Failed Magic or Social Context?

Failed Magic or Social Context?
Market Liberalization and the Rural Poor in Malawi
Pauline E. Peters
Abstract
One of the key questions in the debates swirling around structural adjustment programs in Africa
is their effects on the poor. Have these programs "benefited ... the rural poor disproportionately",
as concluded in Adjustment in Africa (World Bank 1994)? The answer for rural families studied
over a period of years in Malawi is no. Market liberalization has provided new income opportunities
(through tobacco and maize sales) that have disproportionately benefited the better-off households,
while the poorest twenty-five percent have experienced a relative worsening in income and food
security despite increasing the proportion of maize harvest retained and the share of cash budget
spent on purchasing maize. Rather than being due to markets failing "to work their magic" (Mosley
and Weeks, 1993), the outcome is interpreted as the effect of economic policies being mediated
through socio-cultural and political relations.
Pauline E. Peters is an associate at HIID and teaches in the department of anthropology at Harvard.
She is a social anthropologist who has done extensive research in central-southern Africa,
particularly Malawi and Botswana. Recent publications include Dividing the Commons: Politics,
Policy and Culture in Botswana (University of Virginia Press, 1994); “The Uses and Abuses of the
Concept of ‘Female-headed Household’”, in D. Bryceson (ed.). Women Wielding the Hoe: Lessons
from Rural Africa for Feminist Theory and Development Practice (Berg, 1995); "The Erosion of
Commons and the Emergence of Property: Problems for Social Analysis", in R.C. Hunt and A.
Gilman (ed.) Property in the Economy (forthcoming). She is currently conducting longitudinal
research in Malawi on the process of agricultural commercialization.
1
FAILED MAGIC OR SOCIAL CONTEXT? MARKET LIBERALIZATION
AND THE RURAL POOR IN MALAWI
Indeed, the faith that "adjustment helps raise living standards overall and especially for the
poor" [as stated in the World Bank-UNDP 1989 report, Africa's Adjustment and Growth]
would seem one of those piously ideological wishes derived from the view that little, if
anything, can ever go wrong if markets are left to work their magic (Mosley and Weeks,
1993:1595).
1. INTRODUCTION
The debates in recent years around structural adjustment and market liberalization in Africa
are the most contentious and polarizing since those of the 1960s and 1970s on development versus
underdevelopment in Latin America. In both instances, the polarization occurs in large measure
because the descriptive labels are too broad, too under-specified, and too ideologically freighted to
pinpoint the precise processes and conditions authors address. The concepts of development, underdevelopment,
and structural adjustment are as much politically phrased as technical, tending to
conflate the normative and prescriptive with the descriptive and analytical, and referring
simultaneously to an end state and a process. In consequence, the definitional criteria and the
measures of under/development and structural adjustment are difficult, multiple, and contested.
In some ways, the current debates swirling around structural adjustment replay the
discussions of the seventies on what "development" does or should mean. Debates about
development have been over the appropriateness of equating it with economic growth as opposed
to growth and or through redistribution. How are economic growth and the reduction of poverty to
be connected? -- are they alternatives? or linked hierarchically such that growth has to come first?
2
or achievable in tandem? The debates around structural adjustment and liberalization have been very
similar, producing questions about their distributional effects, and leading to programs on the "social
dimensions of adjustment".
Underlying these apparently pragmatic policy questions raised by "development" and by
"structural adjustment and liberalization" is an implied separability of economy and society. This
apparently simple distinction has a complex intellectual history connected with the emergence of
neo-classical economics (see, for example, Deane 1978, Kahn 1990, Preston 1992, Rothenberg
1992). My simpler point here is that the analytical separation of economy and society has costs, and
that these become dangerous costs if the analytical separation is transmuted into one supposed to
exist in reality, ie. that one can attend to the economy without paying attention to the society. Many
of the disputes over structural adjustment policies and their effects in the world turn on a failure to
recognise that all economic policy actions are necessarily mediated through pre-existing social,
political, and cultural structures. Perhaps the most disabling opposition in disputes about structural
adjustment and liberalization is setting "the market" against an amorphous rest of the society,
typified sometimes as "government", sometimes as "civil society". But "the market" is an analytical
construct used to describe multiple relations among a vast range of actors (producers, consumers,
buyers, sellers, transporters, traders, business corporations, and so on). What a market "does" is, in
fact, an outcome of these multiple relationships. Hence, the question we face in African countries
today, where rapid policy change is taking place through programs of structural adjustment and
liberalization, is not whether or not "markets are doing their magic" but the more prosaic and less
glamorous task of trying to understand the way that socio-cultural and political structures mediate
economic policies. Given the political change underway in most of the African continent, not to
speak of the considerable volatility, unrest, and civil strife in many places, this task is even more
pressing.
3
Current discussions about structural adjustment and liberalization programs have recognized
the enormous difficulties in separating the "effects" of these programs from the interaction of the
latter with pre-existing conditions (Gibbon 1992, 1993, Killick 1993, Mosley and Weeks 1993,
Nelson 1990). In addition, national and sectoral policies are necessarily "broad brush" in their
formulation and practice. Designed for an entire country or sector, it is not surprising that such
policies have differential effects on different categories of the population. But we need to know what
kinds of differential effects, and how and why they occur. One of the most pressing debates has been
precisely about the consequences of the policy reforms for different groups, particularly the poor.
In this paper, I seek to throw some light on this question with special reference to Malawi and on
the basis of a longitudinal study of rural households, which were the subject of a field study in
1986/7 and again in 1990/1.
2. CONTEXT TO THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS IN MALAWI
During the 1970s, Malawi's enviable economic growth rates of up to five percent per annum
were attributed to its "market-oriented" policies (Acharya 1981). Its portrayal as a free-market
miracle had to be rejected when research published in the early 1980s showed that much of the
production increase was "achieved by directing the investment resources of the commercial banks
and ... ADMARC [the crop marketing board] ... into private tobacco estates" (Kydd 1988:31). The
market miracle was, in fact, a state-structured dual economy effected through political rather than
market means -- "magical" or not.1 The combined effects of the oil shocks, declining terms of trade
for exports and poor management in the (newer) estates precipitated a financial crisis in 1979-80
(Kydd 1988:31). An IMF Standby loan was arranged in 1980, followed by negotiations with the
World Bank for a series of structural adjustment loans from 1981 through to the present.
