etc. does not invalidate exercise of powers." Putting on paper the Australian Navy's practice of hauling intercepted boats back to their origin in, for example, Sri Lanka, the bill explains: "To avoid any doubt… a vessel, aircraft or person may be taken (or caused to be taken) to a destination under section… whether or not Australia has an agreement or arrangement with any other country relating to the vessel or aircraft (or the persons in it)… and irrespective of the international obligations or domestic law of any other country." | | Diluting checks on deportation The Act even foresaw objections, namely a separate piece of proposed legislation that would amend the Migration Act of 1958 to define Australia's non-refoulement obligations in line with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which Australia ratified in 1980), and the Convention Against Torture (which Australia ratified in 1989).
Pre-empting its impact, in a section entitled Amendments if this Act commences after the Migration Amendment (Protection and Other Measures) Act 2014, the MMPLAB read: "It is irrelevant whether Australia has non-refoulement obligations in respect of an unlawful non-citizen... [And] an officer's duty to remove as soon as reasonably practicable an unlawful non-citizen under section 198 [of the Migration Act, which outlines removal procedures for unlawful citizens] arises irrespective of whether there has been an assessment, according to law, of Australia's non-refoulement obligations in respect of the non-citizen." As one Australian legal researcher explained: "This is saying that Australia is now entitled to return an asylum seeker to a country where they have been, or know they may be, tortured or persecuted." | Access report online |
| IRIN's Top Reads this week
DUBAI, 18 December 2014 (IRIN) - Want to stay on top of the current debate around humanitarian and development issues without having to spend hours surfing the web? Welcome to IRIN's reading list. Every week our global network of specialist correspondents will share some of their top picks of recent must-read research, reports and in-depth articles while also highlighting key upcoming conferences and policy debates. This week we look at humanitarian access, how Ebola survivors are key to contain the virus, Chinese aid policy and the perils of "VolunTourism". Five to read: Humanitarian Access in Situations of Armed Conflict: Practitioners' Manual and Handbook Essential reading for any aid worker involved in a conflict-situation response, this new manual takes a look at the principles of humanitarian access with a view to supporting approaches to improve access. A collaboration between the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and Conflict Dynamics International, its contents include input from consultation workshops held in Switzerland, Jordan, Kenya and Thailand during 2012 and 2013. To hasten Ebola containment, mobilize survivors There is more to Ebola survivors than heartwarming stories. This paper argues that due to their post-infection immunity, people who have survived the virus are vital to helping bring it under control. They have local knowledge, they understand the symptoms, and their blood antibodies may be useful to help others fight the illness. The 'Chinese way'? The evolution of Chinese humanitarianism As a rising economic power, China is also growing as a humanitarian actor, giving generously to a number of recent disaster funds. But Chinese aid gets little coverage and its modus operandi and intentions are generally perceived to be "different" to that of so-called "traditional donors". This paper shines a light on what it refers to as China's distinctive "humanitarian identity", giving important historical context, and makes a case for more dialogue between the international and Chinese humanitarian communities. VolunTourism: More harm than good As the season for giving to charity and making New Year resolutions approaches, how many people will be making plans to "do good" while on holiday? If anyone you know has such an intention, make sure they read this first. Journalist Heather Ruiz, who travelled through West Africa in 2013, highlights some of the follies of "VolunTourism" and makes a good case for why it makes better sense to support vocational training and community-based initiatives rather than sending in "white saviours". Authoritarianism, democracy and development
Many aid programmes are taking place in less than perfect political situations and there are difficult questions about whether it makes good sense to give support to authoritarian regimes with poor records on civil liberties and human rights. This paper from the Developmental Leadership Program examines the evidence on authoritarianism and development from the perspective of a policy-maker providing advice to an imagined developmental authoritarian regime, and raises some interesting points. From IRIN: Time for re-think on humanitarian funding? WFP's celebrity-endorsed #ADollarALifeline campaign thrust the plight of Syrian refugees back into the global spotlight and netted more than the asked-for US$64million in just a matter of days. But experts warn that the success of this type of appeal is masking deeper fundamental and structural issues relating to how humanitarian agencies are funded. What do you think? lr/cb Access report online |
| Mystery over Ebola survivors' ailments
