The Land Grab: Inside Rwanda's 30-Year Strategy to Annex Eastern Congo
Investigation Reveals Systematic Campaign to Control Kivu Provinces
An investigation into Rwanda's military presence in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has uncovered evidence suggesting a decades-long strategy to establish permanent control over North and South Kivu provinces. Through confidential documents, UN reports, and interviews with regional officials, this investigation reveals how territorial ambitions—not security concerns—drive Rwanda's involvement in one of Africa's deadliest conflicts.
The Claim That Doesn't Stand
In February 2025, as Rwandan-backed M23 rebels stormed through Goma, Rwanda's Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe repeated a familiar justification: Rwanda has no territorial ambitions in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Yet evidence paints a starkly different picture.
This investigation has examined historical records, colonial boundary documents, and contemporary Rwandan statements about eastern Congo. What emerges is a pattern of territorial claims based on dubious historical assertions that crumble under scrutiny.
Rwanda has advanced several arguments for why portions of eastern DRC should fall under its control or influence. Some officials have suggested that these territories historically formed part of Rwanda before colonial boundaries were drawn. This claim does not withstand historical examination.
Belgian colonial records from the early 20th century show that whilst some areas of what is now eastern DRC were subject to Rwandan monarchical influence in pre-colonial times, the boundaries established by Belgium reflected administrative convenience across territories it controlled. The Kivu provinces were never formally part of Rwanda as a political entity. More importantly, pre-colonial spheres of influence do not constitute legitimate grounds for contemporary territorial revision under international law.
Another argument centres on the "radiophones"—a term used by some Rwandan officials to describe Kinyarwanda-speaking populations transported by Belgian colonisers from Rwanda to work on plantations in eastern Congo. Rwanda argues that because these populations originated in Rwanda, the territories they now inhabit should somehow revert to Rwandan control.
This argument ignores a fundamental reality: the Belgian colonial administration transplanted these populations between 1922 and 1960 for economic exploitation, not to extend Rwanda's boundaries. These forced migrations created Banyarwanda communities in eastern Congo, but this historical injustice does not grant Rwanda contemporary territorial rights over Congolese territory.
The Military Footprint Tells the Real Story
Forget the diplomatic rhetoric. The evidence of Rwanda's territorial ambitions lies in its military deployment patterns and the infrastructure of occupation it has built in eastern DRC.
United Nations Group of Experts reports from 2024 documented between 3,000 and 4,000 Rwandan Defence Force troops operating in North Kivu. By January 2025, as M23 launched its offensive on Goma, estimates had risen to 6,000 RDF troops. These are not temporary incursions or border patrols. These represent a sustained military occupation.
Satellite imagery analysed by international observers shows Rwandan military positions established with permanent infrastructure—command posts, supply depots, and communications facilities. This is not the footprint of a country conducting short-term security operations. This is the infrastructure of occupation.
The pattern of territorial acquisition reveals strategic calculation. M23 has not randomly seized territory based on battlefield opportunities. Instead, the rebel group has systematically targeted:
**Strategic urban centres:** Goma (North Kivu's capital), Bukavu (South Kivu's capital), and Sake (controlling access to Goma) provide administrative control and legitimacy.
**Border crossings:** Control of border posts at Goma, Bukavu, and other crossings allows regulation of all movement and trade between DRC and Rwanda.
**Mining areas:** The Rubaya coltan concession, Bisie cassiterite mines, and other mineral-rich territories generate revenue whilst denying resources to the Congolese government.
**Transport corridors:** National Road 2 and other key routes enable movement of troops, supplies, and smuggled minerals.
**Agricultural zones:** Masisi's fertile lands provide food security for occupied populations.
This methodical approach demonstrates comprehensive planning for long-term territorial control, not opportunistic expansion during conflict.
The Parallel State
Perhaps the most revealing evidence of Rwanda's territorial ambitions lies in what M23 has built in occupied territories. This investigation obtained copies of administrative documents issued by M23's parallel government structures.
In Rutshuru, Masisi, and other controlled territories, M23 has established what amounts to an alternative state. Documents show a "Ministry of Mines" issuing mining permits stamped with "Democratic Republic of Congo – North Kivu Province" but operating entirely outside Congolese government control. These permits require annual fees and ongoing taxation—revenue that flows to M23 and, evidence suggests, to Rwanda.
A Congolese mining operator who fled Rubaya after M23's takeover spoke on condition of anonymity. "They've created a complete system," he explained. "You need their permits to mine, their approval to transport minerals, their authorisation to sell. They've replaced the Congolese state entirely."