4
The first signs of "economic recovery" between 1982-5 then stalled, with the per capita GDP
in 1986 being 11% lower than the peak in 1979 (Kydd 1988:33). Given the centrality of agricultural
production for both export crops and national food security, the adjustment put strong emphasis on
improving producer prices for smallholders. The maize price was increased by 68% in the 1981-2
season, leading to a large increase in maize purchases by ADMARC (Kaluwa 1992:29). However,
subsequent analysis showed that this was less an increase in total production than a shift among
crops. The increase in maize sales was associated with a sharp decrease in the sales of tobacco,
cotton and groundnuts. Subsequent price hikes for the latter crops led, in turn, to a decrease in maize
sales. The price shifts and a decline in the use of higher-yielding maize varieties appear to have led
to the situation described for 1986-7: "maize production was at the lowest level recorded [for the
'eighties and] equal to the preadjustment level of 1980/1" (Sahn et al. 1990:93). The crop data
revealed the limited effect price changes had on total agricultural output, which was more
determined by "structural constraints" such as access to sufficient land and labor and to inputs of
fertilizer, seeds and credit (Lele 1987, 1989; Sahn et al. 1990).
These structural conditions also underlie the conclusion reached by a report on Food Security
that, despite Malawi's "large marketed surpluses" of maize which "achiev[e] the appearance of
national food security ... the per capita availability of food as measured in caloric value has
displayed a significant downward trend since 1972" (World Bank, 1990: 9-10). The overall
assessment of structural adjustment programs to date appears to be that there has been a somewhat
more positive effect on the "macroeconomic balance" (Kaluwa 1992) than on the living standards
of the poor.2 The decline in the real value of the minimum wage had been documented in Sahn et
al.(1990) and in the annual reports on food security by the Office of the President and Cabinet since
1989. In seeking to account for this situation, most of the commentators stress that one has to look
beyond the "process of policy reform" itself to "the structural characteristics of the economy prior
5
to adjustment" (Sahn et al., p.217; cf. Chilowa 1991; Kaluwa 1992; Lele 1987; Mapondo n.d.; Roe
1990). In this paper, some flesh is put on the bones of the "structural constraints" by means of a
study undertaken among rural households in southern Malawi.
In brief summary, Malawi is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, with
densities of 125 and more per square kilometre in the crowded southern region. Currently, the
national average family landholding is one hectare and, with a population growth rate of over three
percent, can only drop. Although rural families, who make up over eighty percent of the population,
depend on their own maize production for the bulk of their staple food supply, 70-80% run out of
their stored maize before the next harvest in an average year, and are dependent on purchases or
other means (gifts or compensation for work) for obtaining foodstuffs. Food shortages combine with
endemic disease (especially malaria, parasites, measles, respiratory illness) to produce the high rates
of infant and child mortality and chronic undernutrition that have been documented in national
surveys and local studies.3
3. A RURAL CASE STUDY, 1986/7 to 1990/1
Since 1986/7, I have been conducting a longitudinal study of some two hundred households
in a district in the Shire Highlands of southern Malawi. Here, I discuss some of the findings from
the first tranche, 1986/7 to 1990/1. The first round of research took place over the agricultural
season of 1986/7. Since the program for liberalizing crop marketing was initiated in the latter part
of 1987, the restudy of the same households during 1990/1 provides a basis for comparison with the
pre-liberalization year. In addition, during 1990/1, the government of Malawi authorized a pilot
project in the liberalization of burley tobacco production, by allowing a small proportion of rural
families to grow this crop which, formerly, had been restricted to estates.4 The area of our research
happened to be one of those chosen for the pilot project.
6
Both rounds of research employed multiple methods of enquiry. Repeated socio-economic
surveys of households were conducted of income, expenditure, food stores, child morbidity (all
monthly); single surveys for measuring fields, cropping patterns, harvests; and seasonal surveys for
labor use, wage rates, and for anthropometry. In addition, ethnographic (anthropological) and oral
historical research was carried out on relevant topics.5 The initial sample of households selected in
1986 was based on a random selection of villages in an area known to be densely populated and to
include tobacco growers (mostly dark-fired tobacco plus some "illegal" burley). Given the purpose
of the research to investigate the interaction of cash cropping and food security, within the villages,
we purposively selected families so that approximately one third should be growing tobacco, and
the remainder from a range of land-holding size (from "large" to "small").6 All grew maize and other
food crops. In 1990/1, the same methods of data collection were used. Some ten percent of the
households had left or dispersed because of death, divorce, or movement for other reasons. Although
circumstances had allowed only ten months of data to be collected in 1986/7, twelve months of data
were collected in 1990/1. The data were adjusted for comparative analysis.7
Unsurprisingly for one of the most densely populated areas of a small, agricultural country,
landholding size is positively correlated with income. The average household landholding in both
years was 1.5 ha. This is above the average for the district and the southern region as a whole
because, in purposively selecting one third of the sample to be tobacco growers, we had willy-nilly
over-selected those with more land.8 While the sample includes families with very small amounts
of land (under half a hectare) and very poor families, and thus allows study of these social
categories, the sample means nevertheless over-represent the better-off. Farming provides the bulk
of income, both in kind (food) and cash, but about a third of total income was earned, on average,
in both years from off-farm sources (self-employment, wage labor, and transfers, mainly from other
family members). Between the two years, and as a consequence of the market liberalization
7
measures, households in the top fifty percent of income decreased the proportion of their income
from off-farm and increased that from agricultural sales, as is discussed below.
Most landholdings are divided into an average of four fields that are separated from each
other, and all cultivation is by hand-held hoe. The vast majority of land (c.80%) is under maize, the
staple food of the region, though virtually all the maize is intercropped with legumes and other
vegetables. Maize is the queen of the fields because, in the local idiom, "maize is [our] life"
("chimanga ndi moyo"). The maize harvests provide households with the bulk of their food supply,
70% in 1986/7 and 86% in 1990/1. Maize is also a cash crop, with over half of households selling
some (53% in 1986/7 and 60% in 1990/1). Most sales are of very small quantities so that, of the
total amount of maize produced by households, only 9% was sold in 1990/1, slightly less than in
1986/7. Most of the small sales of maize are transacted through the local markets, but in both years
the bulk of all maize sold was sold to ADMARC, the crop marketing board. This reflects the skewed
distribution of sales -- many small sales by a large number of farmers and a few farmers selling
large quantities. The liberalization of the grain market in 1987 resulted in more private traders
operating during the harvest season of 1991 but only 25% was sold to traders in that year by sample
households. While about half of the households did not sell maize, virtually all purchased maize
(95% in 1990/1), reflecting the fact that the majority of rural households are net purchasers.