DAKAR, 18 December 2014 (IRIN) - For some Ebola survivors, overcoming the lethal viral assault has not heralded a full return to good health. An array of ailments including headache, joint pains, vision and hearing problems have afflicted convalescents; experts are still uncertain of the exact cause. Not all survivors of the virus, which has been rampant in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone since earlier this year and killed some 70 percent of patients, suffer the symptoms, the extremes of which include amenorrhea (the absence of menstruation) and erectile dysfunction. It is also not yet known why only some are affected. Margaret Nanyonga, World Health Organization (WHO) consultant clinician, who has assessed 85 Ebola survivors with various symptoms in Sierra Leone's eastern town of Kenema, told IRIN that some of the ailments were treated, but others such as vision and hearing problems tended to persist. "The ladies complained of menstrual failure, but these resumed after three months. They also complained about hair loss. Men complained of testicular pains. We don't know whether it can lead to impotence or not. That is a worry. Some men have reported erectile dysfunction. There are also psychosocial disorders, loss of sleep, anxiety and depression," she said. Focus on survivors Nanyonga explained that the clinic she operated in Kenema is still the only one of its kind in the country dealing with post-Ebola conditions. Responding to Ebola outbreaks in the past, she said, has often ended when the virus is brought under control. "No one had taken interest in the survivors. After fighting the epidemic, that was the end. But before, there were fewer people surviving Ebola," she said. There are comparatively more survivors in the current epidemic in West Africa (because the scale is also unprecedented). Response strategies in the three West African countries have incorporated psychosocial support for families affected by, and survivors of the virus. "We also want to know whether the symptoms are due to the virus itself, the treatment, or the huge amounts of chlorine used for disinfection in the treatment centres" "We also want to know whether the symptoms are due to the virus itself, the treatment, or the huge amounts of chlorine used for disinfection in the treatment centres" But much remains unknown about the causes and impact of the post-Ebola ailments. In an October survey Nanyonga conducted in Kenema, most Ebola survivors complained of joint pains and headaches. More serious conditions such as deafness, amenorrhea and erectile dysfunction were rare. She said there is a need for further investigation of the ailments suffered by those who recover from Ebola. "We want to know how long these people suffer from these symptoms. We want to know the progressions, such as of vision loss, if no intervention is put in place. We want to know whether it can be mitigated… "We also want to know whether the symptoms are due to the virus itself, the treatment, or the huge amounts of chlorine used for disinfection in the treatment centres," Nanyonga explained. There is no approved medicine to treat Ebola. Basic medical interventions involve providing intravenous fluids and balancing body salts (electrolytes); treating other infections, if any, triggered by the virus; and maintaining body oxygen levels and blood pressure. Previous observations Esther Sterk, an Ebola specialist with Médecins Sans Frontières, said: "It has already been observed in previous outbreaks that some of the survivors develop uveitis (inflammation of the uvea, the middle layer of the eye) that can go together with vision loss. After such a serious disease, it is normal that survivors can still be weak for quite a while and slowly regain their strength. However, many of them are also stigmatized and have lost many relatives and friends, so some of the experienced symptoms may also be linked to stress." Nanyonga's study found that 94 percent of the survivors were rejected by their communities upon discharge from Ebola treatment centres. Difficulty in finding jobs and self-stigmatization are also adding to the misfortunes of the survivors. There are also fears that the post-Ebola diseases could become chronic in certain cases or lead to disability, infertility or social problems such as family break-ups, the survey suggested. Ebola's after-effects on survivors (referred to by some as post-Ebola Syndrome) have not been extensively studied as there have been few outbreaks prior to the current epidemic in West African which has killed nearly 7,000 people of the 18,603 cases reported by WHO in its latest statistics. Those who recover from Ebola develop immunity that can last up to 10 years or even longer, according to the US Centers for Disease Control, which also notes that survivors can develop long-term complications such as joint and vision problems. ob/cb Access report online |
| Chaotic closure of a North Kivu IDP camp
KINSHASA, 18 December 2014 (IRIN) - The authorities in North Kivu Province in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) hope soon to close the 60-odd camps housing some 210,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) on its territory: They say peace has returned. Whether the timing is right is debatable. Dozens of local and foreign armed groups are active in North Kivu, and in Beni Territory in the far north of the province there have been a series of brutal killings that have left over 250 dead since October. After the defeat of the Tutsi-Congolese M23 rebels by the army and UN peacekeepers in November 2013, the governor of North Kivu, Julien Paluku, said IDP camps should be closed, but so far only one camp has been closed - in somewhat chaotic circumstances. On a visit to Kiwanja, a town in Rutshuru Territory, on 2 December, Paluku announced that the camp there, which had about 2,300 people, was closing following a decision by the provincial cabinet. "We found several weapons… It was a place where crime was developed… We found 10 weapons in three months," said Paluku, adding that humanitarian workers had not been consulted on the