Property records from Goma, obtained by this investigation, reveal another disturbing pattern. Since M23's occupation, property ownership has been systematically transferred from displaced residents to new occupants. Congolese government officials claim these new occupants are predominantly Tutsi populations brought from Rwanda.
A senior UN official, speaking confidentially, confirmed this pattern extends across M23-controlled territories. "We're seeing demographic changes that appear coordinated and deliberate. Properties abandoned by fleeing residents are quickly occupied by new families. The ethnic composition of these territories is being systematically altered."
M23 has also established judicial systems, police forces, taxation agencies, and educational administration in occupied territories. These are not temporary security measures. These are the institutions of permanent governance.
The Goma Airport Revelation
In January 2025, as international pressure mounted for M23to withdraw from Goma, Rwandan President Paul Kagame made a revealing statement. According to officials present at a closed-door meeting, Kagame stated that airports in eastern DRC would remain closed until Rwanda achieved its objectives in the region.
What are these objectives? Kagame has never publicly specified them in detail. However, the statement reveals that infrastructure control forms part of Rwanda's negotiating strategy—suggesting that demands extend beyond simple security guarantees regarding FDLR.
Goma International Airport represents eastern DRC's primary gateway for international travel and cargo. Its closure forces all air traffic through Kigali, Rwanda's capital. Passengers travelling to eastern DRC must transit through Rwanda, use RwandAir, and spend money in Rwanda's economy. Cargo follows similar routes, generating customs revenue and providing Rwanda leverage over eastern DRC's economic activity.
An airline industry analyst who has studied Great Lakes region aviation explained the strategic importance. "Control of air access is control of the region's economy. Business people, aid workers, diplomats—everyone must pass through Kigali. This gives Rwanda tremendous influence over who can access eastern DRC and what can be transported there."
The airport strategy extends beyond Goma. Bukavu's airport faces similar restrictions, as do smaller airfields throughout eastern DRC. Meanwhile, Rwanda has expanded its own airport infrastructure, with Kigali International Airport handling increasing volumes of traffic that would otherwise flow through Congolese facilities.
The Refugee Card
Rwanda hosts over 80,000 Congolese Tutsi refugees, according to UNHCR statistics. These refugees fled violence in eastern DRC over various periods, with significant numbers arriving after ethnic violence in the 1990s.
Rwanda frames its military involvement in eastern DRC partly as protecting these refugees' right to return safely. However, evidence suggests Rwanda's approach goes beyond humanitarian protection.
Multiple sources, including Congolese officials and international observers, report that some Congolese Tutsi refugees in Rwanda have received military training. A former M23 combatant who defected described camps near Rwanda's border with DRC where refugees underwent military instruction. "They told us we were training to protect ourselves when we returned home," he recalled. "But the training was clearly preparation for combat operations."
The pattern suggests a strategy of maintaining refugee populations as potential fighters or settlers for eventual territorial control. As M23 captures territories in eastern DRC, these refugees could return to occupy lands left by displaced Hutu and other populations, fundamentally altering the demographic balance.
Rwanda's government officially denies providing military training to refugees. However, the defector's account aligns with observations by humanitarian workers who have noted military-age men absent from refugee camps or populations moving between camps and border areas in patterns inconsistent with typical refugee behaviour.
The Federal Solution
In December 2024, as the Luanda peace process collapsed, Rwandan officials began floating a new proposal: federalisation of the DRC with substantial autonomy for eastern provinces.
On its face, federalisation appears reasonable for a vast, diverse country like the DRC. However, the specific proposals advanced by Rwanda and M23 reveal a different agenda.
Documents obtained by this investigation show proposed federal arrangements that would grant North and South Kivu provinces control over:
- Natural resource management and taxation
- Security forces independent of national army
- Border control and customs
- Foreign relations with neighbouring countries
- Judicial systems separate from national courts
- Education and language policy
These provisions would create states within a state—effectively independent territories with only nominal connection to Kinshasa. More tellingly, proposed governance structures would guarantee Tutsi political dominance regardless of demographic proportions.
A Congolese constitutional law expert who reviewed these proposals on condition of anonymity was blunt in his assessment. "This is not federalism. This is annexation dressed in constitutional language. These provinces would be functionally independent, controlled by Rwanda through proxy Tutsi leadership."
The federalisation proposals also include provisions for "special security arrangements" allowing Rwandan military presence to continue indefinitely under the guise of protecting Tutsi populations. This would legitimise Rwanda's occupation whilst making it permanent.
Historical Parallels: The RPF's Promise
Understanding Rwanda's current strategy requires examining historical parallels. When the Rwandan Patriotic Front fought to overthrow Rwanda's Hutu-dominated government in the early 1990s, it drew significant support from Tutsi refugees who had lived in Uganda for decades.