(a) Documented changes in household data, 1986/7 to 1990/1
(i) Levels and sources of income
The overall average household income of the sample increased between 1986 and 1990.9 But
the increase proved to be heavily concentrated in the top fifty percent of households so that the
income differential between the top and bottom income quartiles actually widened. Assessing
income changes in money terms in a period of high inflation is difficult, especially for a group who
8
derive so much of their livelihood from own production. Since there is no Consumer Price Index
(CPI) for rural areas, I use the low-income CPI for Zomba town. This changed from 160.6 in 1987
to 300 in 1991 (on a base of 100 for 1984) and provides a deflator of 0.5353. As seen in Table 1,
the resulting calculation suggests that there was an overall increase in the sample average income
of 26%. However, this masks unequal gains: the breakdown of the sample by income quartiles
shows gains of 56% for the richest group and a loss of 16% for the bottom quartile. Because the CPI
is constructed for urban groups, it is at best a rough measure for a rural population, but its use as a
deflator may indicate a relative decline in the incomes of the poorer households over the four years
between 1986-7 and 1990-1. Thus, the poor have lost ground relatively rather than gaining
disproportionately over the period of liberalization.
The findings on shifts in income sources and in food expenditures for different income
groups support the picture of a gain for the better-off and a loss for the poor. The overall pattern of
diversification followed by sample households, combining crop production for food and for sale
with various off-farm activities and sources of income, was clear in both years (and continues to be
so). However, between 1986 and 1990, the poorest twenty-five percent of families decreased their
income from crop sales and increased that from casual wage labor. These households have
experienced a large decline in their agricultural cash income, and were, for example, the only
income quartile to have decreased their share of income from maize sales. This is particularly
noteworthy, since in 1986-7, the proportion of maize harvest sold by this poorest quartile was twice
the sample average (22% cf 11%). The reverse holds for the better-off families, who proportionately
reduced their income from off-farm sources and increased that from agricultural sales (see Table
2). This was particularly marked for the richest twenty-five percent of households, who increased
the share of their total income from tobacco substantially (from 9% to 29%), and also increased the
share from maize sales (from 2.4% to 8%).
9
(ii) Harvests, food supplies and expenditures
Sample households reaped larger maize harvests in 1990/1 than in 1986/7, with even the
poorest twenty-five percent (who also have, on average, smaller landholdings) making some gains.
Since there was no significant change in the amount of land cultivated, nor in the weather patterns,
the improvement in harvests appears to be attributable to the large increase in the number of
households growing high-yielding varieties of hybrid maize (from 2% in 1986/7 to 52% in 1990/1),
and an increase in the average amounts of fertilizer used. This outcome, in turn, is attributable to
special efforts by government, following the dramatic decline of hybrid maize production up to
1986-7, to promote and encourage its production. This was achieved by institutional changes in
extension services that increased the access to credit for smallholder maize (and fertilizer), including
the formation of women's credit clubs, and by improvements in service delivery of hybrid seeds.
Although not presented here, the sample data reflect these efforts and are supported by national data
and field surveys in all regions showing the same increase in hybrid maize production (Smale et al
1991).10
The larger harvests, combined with attractive producer prices and an increase in the number
of private traders, led the majority of households to increase their maize sales (Table 3). In clear
contrast, households in the lowest income quartile reduced their maize sales. Across the sample,
households increased the proportion of their total maize supply provided by their own stored maize.
As far as maize purchases were concerned (virtually all in the deficit or pre-harvest season), the
average amounts decreased for all income groups. However, a major difference emerges when one
considers the share of household cash budget spent on purchasing maize. While the top income
quartile households actually reduced their budget share, and the middle fifty percent spent about the
same proportion, the poorest twenty-five percent of households increased the budget share even
though they obtained a smaller quantity of maize. When the total supply of maize is considered,
10
households in the third income quartile significantly increased their per capita supply, households
in the second income quartile had a marginally significant increase, but the bottom income quartile
achieved no significant increase. (The lack of significance in the figure for the top quartile is
probably explained by the high standard deviation of 244.9 for the 1990 figure).
In sum, the strategy followed by the poorest quartile of households (reducing maize sales
to increase retained stores, increasing wage labor to replace forgone cash revenues, and increasing
the budget share of purchased maize) did not prove sufficient to significantly improve their food
situation. This finding together with that on an intensified skewness in income distribution suggest
no improvement and, possibly, a worsening in the welfare and food security of the poorest twentyfive
percent.
(b) Interpretation of changes
The program of liberalizing crop marketing involved several changes: increases in the
producer price for maize (and, over the years, in other food crops relative to maize); efforts to
encourage private marketing of crops; and allowing (some) smallholders to grow burley tobacco.
The reasons these changes resulted in greater benefit for the richer households and a possible
worsening for the poorest lie in the pre-existing distribution of resources and the structure of social
relationships mediating access to resources of land, labor, capital, credit and information.
Because all smallholder households give first priority in cultivation to the production of
maize as the staple food, tobacco and similar non-food crops have been grown disproportionately
by those with larger amounts of land. In addition, growing and processing tobacco requires a high
input of labor, which also favors those who have more than adequate family labor and who are able
to hire workers. The large bulk of labor hiring in the villages is done by the richest ten to twenty
percent of households because these are able to obtain sufficient cash (either through crop and
11
livestock sales, transfers from employed children, or other business activities) to pay workers, and/or
have sufficient surplus maize to compensate workers "in-kind". In addition, it was precisely these
better-endowed farmers who were disproportionately represented in the credit clubs organized by
agricultural extension staff. They also provide most of the store-keepers, traders, and the leaders in
the political, religious, and community organizations. Hence, when the legalization of burley
growing took place, the majority of applicants for the pilot projects were these farmers with more
land, with maize surpluses and access to cash, and who were already closely connected with the
extension service. When, in 1991, new organizations (so-called "clubs") were formed to enable
burley growers to sell their tobacco directly on the auction floors (at world price), again the
membership was drawn disproportionately from the top third to a quarter of farming households.11
It is not surprising then, with hindsight, to see the richest twenty-five percent of households
benefiting so much more from the liberalization of burley production. This does not mean that the
bottom thirty percent of households have derived no benefit from the liberalization. Some do grow
small amounts of burley tobacco and this trend has increased somewhat since 1990. Moreover, the
large injections of cash income from burley tobacco into the community circuits of exchange can
be seen to have some beneficial spinoffs for families other than those who are direct recipients of
burley money. For example, the burley money has been put into new and improved housing,
furniture, clothes, household artefacts, and bicycles. These expenditures, in turn, translate into more
jobs (making bricks, carpentry, bicycle repairs) for others. Similarly, the increased expenditures on
certain foodstuffs, such as small cakes or fish, or on beer and local gin (kachasu) translate into
benefits for the local producers of these goods. These trends have been confounded by the repeated
droughts from 1991 but, in good rainfall years, seem to reemerge.