closure. Michel Magenda, mayor of Kiwanja, says there were "cases of banditry reported in this camp", with residents "caught after committing crimes" and that a man was even "lynched by people in surrounding communities when he was caught looting". John, a resident of Kiwanja, said "bandits were hiding in the camp and had come to loot." The confusion caused tension between the local population and IDPs. How the camp came into being The camp, about 60km north of Goma, capital of North Kivu, was set up in November 2008 following fighting between the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP - a precursor of the M23) and the army, says the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). It had 10,000 IDPs who had fled fighting between CNDP and the army (FARDC). "Towards the end of 2009, with an improved security situation in the wake of military operations… a wave of IDPs opted to return [to their homes]," said Celine Schmitt, spokesman for UNHCR in DRC. These operations targeted the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR - mainly of Rwandan Hutu rebels, including leaders who had participated in the genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994). FDLR has been given until 2 January 2015 to disarm or face an offensive by the army and UN peacekeepers. The military operations against FDLR in 2009 and 2010 caused its members to scatter, allowing some IDPs to return to their villages. About 1,000 people remained in the camp, mostly from the Binza group and villages near Virunga National Park occupied by FDLR. The attacks of 2011 and 2012 against the M23 led to fresh displacements towards Kiwanja. "We then had 4,000 people [in the camp]. After the conflict with the M23, IDPs from the Jomba, Kinyandoni and other groups returned [to their homes]," said Schmitt. Bogus residents Hours after the camp's closure announcement, the camp partially emptied. "Half of the camp was empty because it was inhabited by people from Kiwanja who had put up shacks in the camp to make the World Food Programme believe they were IDPs," said Paluku. Vehicles were hired to take the displaced home. "Every IDP was busy. They brought even the reeds with which they had built their huts. They took everything, everything away," said Magenda, who said he had seen it. UNHCR's version of events differs. "Many people lost almost everything when the camp closed. Their possessions, including their plastic sheeting, blankets and cooking utensils were often stolen," said Schmitt. "Some of the displaced… were in the fields or had gone to collect firewood when the site was closed. They relied on the hospitality of local people and had asked for help from aid workers, including tarpaulins against rain, blankets and kitchen utensils."
A civil society representative, on condition of anonymity, said he saw with his own eyes the camp being destroyed and burned. "They burned everything after people left… so that other gangsters could not come and hide there," he said. Jean-Claude Bambanze, president of a civil society grouping in Rutshuru, which includes associations, NGOs and trade unions, said he welcomed the closure, "although there has been some indignation" on the part of the humanitarian community. His regret: "We should have had accompanying measures, a departure kit. It would have been good if UNHCR could have tracked where they are for reintegration. Otherwise, people leave without assistance. There were children, and with the cold they could get respiratory diseases. "Is someone out there to see if they have arrived? Are children going to study there? We asked for the closure of the camp but we demanded accompanying measures, sensitization, followed by returns once the ground was well prepared," he added. Governor wants to end dependency culture For Paluku, closing Kiwanja camp - with activities like closing the latrines - was a test. Despite criticism, he hopes to close other camps in the province soon. "In my opinion, it is urgent that camps are closed, otherwise we risk promoting a culture of beggars happy to get bean seeds even though the situation has completely changed," he said, referring in particular to the end of M23. In a sign that the authorities are willing to work with international aid groups on future camp closures, Paluku met the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in DRC, Moustapha Soumare. They agreed on "a consensual schedule" with humanitarian workers. Paluku believes camp closures will also encourage foreign investors. "There will be no zero crime rate. There will always be insecurity… I don't want people to have a picture of a province at war with the existence of the camps. Those who want to invest can," he insisted. Meanwhile, UNHCR is stressing that returns must be voluntary: "We recognize that the improving security situation in parts of North Kivu Province has allowed the voluntary return of IDPs accommodated in IDP sites around Goma. However, we reiterate that the transfer or return of IDPs should be conducted on a voluntary basis, in accordance with international humanitarian law and the laws on human rights" and "in safety and dignity, respecting the unity of the family and the specific needs of the people," said Schmitt. Besides, she added, IDPs from Kiwanja - few of whom have returned home, while others may have returned to Kiwanja - "are asking… the authorities to restore peace in their villages. They do not want to remain in IDP sites and would prefer to go home if peace were restored." UNHCR recommends promoting access to livelihoods where the displaced live in order to reduce dependence on humanitarian aid and help provide better future prospects, or local integration. hb/cb Access report online |
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