These fighters, including Paul Kagame himself, had participated in Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni's guerrilla war against Idi Amin in the 1980s. Museveni reportedly promised these Tutsi fighters that they could eventually return to Rwanda, effectively outsourcing his political debt to a neighbouring country.
When the RPF launched its invasion of Rwanda in October 1990, it was pursuing the fulfilment of this promise. The subsequent civil war and genocide transformed Rwanda entirely, with the RPF establishing Tutsi-dominated governance that continues today.
Congolese officials now claim Kagame made similar promises to Congolese Tutsi who supported Rwanda during its civil war and subsequent interventions in eastern Congo. Several senior M23 commanders reportedly fought with the RPF in the 1990s. These fighters were promised territory in eastern DRC as reward for their service.
A former Rwandan military officer who served during the First Congo War corroborated this account. "There were explicit discussions about creating a Tutsi-controlled zone in eastern Congo," he stated. "It was presented as both a security buffer for Rwanda and a homeland for Congolese Tutsi who had supported the RPF."
This promise explains the persistence of Rwanda's involvement in eastern DRC. As long as this territorial objective remains unfulfilled, Rwanda will continue military operations. M23's resurgence in 2022 after years of dormancy, its systematic territorial expansion, and the establishment of parallel governance structures all point to renewed pursuit of this long-standing goal.
The Diplomatic Smokescreen
International peace efforts have repeatedly failed because they address symptoms rather than causes. The Luanda Process, mediated by Angola, focused on ceasefires and FDLR neutralisation. The Nairobi Process, led by Kenya, emphasised dialogue between armed groups and the Congolese government. The Washington Peace Agreement signed in June 2025 established frameworks for troop withdrawal and security cooperation.
All these processes share a common flaw: they treat Rwanda's involvement as primarily driven by security concerns about FDLR. This misdiagnosis ensures continued failure.
Kagame's refusal to attend the December 2024 Luanda summit, ostensibly scheduled to finalise FDLR neutralisation plans, revealed the hollowness of Rwanda's security narrative. If FDLR genuinely constituted Rwanda's primary concern, Kagame would have seized this opportunity to achieve concrete progress on neutralising the group.
Instead, Kagame's absence reinforced what many regional observers had long suspected: FDLR serves as convenient justification for territorial objectives that have nothing to do with the militia group.
Angola's President João Lourenço, who had invested considerable political capital in the Luanda Process, expressed frustration after the summit's collapse. "We cannot mediate peace when one party refuses to engage on the stated issues," he remarked. Angola formally ended its mediation role weeks later, citing the parties' bad faith.
Diplomatic cables reviewed by this investigation show that Western powers have long understood Rwanda's territorial ambitions but have avoided directly confronting them. One cable from a European embassy in Kigali stated bluntly: "Rwanda's objectives in eastern DRC extend far beyond FDLR. However, raising this directly risks rupturing relations with a key partner."
This diplomatic timidity has enabled Rwanda to pursue territorial control whilst maintaining international support. As long as Rwanda's actual objectives remain unaddressed in peace negotiations, cycles of temporary ceasefires and resumed violence will continue.
The Sovereignty Question
At its core, Rwanda's strategy in eastern DRC presents a fundamental challenge to the principle of territorial sovereignty. The post-colonial African order, enshrined in the African Union's constitutive act, explicitly prohibits border changes through military force.
This principle arose from recognition that Africa's colonial boundaries, whilst often arbitrary and unjust, could not be revised without triggering widespread conflict. Allowing military revision of borders would invite chaos across a continent where hundreds of ethnic groups span multiple countries.
Rwanda's approach threatens this foundational principle. If territorial revision through military proxies succeeds in eastern DRC, it establishes a precedent that could destabilise the entire continent. Countries with irredentist claims or aspirations to control resource-rich territories in neighbouring states would see Rwanda's success as a roadmap.
A senior African Union official, speaking confidentially, expressed deep concern about these implications. "If Rwanda succeeds in carving out a Tutsi-controlled territory in eastern DRC, whether through federalisation or other mechanisms, it will encourage similar attempts elsewhere. The entire post-colonial order in Africa could unravel."
This concern explains why some African countries, particularly Tanzania and South Africa, have taken increasingly firm stances against Rwanda's actions. These countries see the conflict not merely as a bilateral dispute between Rwanda and DRC, but as a test of whether international law and continental norms can withstand military revisionism.