The ability of the richer twenty-five to thirty percent of households to benefit from the
liberalization of burley production between 1986/7 and 1990/1 was seen, too, in their taking up the
12
opportunity for increasing maize sales. An increase in the producer price for maize is attractive
mainly to the surplus producers who are precisely drawn from the category already described --
better endowed with land, labor, and both financial and social capital. It is important to stress that
all households, including the richest, aspire to produce all the maize they need. Only a small
minority (perhaps ten to fifteen percent) manage to do so consistently. Hence, the producer price
is most important to these. For the larger number of households who sell only small quantities of
maize, which often do not represent an absolute surplus but a way of obtaining cash for other
purposes, and for the people who sell no maize, the critical price is the consumer price, the price that
holds in the deficit months before the harvest.
People in the sample area know very well that an increase in the producer price almost
always translates into an increase in the consumer price. Each time the maize prices have been raised
significantly in recent years, even those people who have made an immediate gain through their
small post-harvest sales of maize inevitably expressed anxiety that "it [the price hike] means maize
will be more expensive in January". We saw above that the households in the bottom income
quartile, who are also among the most deficit in own food supplies, reduced the amount of maize
sales between 1986/7 and 1990/1. We also saw that, despite doing so, and despite spending a larger
proportion of their cash budget on purchasing maize, they ended up with no significant increase in
their total supply. This pattern suggests an increase in the cost of maize relative to their earnings.
Let us consider this a little more. First, people explained to us that they reduced their maize
sales in the hope of reducing their dependence on food purchases since they saw the price of
purchased maize rise, and also felt that the uncertainty in supplies of food for purchase was
increasing. In trying to identify the source of these perceptions, I found that, in the deficit months
immediately following liberalization (September 1987 to February 1988), there had been an
unusually sharp increase in the prices for maize in the Blantyre urban markets. This became well
13
known in the sample villages, the information flowing through family members who work in or
travel to town and through traders moving between the villages and town. For families with
members living and working in town it had more immediate effect in influencing their income and
expenditures. Subsequently, analysts in Malawi decided that the main influence on the
unprecedented rise in prices was less an effect of the liberalization measures as the sudden influx
of aid monies to buy maize for the Mozambican refugees flooding into camps. The pressure to buy
maize pushed prices way above the usual seasonal increase. From the point of view of village
consumers, however, the much sharper rise in prices for food in the deficit season signalled that they
should try to increase their own stored supplies.
In addition, people in the study villages reported increased instability in the prices and
movements of maize in the immediate rural area, pointing to the increase in numbers of people
buying and selling maize immediately after harvest. People thus expressed anxiety not only about
the sharp seasonal price rise in the neighboring towns but also about the possibility of more maize
leaving the area than normally. Both circumstances led to fears of higher prices in the deficit, preharvest
months when so many of them had to purchase maize. Such an interpretation has to be
understood against the well-established seasonal shift in prices, the higher deficit season prices in
the local markets than in ADMARC centers, and the periodic shortfalls in ADMARC supplies.
ADMARC has long played an essential role in supplying the majority of deficit households with
maize. However, people have also long learned that ADMARC centers often run out of maize in
January or February, throwing people onto the small supplies still available in local markets or
villagers' granaries. In both 1986/7 and 1990/1, there were a couple of such shortages in local
ADMARC centers during January and February in the research area which caused distress and
extreme anxiety for the many who can only scrape enough cash together to purchase maize every
few days. In years of national shortage, these localized cuts in supplies are more common. The
14
overall effect is to provide a further incentive to people to provide as much of their own food as
possible. People's perceptions of increased instability in prices and supplies in the years following
liberalization and high inflation have reinforced such a response. Hence, the survey showed an
overall increase across the sample in the proportion of maize harvest stored for future use.
Analysis of maize prices in the local markets suggests an additional reason for poor
households to reduce their post-harvest maize sales in an effort to reduce purchases later in the year.
The particular squeeze felt by poorer households may have derived from the fact that their sales and
purchases of maize are disproportionately through local markets compared with the better-off
households. Most purchasers of maize in the deficit season prefer to purchase from ADMARC since
the government-regulated price there is lower than prices for maize in the local markets (or those
asked by local farmers with surplus stores or by local storekeepers). However, shortages of cash,
time, and other constraints lead to many of the poor buying in small quantities and at a high
premium (over ADMARC's price) in local markets or from other villagers or, at a high implicit
price, in exchange for labor.
Table 4 gives the change in prices for maize in ADMARC and local markets between 1986/7
and 1990/1 in nominal and real (deflated) terms.12 The figures indicate a slight increase in
ADMARC prices, moreso for producer than consumer prices. The consumer price in local markets
increased much more (by about 19% over the 1986/7 level). Since, as noted, the poorer families
more often buy in local markets, this is one likely explanation for the greater pressure on their food
budget. Moreover, while government mandated an increase in producer prices at ADMARC, those
in local markets fell by just over 25% by comparison with the pre-liberalization year of 1986. Since
smaller producers also tend to sell whatever maize they sell in local markets, then the lower
producer price combined with the higher consumer price represented an overall increase of 44% in
the actual cost of their maize.
15
Finally, if the poorest twenty-five percent purchased less maize, despite increasing the share
of their cash budget spent on it, this suggests that, despite shifting more into casual wage labor, their
rates of compensation fell behind the rising costs of maize. This would fit with the decline in the
real minimum wage documented by those working with national data (Sahn et al. 1990, Food
Security and Nutrition Bulletins of the Malawi Government). Here, it is important to point out the
way that casual wage labor is organized in rural areas. The official minimum (day's) wage is
virtually never given to hired workers by the smallholder farmers who hire the bulk of casual labor.
(Some, but by no means all, of the privately owned, small estates use the minimum wage.)
Moreover, a very large amount of the work done is by the task rather than by the day or month. For
example, clearing and ridging is usually done by the field (which vary greatly in size), weeding by
a certain number of ridges or planting stations, water carrying by the bucket, etc. The particular rates
also vary, though generally within a certain range with, for example, relatives and neighbors
normally at the higher end compared with incoming workers (from even more land-short areas).
Among local people, the most vulnerable in labor-hiring arrangements are the chronically
poor. These work disproportionately more often in the deficit, pre-harvest months for compensation
in food (maize, cassava, sweet potatoes, etc.). Because they are known to have few or no reserves,
their bargaining position is poor. Hence, in years of harvest shortfall or in periods of poor supply
of maize for purchase, they find themselves having to work at even more disadvantageous rates than
in more "normal" years or periods. In recalling for me the year of the serious drought, 1991/2, one
of the poorest women in my sample said she had to work much harder than usual -- further
conversation revealed that this translated into more work demanded for a particular amount of maize
or cassava. In contrast, after the food relief distribution during the drought of 1993, some of the
bigger farmers in our sample were unable to recruit as many laborers as they wanted to (at the rates
they offered) precisely because "people were satisfied with the free food". In other words, the food
16
distributed to the poor significantly reduced their need to work at rates of compensation which they
considered low but, usually, had no ability to refuse.
In the period considered in this paper, 1986/7 to 1990/1, the rates of compensation for casual
labor appear not to have kept pace with the rising cost of living, particularly maize. Since the
increase in burley tobacco production entails an increased demand for labor, one would expect that
it might translate into rising levels of wages. In the period considered, this appears not to have
happened. Since then, the periodic droughts have confounded any trends at all. It remains to be seen
whether a further spread of burley growing will push up local wages.
4. THE MALAWI CASE AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA
Over the past decade, many critiques have been published arguing that structural adjustment
has had negative effects, especially on the poorer and more vulnerable groups. In contrast (and
partially as a reponse) the recent report on Adjustment in Africa by the World Bank (1994)
concluded that, in those countries with "more successful adjustment reforms" and a rise in GDP per
capita, not only has "faster growth in all likelihood reduced the deterioration in the conditions of the
poor" but "the gains from growth may well have benefited the poor, and especially the rural poor,
disproportionately ... [because of] the reductions in disincentives to the production of tradable
goods, as well as other agricultural reforms such as liberalizing marketing" (p.165).
The assumptions behind this conclusion include that higher producer prices will induce
farmers, including the rural poor, to sell more, thus benefiting from the price increase; that rural
households are net producers; and that, once "adjustment reforms" are in place, the obstacles to
households shifting into more profitable tradable goods are removed. However, if these assumptions
do not hold, then the rural poor are likely to experience either stagnant or declining levels of income
and food security. This is what I have argued for Malawi in this paper, pointing out that rural
17
households have to be set within their specific social contexts to understand why the assumptions
(made in the World Bank report, but more generally held) are incorrect, and, hence, why the
conclusions do not follow.
First, the contention that an overall increase in per capita income "reduced the deterioration
in the conditions of the poor" is not supported by the Malawi case. An increase in income for the
total sample proved to be heavily concentrated in the top fifty percent of households so that the
income differential between the top and bottom income quartiles actually widened. Moreover, the
lack of a significant rise in total maize available (retained and purchased) for the poorest twenty-five
percent of households, despite an increase in the percentage of maize harvest retained for own
consumption and despite an increase in the proportion of their cash budget spent on maize, together
suggest more, not less, stress on their food security.
Second, the proposition that "the reductions in disincentives to the production of tradable
goods, as well as other agricultural reforms such as liberalizing marketing" led to a disproportionate
benefit for the rural poor also fails to hold for Malawi. Certainly, the overall effect of the Malawi
government's actions in rescinding the ban on smallholder farmers from producing burley tobacco
has been to increase the agricultural income of growers. However, the beneficiaries of the new
burley program are disproportionately drawn from the better-off families. In years of good rainfall
and harvests, some of the burley income does appear to flow into other people's pockets through the
increased demand by burley growers for locally-produced goods and services, although upward
pressure on wages for the poorest quartile is not evident.
Third, the Malawi case shows that, when the majority of farmers are net consumers, it is not
appropriate to assume that improved producer prices will induce farmers, including the poor, to sell
more of their produce, including food crops. The 1994 World Bank report does recognize that the
rural poor produce much of their own food and are therefore "somewhat buffer[ed] from market
18
forces". But the report appears to set aside the implications of this recognition when it continues:
"they still rely on selling their produce for a significant part of their income. So, changes in market
[producer] prices matter" (p. 167). Increases in prices received for crops sold are beneficial but their
overall effect has to be set against the sellers' "costs". Because the poor are net consumers of maize,
the rise in producer prices for maize caused them to reduce the amount they sold from their maize
harvest in an attempt to cope with the expected rise in consumer prices. The net effect of a price rise
in maize was negative for them -- therefore, they made a relative withdrawal from marketing. Those
who benefitted most from the increase in producer prices were the true surplus producer-sellers.
These three corrections to the World Bank's conclusion made on the basis of household data
from Malawi turn on two critical points. First, the need for land, labor and capital entailed in
entering or intensifying tobacco production and maize sales meant that the better-off were able to
take up opportunities consequent on market reforms that are not feasible for the poor. Second, that
chronic poverty, including chronic food deficits, resulted in the poorer losing when producer prices
for foods were increased, because they had to purchase at the higher consumer prices.
A final point on the importance of setting policy reforms, including market reforms, into
their social and institutional context shifts from household strategies to regional distributional
systems of food.
Clearly, one major part of households' food security strategies emerging from the study was
the failure of the private traders, at least up to 1990/1, to provide a stable source of affordable maize
for purchase in the deficit pre-harvest season. The rationale for the liberalization of grain marketing
was to increase the efficiency of ADMARC, and, by encouraging private traders to enter the market,
to increase the efficiency of the food market in adjusting to changes in supply and demand.
Subsequent research has shown that the latter has not happened, at least insofar as the dependence
on ADMARC is concerned. While fairly large numbers of traders have registered as licensed traders
19
and a much larger number of small unlicensed traders (mostly farmers) opportunistically trade a few
bags of maize or pigeon peas to make a little extra cash, the traders are heavily concentrated in areas
not far from the main urban centers of high demand for maize and other food crops. The research
area reported on here, for example, is within reach of Zomba, a local market town with a substantial
urban population, as well as Blantyre-Limbe, the largest commercial center in the southern region,
where maize is purchased by a very large urban population as well as by industries (breweries, grain
millers) and large institutional customers (hospitals, schools, Police). A study of maize trading by
the Food Studies Group of Oxford University also found that traders were highly concentrated in
urban centers, in centers located near the borders with Mozambique, from which come apparently
significant flows of maize, and within reach of key ADMARC buying centers to which many traders
on-sell (1992:10).
Areas distant from such centers and from main transport routes are not well served. As part
of the restructuring of ADMARC, several of its centers were closed but traders failed to move into
these areas, leaving large gaps in the trading network (Cromwell 1992:124). This caused such
hardship for villagers wanting to sell maize after harvest and needing to purchase maize in the
deficit season, that a number of the centers had to be reopened (Kaluwa 1992). The reasons for the
concentration and the gaps in trading networks are reportedly the lack of capital and expertise for
large-scale storage of maize from the harvest to deficit seasons, the scarcity and cost of transport,
and the wish, among many traders, for a quick turnover of cash.
Another critical aspect of this situation is that the traders are active immediately after the
main harvest but disappear from the rural areas in the deficit season. In 1990/1, for example, in the
research area discussed here, there was only one fairly large-scale trader who ran a store selling
maize in the deficit season.13
20
What are the implications of the changes in crop marketing for the income and food security
of rural households? I divide the answer into consideration of production and consumption of maize.