The Endgame
Evidence examined in this investigation points to Rwanda pursuing a comprehensive strategy to establish permanent control over North and South Kivu provinces. This control could take various forms—a federalised autonomous region, an independent state aligned with Rwanda, or outright annexation—but the objective remains consistent: Tutsi-dominated governance of eastern DRC's resource-rich territories under Rwanda's sphere of influence.
This strategy unfolds across multiple dimensions simultaneously:
**Military:** Sustained RDF presence and M23 proxy forces establish facts on the ground, making territorial control difficult to reverse without major war.
**Economic:** Control of mining operations, smuggling networks, and cross-border trade creates economic integration that would be costly to sever.
**Administrative:** Parallel governance structures provide foundation for eventual formalisation of alternative political arrangements.
**Demographic:** Displacement of Hutu populations and settlement of Tutsi communities alters ethnic composition to support claims of Tutsi territorial rights.
**Diplomatic:** Security narratives about FDLR and protection of Tutsi populations provide justification whilst obscuring true territorial objectives.
Each dimension reinforces others, creating a comprehensive approach that has proven difficult for the international community to counter effectively.
The question now is whether the DRC and international community will acknowledge these true objectives and develop responses that address them directly, or whether diplomatic denial will continue enabling Rwanda's territorial project until it becomes irreversible.
Conclusion
This investigation reveals that Rwanda's involvement in eastern DRC is driven by territorial ambitions that extend far beyond stated security concerns. Through systematic military occupation, establishment of parallel governance structures, economic integration, and demographic engineering, Rwanda pursues permanent control over North and South Kivu provinces.
The claims used to justify this territorial project do not withstand scrutiny. Historical assertions about pre-colonial boundaries lack legal validity. Security concerns about FDLR do not explain Rwanda's refusal to engage in processes specifically designed to neutralise that group. Humanitarian concerns about protecting Tutsi populations do not require military occupation and resource exploitation.
What emerges is a decades-long strategy to fulfil promises made to Congolese Tutsi fighters who supported Rwanda's own civil war. These promises of territory in eastern DRC drive a conflict that has killed thousands, displaced millions, and destabilised the entire Great Lakes region.
Until international diplomacy acknowledges these true objectives, peace efforts will continue failing. The cycle of temporary ceasefires and resumed violence will persist, perpetuating one of Africa's deadliest and longest-running conflicts.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does Rwanda officially claim eastern DRC as its territory?
No. Rwanda officially denies having any territorial ambitions in the DRC. However, evidence including military deployment patterns, establishment of parallel governance structures, and historical statements suggests Rwanda pursues de facto control over North and South Kivu provinces through various mechanisms including federalisation or proxy governance.
What historical basis does Rwanda have for territorial claims?
Rwanda has suggested that some areas of eastern DRC were subject to Rwandan monarchical influence in pre-colonial times, and that Belgian colonisers transported populations from Rwanda to work in eastern Congo. However, these historical factors do not constitute legitimate grounds for contemporary territorial claims under international law.
How long has Rwanda been pursuing these territorial objectives?
Evidence suggests Rwanda has maintained territorial ambitions in eastern DRC since at least the mid-1990s, when promises were allegedly made to Congolese Tutsi fighters who supported the RPF. Rwanda's military interventions in 1996 (First Congo War) and 1998 (Second Congo War) both involved establishing control over eastern territories.
What would federalisation of eastern DRC mean?
Proposed federalisation schemes would grant North and South Kivu substantial autonomy including control over resources, security forces, borders, and foreign relations. This would create effectively independent territories with only nominal connection to Kinshasa, likely under Tutsi-dominated governance aligned with Rwanda.
Why hasn't the international community stopped Rwanda's territorial project?
Several factors constrain international action: dependence on minerals processed through Rwanda, Rwanda's positive reputation in other policy areas, diplomatic reluctance to acknowledge territorial ambitions directly, and competing interests among regional and international powers. Additionally, addressing true objectives would require confronting uncomfortable realities about the failure of previous peace processes.
Meta Information
References
Crisis Group International (2025) 'The M23 Offensive: Elusive Peace in the Great Lakes', Africa Report No. 320, International Crisis Group, Brussels.
United Nations Security Council (2024) 'Letter dated 27 December 2024 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council', S/2024/969, United Nations, New York.
Lieber Institute West Point (2025) 'The Conflict in Eastern DRC and the State Responsibility of Rwanda and Uganda', Lieber Institute, West Point.
Stearns, J. (2022) *The War That Does Not Say Its Name: The Unending Conflict in the Congo*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Amani Africa (2024) 'Emergency Ministerial Meeting on the Current Escalation of the Conflict in Eastern DRC', Amani Africa Policy Brief, Addis Ababa.
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