Farmers in the areas where traders are most active are provided with extra options for farmers to sell
their maize. Farmers note that they particularly appreciate the fact that some traders arrange to pick
up the crops to be purchased at the seller's compound (despite the regulation that traders are
supposed to operate only from recognized markets). Obviously, this is an advantage for the few
large-scale sellers in the villages. Another rule on the books is that traders are not supposed to
operate before the offical opening of ADMARC buying centers. This is also disregarded. However,
farmers who sell early usually need to do so for urgent cash needs and do so at a lower price than
the announced official price. Although traders have a bad name in such circumstances, our data
indicate that similar reductions in price have been and continue to be made by the larger producers
of the area who also buy and sell from and to fellow villagers. Hence, the critical determinants
appear to be the seasonal changes and the prevailing regulations rather than trader vs ADMARC.
However, the concentration of traders in areas reasonably close to ADMARC and urban centers
means that farmers in the poorly served areas wishing to sell maize in quantity continue to rely on
ADMARC as buyer.
As far as maize consumption is concerned, I pointed out that traders have had virtually no
effect on the availability of maize in rural areas in the deficit season. Our monthly surveys of the
source of maize consumed show that in January (1991) 63% of maize used in meals was purchased
from ADMARC compared with only 3% from traders, the rest coming from own stores, local
markets, gifts and compensation for work. A study of trading in the three regions of Malawi found
the same situation and concluded that traders do not play a major role in supplying maize to rural
"deficit households" (Food Studies Group, 1992:10, 22). ADMARC continues to be the critically
important source of staple food for rural families. The main reasons for the failure of traders to have
21
made serious inroads in ADMARC's role as seller of maize in the pre-harvest season derive from
the small-scale nature of operations of most traders and their lack of capital and organization. They
store for very short periods before onselling to ADMARC, larger traders or urban buyers (cf.
Kaluwa 1992; Christiansen and Stackhouse 1989).
There seems to be consensus in the available research on the inability of private traders, so
far, to replace the role of ADMARC as main supplier of food to Malawi's rural households. An issue
on which there is no information, as far as I'm aware, is the effect of increased maize sales postharvest
on local supplies in the deficit season. Might there be a decline in locally available supplies
of maize in the deficit season caused by the few surplus producers selling more maize post-harvest?
Although ADMARC is by far the biggest supplier of maize in the deficit season, the bigger rural
producers are also a source of maize whether directly through sales or through employment for food.
Our research indicates a substantial increase in the sales of maize by the bigger producers since
liberalization. The corollary of this is that these producers may reduce the amount of maize they
retain for later sale. Against such a possibility is their need for labor in the cultivation season. While
there are large numbers of poor people without maize in the area, the advantage to big producers
of holding reserves of maize to acquire labor and/or sell at high deficit season prices is likely to
counteract the attractiveness of cash from post-harvest sales.14
A related question is whether the potentially high returns to burley production will lure the
bigger producers away from maize surpluses. In conversation, a few farmers imply this may happen,
largely because of the heavy demands on labor and management made by combining tobacco
production with surplus maize production. (Note that this does not imply a decline in maize grown
for own consumption; the richest farmers, along with the poorer, increased the proportion of
retained maize between 1986-7 to 1990-1)15. In either case, the local supplies of maize in the deficit
season would decline, throwing even more reliance on ADMARC sources than ever.
22
In short, the process of liberalizing grain and food marketing has proven to be more complex
than merely encouraging private traders to enter rural marketing. It will take time for a cadre of
entrepreneurs with the requisite capital, skill and organizational capacities to develop. Since
ADMARC continues to be the major player in the sale of maize in food-deficit months (as well as
a major player in the purchasing of crops after harvest), the process of restructuring food crop
marketing will need very careful monitoring over a number of years.
5. CONCLUSION
The optimistic conclusion cited earlier from the 1994 World Bank Report on adjustment and
liberalization measures disproportionately benefiting the poor has been questioned in this paper on
Malawi. However, that conclusion was qualified by other statements that stress the need "to protect
--and, where necessary, to strengthen-- public expenditure programs benefiting the poor, particularly
those for the delivery of basic services" (209). The latter was a conclusion also reached by Mosley
and Weeks (1993) on the basis of comparisons across African countries. They state: "it seems
reasonably clear that ... adjustment programs do not automatically help the poor" (p.1595). Not only
have the programs "diverted public expenditure away from the health and education sectors" but also
"agricultural liberalization appears only to assist food production if ... public sector development
expenditure ... supports it" (p.1593). Perhaps the most realistic conclusion in the World Bank 1994
Report is that "[a]djustment alone will not put countries on a sustained, poverty-reducing growth
path" (p.2).
As many commentators on Malawi have stressed, at issue in this challenge is "the structural
constraints" or what an anthropologist would refer to as social and political organization, including
socio-economic differentiation. Like any policy, structural adjustment and liberalization are
necessarily mediated through existing structures -- social relations of production and exchange that
23
include family and community, government, private organizations, political structures, distribution
networks, and so on. The formulation of adjustment and liberalization programs all too often does
not take sufficient account of the particular sets of structures and contingent conditions in a country.
Only analysis that takes account of these mediating structures can begin to respond to the need to
consider "the distributional consequences ... of reform programs" (Duncan and Howell 1992:5).
What might be some of the implications of the above analysis for Malawi? A long
recognized problem for the poorer rural households is that they are forced to look for temporary
work in the deficit (rainy) season, usually working on the fields of neighbors or local estates, so
failing to work as much on their own fields as they should. How might policy help break this classic
vicious cycle of the poor? One way is to find means of increasing the income (and purchasing
power) of the poor. Our research found that the injection of income in the form of cash wages from
dry season work on rural roads enabled some of the poorer families to purchase needed food
supplies when maize prices were at their lowest. The problems of transport and communications in
the rainy season as well as the tendency for bulk goods to be vulnerable to diversion by the
privileged and the politically well-connected suggest it is better to favor cash flows, that is, as wages
for work, in preference to food/seeds/fertilizer for work. However, several of the latter type
programs have been initiated in Malawi and assessments of their relative efficacy will become
available soon enough. One indication of their potentially positive effect was seen in the example
given above where food aid had the (unintended) effect of increasing the bargaining position of the
poorer families relative to the better-off families who do the bulk of the hiring locally.
Other "structural constraints" pose even more difficult problems for policy. As far as land
shortage is concerned, a moratorium has been placed in recent years on the diversion of land from
"customary" tenure to leaseholds, a welcome move though difficult to impose, especially given the
huge backlog of lease applications (see Mkandawire et al. 1990). Another suggestion has been to
24
transfer currently "unused" land from estates to smallholders, an even more difficult proposition
politically and legally, as well as technically (in light of the official call for increasing estate land
to be put into forestry). Even if some more land is made available to smallholders in this way, that
would only be a stop-gap in the face of the present rate of increase in person/land density. The
longer term solutions to low levels of food intake and the other dimensions of poverty are
considered by most commentators to lie in, one, increasing the land's productivity; two, increasing
smallholder access to higher value crops; and three, encouraging the development and expansion
of non-agricultural activities in the rural areas. In addition, given the synergy between food shortage
and sickness seen in our study (but not discussed here), improvements in access to education and
health care are needed.16
At present, tobacco is the highest value crop available for farmers. Its very high labor
demand is a problem for small families, especially those without resident adult men (so-called
"female-headed households") and with insufficient cash income from other sources to be able to hire
labor. In the longer term, moreover, the prospects for tobacco exports are likely to decline in face
of decreasing levels of smoking in some parts of the world. Sadly, the legitimate concerns about the
negative effects of smoking on health cannot gainsay the fact that, for Malawi, tobacco continues
to provide one of the very few crops able to bring it revenue, and to put money into the farmers'
pockets. As noted, the opening of burley production to smallholders is a revolution even though only
a minority of rural households can be included. In light of the difficulties associated with tobacco,
especially burley, however, other crops are also needed to provide a source of income. In our
research area, these include chili peppers (mainly for export), sunflower, and numerous vegetables
(to serve the increasing demand from nearby towns). Since the demand for these is unstable (both
in local markets and as export crops), it is unsurprising that most farmers prefer to be highly
25
diversified, switching in and out of crops as conditions change. The call to identify other high value
crops than tobacco has been frequently made in recent years but is proving difficult to realize.
If improvements in the lives of rural families are to depend, for some time, on increasing the
production and productivity of agriculture, then one has also to point to the implications for
increasing use of and competition over resources (for example, over streambed gardens which are
in increasing demand for both tobacco nurseries and for dry-season cultivation of vegetables). Major
topics for future research are the effects of intensified agricultural production on use of and claims
over resources; and, in turn, the implications for sustainable agriculture and for improvements in
standards of living of rural families. Finally, given the extensive and, to judge from our research,
apparently intensifying transfers between rural and urban populations, the policy strategies to tackle
poverty should not be conceived on a simple sectoral basis, while research needs to encompass both
rural and urban groups more often than is usual.
26
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Christiansen, R.E. and Stackhouse, L.E. 1989 The Privatization of Agricultural Trading in Malawi.
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Deane, P. 1978 The Evolution of Economic Ideas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Duncan, Alex and John Howell 1992 ed. Structural Adjustment and the African Farmer. London:
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Killick, Tony 1993 The Adaptive Economy: Adjustment Policies in Low-Income Countries. (EDI
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Kydd, J.G. 1985 Malawi in the 1970s: development policies and economic change. IN Malawi: An
Alternative Pattern of Development. Edinburgh: Centre of African Studies.
Kydd, J. 1988 Policy Reform and Adjustment in an Economy under Siege: Malawi 1980-87. IDS
Bulletin 1: 31-41.
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Lele, U. 1987 Structural Adjustment, Agricultural Development and the Poor: Some Observations
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Lele, U. 1989 Structural Adjustment, Agricultural Development and the Poor: Lessons from the
Malawian Experience. MADIA Discussion Paper 9, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Mapondo, H. n.d. Economic Adjustment Programs: Lessons from the Malawian Experience.
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McCracken, J. 1983 Planters, Peasants and the Colonial State: the Impact of the Native Tobacco
Board in the Central Province of Malawi. Journal of Southern African Studies 9,2:172-192.
Mkandawire, R., Jaffee, S., and Bertoli, S. 1990 Beyond "Dualism": The Changing Face of the
Leasehold Estate Subsector of Malawi. Binghamton, N.Y.: Institute for Development of
Anthropology.
Mosley, P. and J. Weeks 1993 Has Recovery Begun? "Africa's Adjustment in the 1980s" Revisited.
World Development 21,10: 1583-1606.
Nelson, J. M. ed. 1990 Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third
World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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1989, Volume 1, No.2, Lilongwe.
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Roe, G. 1990 ed. Report of the Workshop on The Effects the of Structural Adjustment
Programmeme in Malawi. Centre for Social Research, University of Malawi, Zomba.
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Sahn, D.E., Arulpragasam, J. and Merid, L. 1990 Policy Reform and Poverty in Malawi: a survey
of a decade of experience. Ithaca, New York: Cornell Food and Nutrition Policy Program
Monograph 7.
Smale, M. with Kaunda, Z.H.W., Makina, H.L., Mkandawire, M.M.M.K., Msowoya, M.N.S.,
Mwale, D.J.E.K., and Heisey, P.W. 1991 Chimanga cha makolo, Hybrids, and Composites: an
Analysis of Farmers' Adoption of Maize Technology in Malawi, 1989-91. CIMMYT, Mexico.
Timmer, C. Peter, Walter P. Falcon, Scott R. Pearson 1983 Food Policy Analysis. Baltimore: Johns
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D.C.
28
TABLE 1 SAMPLE HOUSEHOLD (PER CAP) INCOME: 1986-7 AND 1990-1,
NOMINAL AND ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION
1986-7* 1990-1 90-1 Deflated** % Difference
Total Sample 93.36 219.78 117.65 +26%
Btm. Income Quartile 1 37.49 58.63 31.39 -16%
Income Quartile 2 64.49 107.90 57.76 -10%
Income Quartile 3 87.66 174.81 93.78 +7%
Top Income Quartile 4 184.56 538.75 288.39 +56%
* The 1986-7 data were for a 10 month period; these have been converted to a 12 month figure
to make them comparable to the 1990 data for the purposes of this table.
** A deflator of .5353 is based on the change in Zomba C.P.I. from 160.6 in 1987 (on a base
of 100 in 1984) to 300 in 1991.
29
TABLE 2 INCOME SOURCES AS % OF TOTAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME FOR INCOME QUARTILES, 1986-7 TO 1990-1
Total Sample 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile
Sources 90-1 86-7 90-1 86-7 90-1 86-7 90-1 86-7 90-1 86-7
All Food Crops 16.2 17.1 12.6 19.1 17.3 16.6 18.1 18.2 16.5 14.4
maize 6.6 3.3 4.6 5.3 8.2 2.3 5.5 3.1 8.0 2.4
roots 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.6
pulses 1.6 4.6 0.7 4.5 1.8 5.0 2.8 4.7 1.0 4.0
vegetables 5.5 5.5 5.0 5.9 5.0 5.1 7.6 7.0 4.4 4.1
other 1.9 3.1 1.8 3.1 2.1 3.2 1.4 2.6 2.2 3.2
Tobacco 11.0 4.7 1.4 2.0 5.1 3.4 8.4 4.3 29.0 9.2
Non-Crop Agric.a 8.0 8.1 7.4 9.2 7.5 8.1 10.4 7.5 6.8 7.5
Self Employment 5.5 7.6 3.4 6.4 7.3 6.1 4.6 9.6 6.8 8.3
Agric. Wages 5.8 7.5 10.7 6.9 6.8 11.0 4.0 6.8 1.6 5.3
Non-Agric. Wages 4.7 3.7 3.8 2.2 5.6 4.6 6.0 4.5 3.5 3.5
Giftsb 10.2 10.0 12.7 11.1 10.6 8.5 10.3 10.8 7.3 9.8
Loan/Repayment 3.0 3.7 1.7 2.4 3.1 3.8 3.4 3.6 3.9 4.8
Remittancesc 3.5 5.1 6.5 6.1 2.2 5.3 4.7 2.3 0.4 6.7
Rent, Pension, etc. 0.9 0.4 0.2 0 0.8 0 0.2 0 2.4 1.7
Sale of Hhd. Assets 0.3 -- 0.7 -- 0.4 -- 0.1 -- 0.1 --
Home Consumptiond 30.8 32.1 38.3 34.6 33.6 32.6 29.8 32.4 21.8 28.8
Notes: a Includes livestock, poultry, beers, processed foods. b Most from adult children employed elsewhere
c Most from husbands working elsewhere d The value of maize retained for own consumption.
30
TABLE 3 COMPARISON OF MAIZE HARVEST, SALES, PURCHASES AND TOTAL HOUSEHOLD
SUPPLY (KG PER CAPITA) AND PERCENT OF BUDGET EXPENDED ON MAIZE BY
INCOME QUARTILES
IQ1=btm IQ2 IQ3 IQ4
Mz Harvest 1986/7 73.2 110.9 146.1 258.9
1990/1 86.8 152.9 228.6 408.3
Mz Sales 1886/7 8.5 3.6 8.5 17.2
1990/1 4.7 17.4 28.4 89.9
Mz Purchases 1986/7 22.8 32.4 34.6 36.8
1990/1 16.9 26.1 29.6 24.7
Total Mz 1986/7 87.4 139.6 172.3 278.4
1990/1 99.0 161.5 229.8 343.1
Signif. (T Test) 0.1815 0.0784 0.0012* 0.1386
% Cash Budget 1986/7 25 23 19 13
Spent on Maize 1990/1 36 24 19 9
31
TABLE 4 MAIZE PRICES, NOMINAL AND REAL (TAMBALA PER KG)
ADMARC LOCAL MARKETS
Consumer Producer Consumer Producer
1986 20 12.2 20 16
1990 Nominal 36 27 47 22
Real* 19 14.5 26.2 11
* Deflator of 0.5353 based on CPI (see text and Table 1)
32
1.It was also a replication of an earlier pattern. The colonial economy was very much structured
as a dual economy with the marketing boards, forerunners of ADMARC, operating largely in the
interests of the estates to the disadvantage of the "native" sector (see, for example, McCracken
1983 on the Native Tobacco Board).
2.Kaluwa points out that the gains are2. modest and warns particularly on the implications of the
large debt burden carried by the country and the need for continued "massive financial inflows"
(p.2).
3.The infant mortality rate was 136.4 in the period 1978-1982 and 134.3 1988-1992 (World
Bank, 1996). Data from the national survey (NSSA) for 1980/1 showed 56% of children under six
years old were stunted, a proportion also found in several detailed local surveys, including the one
reported on in this paper. The most recent figure for stunting, based on 1992 national data, is
49% (World Bank 1996).
4.In order to apply for a tobacco quota, one had to have title to leasehold (or freehold) land.
This regulation thus essentially restricted burley production to estates.
5.Interviewers lived in each of the six village clusters in the area (approximately 15 by 12 miles
total), and were visited every one to two days by a graduate student assistant and periodically by
myself. I carried out the ethnographic and oral historical research with an assistant and lived in
one of the study villages.
NOTES
33
6.The terms "small" and "large" were used in the selection process with villagers in an effort to
select the sample before measuring the fields. Subsequently, the fields were measured and we
found that people's own representations of the size of landholdings are mostly inaccurate as to
precise measurement but usually adequate for assessing relative size. The field measurement
showed that the resulting sample includes families from a wide range of landholdings, from under
half a hectare to over three.
7.The two "missing" months in the first round were August and September. Because these were
after the main harvests and before the next planting season, their loss was less problematic than
other months (though obviously not optimal). The 1986/7 study was funded with a grant from
AID/PPC/PDPR, Washington, and conducted in collaboration with Guillermo Herrera of the
Harvard School of Public Health and with the assistance of Thomas Randolph, then doing
graduate work in Cornell. The 1990/1 study was funded with a grant from AID/Malawi,
supplemented by the World Bank, and conducted with the assistance of Peter Walker, then at
Harvard and currently a graduate student at Berkeley. The author of the paper bears full
responsibility for the analysis and the conclusions do not necessarily reflect those of the funding
agencies, home institution, or collaborators.
8.The overall distribution in both years was 13% had less than 0.7 ha, 52% between 0.7 and 1.5
ha, and 35% more than 1.5 ha. This compares with figures given in the Government of Malawi's
"Statement of Development Policies, 1987--1996" of 35%, 40% and 25% for the respective land
categories.
34
9.Information on both income and expenditures was collected from all the adults who were
responsible for managing a household. The quality of the data is very high, due to the monthly
collection method, coverage of all adult earners, and the fact that the interviewers resided in the
villages and, hence, became very knowledgeable about what people were doing. As a result, we
do not use expenditures as a proxy for income but use each independently.
10.The Zomba data also show the same skewed distribution as the sites in other regions
surveyed by Smale et al., with a positive association between hybrid maize production (as well as
membership of a credit club) and landholding size, income, and the presence of a male "head of
household".
11.This same pattern was been found subsequently in visits during 1993 and 1994. This year
(1995), for the first time, the pattern appears to be changing, but analysis remains for a future
paper.
12.The local market prices were collected monthly during both periods of research in the three
main local markets in the research area. There are no other sources of local prices and I therefore
have no data for the years between 1987 and 1990. It is only in the past year that efforts are being
made by government offices to collect local market prices for key foodstuffs.
13.There were few changes in the following seasons. A recent visit (in 1995) showed more
stores were selling maize in the deficit months, though still in far smaller quantities than the local
35
demand for maize, and than the sales by ADMARC. This is under current study.
14. A critical part of this strategy is the different storage quality of maize varieties: the surplus
farmers sell most of their hybrid maize soon after harvest but store "local" varieties for the deficit
months for food, sale, and for compensating workers. This cannot be discussed further here.
15.The 1990-1 average was 86% of available maize, compared with 70% in 1986-7.
16.There was no significant improvement or deterioration in the mean nutritional status of
children as measured by anthropometry between the two rounds. In both years, approximately
56% of children under six years of age were moderately stunted.

http://www.cid.harvard.edu/hiid/562.pdf